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SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN CANADA

Presidential Address by FRANK H. UNDERHILL
The University of Toronto

"THE reader is about to enter upon the most violent and certainly the most eventful moral struggle that has ever taken place in our North American colonies. . . . That I was sentenced to contend on the soil of America with Democracy, and that if I did not overpower it, it would overpower me, were solemn facts which for some weeks had been perfectly evident to my mind." So wrote Sir Francis Bond Head in his *Narrative*,¹ the famous apologia for the policy of his governorship of Upper Canada. The issue as he saw it, and as his contemporaries in Canada saw it, was not merely whether the British North American colonies were to set up a responsible form of government; it was the much deeper one of whether they were to follow the example of the United States and commit themselves to achieving a democratic form of society. And good Sir Francis appealed with confidence to all right-thinking property-owning Englishmen against what he termed "the insane theory of conciliating democracy" as put into practice by the Colonial Office under the guidance of that "rank republican," Mr. Under-Secretary Stephen. No doubt, if the phrase had been then in use he would have accused Stephen, and Lord Glenelg and Lord Durham, of appeasement. In rebuttal of Durham's criticisms of the Upper Canada Family Compact he wrote:

It appears from Lord Durham's own showing that this "Family Compact" which his Lordship deems it so advisable that the Queen should destroy, is nothing more nor less than that "social fabric" which characterizes every civilized community in the world. . . . "The bench," "the magistrates," "the clergy," "the law," "the landed proprietors," "the bankers," "the native-born inhabitants," and "the supporters of the Established Church" [these were the social groups which Durham had defined as composing the Family Compact] form just as much "*a family compact*" in England as they do in Upper Canada, and just as much in Germany as they do in England. . . . The "*family compact*" of Upper Canada is composed of those members of its society who, either by their abilities and character, have been honoured by the confidence of the executive government, or who by their industry and intelligence, have amassed wealth. The party, I own, is comparatively a small one; but to put the multitude at the top and the few at the bottom is a radical reversion of the pyramid of society which every reflecting man must foresee can end only by its downfall.²

Sir Francis's statement is as clear and as trenchant an enunciation of the anti-democratic conservative political philosophy of his day as could be quoted from the American conservatives who were fighting Jacksonian Democracy at this same time or from the English conservatives who were fighting the Reform Bill or Chartism. As we all know, this "moral struggle" over the

¹Sir Francis Bond Head, *A Narrative* (London, 1839), 64.

²*Ibid.*, 464.

fundamental principles on which society should be based, which Sir Francis correctly discerned as representing the real meaning of the Canadian party strife of the eighteen-thirties, was to be decided against him and his tory friends. The century since his *Narrative* was published has been, in the English-speaking world at least, a period of continuously developing liberal and democratic movements. Liberalism has merged into democracy. Today the people of Canada are recovering from the second world war within a generation in defence of democracy. Presumably, considering the sacrifices we have shown ourselves willing to make for the cause, we Canadians cherish passionately the liberal-democratic tradition which is our inheritance from the nineteenth century. Presumably, the growth of liberal-democratic institutions and ideas in our political, economic, and social life is one of the main themes in our Canadian history, just as it certainly is in the history of Great Britain and the United States, the two communities with which we have most intimately shared our experience.

Yet it is a remarkable fact that in the great debate of our generation, the debate which has been going on all over the Western World about the fundamental values of liberalism and democracy, we Canadians have taken very little part. We talk at length of the status which our nation has attained in the world. We have shown in two great wars that we can produce soldiers and airmen and sailors second to none. We have organized our productive resources so energetically as to make ourselves one of the main arsenals and granaries of democracy. We have achieved political autonomy and economic maturity. But to the discussion of those deep underlying intellectual, moral and spiritual issues which have made such chaos of the contemporary world we Canadians are making very little contribution.

Our Confederation was achieved at the very time in the nineteenth century when a reaction was beginning to set in against the liberal and democratic principles which, springing from eighteenth-century Enlightenment, had seemed up to that moment to be winning ever fresh victories. The liberal nationalism of the early part of the century was beginning to turn into something sinister, the passionate, exclusive, irrational, totalitarian nationalism that we know today. The optimistic belief in human equality and perfectibility was beginning to be undermined by new knowledge about man provided by the researches of biologists and psychologists. At the same time technological developments in mass production industries were building up a new social pyramid with a few owners and managers at the top and the mass of exploited workers at the bottom; and new techniques of mass propaganda still further emphasized this division of mankind into *élite* and masses. The freedom which our Victorian ancestors thought was slowly broadening down from precedent to precedent seemed to become more and more unreal under the concentrated pressure of capitalistic big business or of the massive bureaucratic state. In such surroundings, the liberal spirit does not flourish. And the more reflective minds of our day have been acutely aware that the mere winning of military victories under banners labelled "liberty" or "democracy" does not carry us very far in the solving of our deeper problems.

Canada is caught up in this modern crisis of liberalism as are all other national communities. But in this world-debate about the values of our civilization the Canadian voice is hardly heard. Who ever reads a Canadian book? What Canadian books are there on these problems? What have we had to say about them that has attracted the attention of our contemporaries

or has impressed itself upon their imagination? In the world of ideas we do not yet play a full part. We are still colonial. Our thinking is still derivative. Like other peoples Canadians have of late expended a good deal of misdirected energy in endeavours to export goods without importing other goods in return. But we continue to import ideas without trying to develop an export trade in this field. We are in fact, as I have said, colonial. For our intellectual capital we are still dependent upon a continuous flow of imports from London, New York, and Paris, not to mention Moscow and Rome. It is to be hoped that we will continue to raise our intellectual standards by continuing to import from these more mature centres, and that we will never try to go in for intellectual autarchy. But international commerce in ideas as well as in goods should be a two-way traffic at least, and preferably it should be multilateral.

Incidentally, it is worth remarking in passing that one sign of this colonialism in our intellectual world is to be seen in the present state of Canadian historiography. The guild of Canadian historians confine their activities very largely to the writing of studies in local national history. South of the border American historians have long been demonstrating their intellectual equality by pouring out books on English and European and world history as well as on local subjects. But how little of this kind of research and writing has been done in Canada! During the past year we have lost one of our most distinguished colleagues, in the person of Professor Charles Norris Cochrane; and his book on *Christianity and Classical Culture* is a notable example of the sort of thing I mean. But one cannot think of many cases like this, in which we have asserted our full partnership in the civilization of our day by Canadian writing upon the great subjects of permanent and universal interest.

* * *

Now it seems to me—and this is more or less the main theme of the present rambling discursive paper—that this intellectual weakness of Canada is a quality which shows itself through all our history. In particular it is to be discerned in that process of democratization which is the most important thing that has happened to us, as to other kindred peoples, during the last hundred years. When we compare ourselves with Britain and the United States there is one striking contrast. Those two countries, since the end of the eighteenth century, have abounded in prophets and philosophers who have made articulate the idea of a liberal and equalitarian society. Their political history displays also a succession of practical politicians who have not merely performed the functions of manipulating and manoeuvring masses of men and groups which every politician performs, but whose careers have struck the imagination of both contemporaries and descendants as symbolizing certain great inspiring ideas. We in Canada have produced few such figures. Where are the classics in our political literature which embody our Canadian version of liberalism and democracy? Our party struggles have never been raised to the higher intellectual plane at which they become of universal interest by the presence of a Canadian Jefferson and a Canadian Hamilton in opposing parties. We have had no Canadian Burke or Mill to perform the social function of the political philosopher in action. We have had no Canadian Carlyle or Ruskin or Arnold to ask searching questions about the ultimate

values embodied in our political or economic practice. We lack a Canadian Walt Whitman or Mark Twain to give literary expression to the democratic way of life. The student in search of illustrative material on the growth of Canadian political ideas during the great century of liberalism and democracy has to content himself mainly with a collection of extracts from more or less forgotten speeches and pamphlets and newspaper editorials. Whatever urge may have, at any time, possessed any Canadian to philosophize upon politics did not lead to much writing whose intrinsic worth helped to preserve it in our memory.

At least this is true of us English-speaking Canadians. Our French-speaking fellow citizens have shown a much greater fondness and capacity for ideas in politics than we have; but their writings, being in another language, have hardly penetrated into our English-Canadian consciousness.

We early repudiated the philosophy of the Manchester School; but in the long history of our Canadian "National Policy" it is difficult to find any Canadian exposition of the anti-Manchester ideas of a national economy, written by economist, business man, or politician, which has impressed itself upon us as worthy of preservation. Our history is full of agrarian protest movements, but the ordinary Canadian would be stumped if asked to name any representative Canadian philosopher of agrarianism. And the most notable illustration of this poverty of our politics at the intellectual level is to be found in the fact that while we were the pioneers in one of the great liberal achievements of the nineteenth century—the experiment of responsible government, which transformed the British Empire into the Commonwealth, and which has thrown fresh light in our own day on the possibility of reconciling nationalism with a wider international community—even in this field, in which our practical contribution was so great, there has arisen since the days of Joseph Howe no Canadian prophet of the idea of the Commonwealth whose writings seem inspiring or even readable to wider circles than those of professional historians.

This seeming incapacity for ideas, or rather this habit of carrying on our communal affairs at a level at which ideas never quite emerge into an articulate life of their own, has surely impoverished our Canadian politics. Every teacher of Canadian history has this fact brought home to him with each fresh batch of young students whom he meets. How reluctant they are to study the history of their own country! How eagerly they show their preference for English or European or (if they get the chance) for American history! For they instinctively feel that when they get outside of Canada they are studying the great creative seminal ideas that have determined the character of our modern world, whereas inside Canada there seem to be no ideas at issue of permanent or universal significance at all. I can myself still remember the thrill of appreciation with which as a university freshman I heard a famous professor of Greek³ remark that our Canadian history is as dull as ditchwater, and our politics is full of it. Of course there is a considerable amount of ditchwater in the politics of all countries; my professor was more conscious of it in Canada because he missed here those ideas which he found in the politics of classical Greece. And as far as I have been able to observe, young students of this present generation are still repelled by

³Maurice Hutton, Principal of University College in the University of Toronto.

Canadian history because they find in it little more than the story of a half-continent of material resources over which a population of some twelve million economic animals have spread themselves in a not too successful search for economic wealth.

* * *

It will of course be said in answer to these mournful reflections upon the low quality of intellectual activity in Canadian politics that they are exaggerated and extreme. So I should like to buttress my position by referring to observations made at different times by students from the outer world upon the nature and quality of Canadian party politics. The name of Goldwin Smith⁴ comes to mind at once. He watched and studied Canadian politics continuously from the early eighteen-seventies to the early nineteen-hundreds, applying to them the standards of an English Manchester liberal; and his verdict was adverse. He felt that Canadians after 1867 had failed to rise to their intellectual opportunities, that they had failed to grasp in their imagination the potentialities of the new nationality, that their political parties operated only to debase and pervert the discussion of public issues, and that in the absence of great guiding inspiring ideas Canadian national statesmanship had degenerated into a sordid business of bargaining and manoeuvring among narrow selfish particularist interest groups. He took a certain sardonic pleasure in noting the skill with which Macdonald played this low game as contrasted with the clumsiness with which Mackenzie and Blake played it; but he could see in it nothing but a low game after all. The obvious reply to Goldwin Smith is that he was embittered by the disappointment of his own ambitions and that his testimony is therefore to be discounted. But no one who studies the politics of the period 1867 to 1914 can be convinced that this is a wholly satisfactory defence against his criticisms.

At the period of the turn of the century, we were studied by another overseas observer who has given us the most penetrating and illuminating analysis of our politics that has yet been written by anyone, native or foreign. In 1906 André Siegfried published his book, *The Race Question in Canada*, and set forth the somewhat paradoxical conclusion that, while (to quote his opening sentence) "Canadian politics are a tilting ground for impassioned rivalries," they operated so as to suppress the intellectual vitality which would be the natural result of such a situation.

Originally formed to subserve a political idea, these parties are often to be found quite detached from the principles which gave them birth, and with their own self-preservation as their chief care and aim. Even without a programme, they continue to live and thrive, tending to become mere associations for the securing of power; their doctrines serving merely as weapons, dulled or sharpened, grasped as occasion arises for use in the fight. . . . This fact deprives the periodical appeals to the voting public of the importance which they should have. . . . Whichever side succeeds, the country it is well known will be governed in just the same way; the only difference will be in the *personnel* of the Government. That is how things go save when some great wave of feeling sweeps over the Dominion, submerging all the pigmies of politics in its flood.

⁴See F. H. Underhill, "Goldwin Smith" (*University of Toronto Quarterly*, II, Apr., 1933).

In the intervals between these crises... it is not the party that subserves the idea, it is the idea that subserves the party. Canadian statesmen... undoubtedly take longer views. They seem, however, to stand in fear of great movements of public opinion, and to seek to lull them rather than to encourage them and bring them to fruition. Thus, deliberately and not from short-sightedness, they help to promote the state of things which I have described. The reason for this attitude is easy to comprehend. Canada, with its rival creeds and races, is a land of fears and jealousies and conflicts... Let a question involving religion or nationality be once boldly raised... and the elections will be turned into real political fights, passionate and sincere. This is exactly what is dreaded by far-sighted and prudent politicians, whose duty it is to preserve the national equilibrium... They exert themselves, therefore, to prevent the formation of homogeneous parties, divided according to creed or race or class. The purity of political life suffers from this, but perhaps the very existence of the Federation is the price. The existing parties are thus entirely harmless. The Liberals and Conservatives differ very little really in their opinions upon crucial questions, and their views as to administration are almost identical... They have come to regard each other without alarm: they know each other too well and resemble each other too closely.⁵

Mr. J. A. Hobson, the well-known English economist, published a little book about Canada at almost the same moment as M. Siegfried—*Canada To-day*, which appeared in 1906. It also gives a rather unfavourable impression of Canadian politics, although the author's main interest was in the economic question of protection and the British preference.

More recently another great student of politics from overseas has given us his observations upon Canada. James Bryce had played an active part in the politics of his own country, had made himself intimately acquainted with the American Commonwealth, and applied to Canada a mind that was deeply learned in comparative politics. In his book, *Modern Democracies*, published in 1921, he devoted some chapters to the working of Canadian democracy.

Since 1867 the questions which have had the most constant interest for the bulk of the nation are . . . those which belong to the sphere of commercial and industrial progress, the development of the material resources of the country . . . —matters scarcely falling within the lines by which party opinion is divided, for the policy of *laissez faire* has few adherents in a country which finds in governmental action or financial support to private enterprises the quickest means of carrying out every promising project. . . . The task of each party is to persuade the people that in this instance its plan promises quicker and larger results, and that it is fitter to be trusted with the work. Thus it happens that general political principles . . . count for little in politics, though ancient habit requires them to be invoked. Each party tries to adapt itself from time to time to whatever practical issue may arise. Opportunism is inevitable, and the charge of inconsistency, though incessantly bandied to and fro, is lightly regarded. . . . In Canada ideas are not needed to make parties,

⁵André Siegfried, *The Race Question in Canada* (English translation, London, 1907), 141-3.

for these can live by heredity. . . . The people show an abounding party spirit when an election day arrives. The constant party struggle keeps their interest alive. But party spirit, so far from being a measure of the volume of political thinking, may even be a substitute for thinking. . . . In every country a game played over material interests between ministers, constituencies and their representatives, railway companies and private speculators is not only demoralizing to all concerned but interferes with the consideration of the great issues of policy on a wise handling of which a nation's welfare depends. Fiscal questions, labour questions, the assumption by the State of such branches of industry as railroads or mines, and the principles it ought to follow in such works as it undertakes—questions like these need wide vision, clear insight, and a firmness that will resist political pressure and adhere to the principles once laid down. These qualities have been wanting, and the people have begun to perceive the want.⁶

* * *

This general failure of our Canadian politics to rise above a mere confused struggle of interest groups has been no doubt due to a variety of causes. In the middle of the twentieth century it is rather too late for us to keep harping on the pioneer frontier character of the Canadian community as the all sufficient answer to criticism. The young American republic which included a Jefferson and a Hamilton and a Franklin, not to mention many of their contemporaries of almost equal intellectual stature, was a smaller and more isolated frontier community than Canada has been for a long time; but it was already by the end of the eighteenth century the peer of Europe in the quality of its political thinking and was recognized as such. We still remain colonial in the middle of the twentieth century.

One reason for our backwardness, and the reason which interests me most at the moment, has been the weakness of the Radical and Reform parties of the Left in our Canadian history. A healthy society will consist of a great majority massed a little to the right and a little to the left of centre, with smaller groups of strong conservatives and strong radicals out on the wings. If these minority groups are not present in any significant force to provide a perpetual challenge to the majority, the conservatives and liberals of the centre are likely to be a pretty flabby lot, both intellectually and morally.

For this weakness of the Left in Canada, the ultimate explanation would seem to be that we never had an eighteenth century of our own. The intellectual life of our politics has not been periodically revived by fresh drafts from the invigorating fountain of eighteenth-century Enlightenment. In Catholic French Canada the doctrines of the rights of man and of Liberty Equality Fraternity were rejected from the start, and to this day they have never penetrated, save surreptitiously or spasmodically. The mental climate of English Canada in its early formative years was determined by men who were fleeing from the practical application of the doctrines that all men are born equal and are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights among which are life liberty and the pursuit of happiness. All effective liberal and radical democratic movements in the nineteenth century have had their roots in this fertile eighteenth-century soil. But our ancestors made the great refusal

⁶James Bryce, *Modern Democracies* (New York, 1921), I, 471-505. Bryce's analysis was based mainly upon observations made before World War I.

in the eighteenth century. In Canada we have no revolutionary tradition; and our historians, political scientists, and philosophers have assiduously tried to educate us to be proud of this fact. How can such a people expect their democracy to be dynamic as the democracies of Britain and France and the United States have been?

Then also it has never been sufficiently emphasized that our first great democratic upheaval a hundred years ago was a failure. In the United States, Jacksonian Democracy swept away most of the old aristocratic survivals and made a strong attack upon the new plutocratic forces. The Federalists disappeared; and their successors, the Whigs, suffered a series of defeats at the hands of triumphant Democracy. But the Canadian version of Jacksonian Democracy represented by the movements of Papineau and Mackenzie was discredited by the events of their abortive rebellions. And Canada followed the example of Britain rather than of the United States. Responsible government was a British technique of government which took the place of American elective institutions. Our historians have been so dazzled by its success that they have failed to point out that the real radicals in Canada were pushed aside in the eighteen-forties by the respectable professional and property-owning classes, the "Moderates" as we call them; just as the working-class radicals in Britain, without whose mass-agitation the Reform Bill could not have been passed, were pushed aside after 1832 for a long generation of middle class Whig rule. The social pyramid in Canada about which Sir Francis Bond Head was so worried in 1839 was *not* upset; and after a decade of excitement it was clear that the Reform government was only a business men's government. When Baldwin and Lafontaine were succeeded by Hincks and Morin this was so clear that new radical movements emerged both in Upper and in Lower Canada, the Grits and les Rouges.

Now in North America the essence of all effective liberal movements—I assume in this paper that liberalism naturally leads towards democracy—must be that they are attacks upon the domination of the community by the business man. This was what the Democratic party of Jackson and Van Buren was. As Mr. Schlesinger has recently been pointing out in his brilliant book, *The Age of Jackson*,⁷ the effectiveness of the Jacksonians was due to the fact that their leading ideas about the relations of business and government came primarily not from the frontier farmers of the west but from the democratic labour movements in the big cities and their sympathizers among the urban intellectuals. Jefferson had been mainly interested in political democracy; Jackson tackled the problem of economic democracy in a society becoming increasingly industrialized. The social equality of the frontier has never given agrarian democrats a sufficient understanding of the problems of a society divided into the rich and the poor of an urban civilization. Here we seem to come upon an important explanation for the weakness of all Canadian radical movements from the eighteen-thirties to the end of the century. They were too purely agrarian. The only force that could ultimately overcome the Hamiltonians must, like them, have its base of operations in the cities.

Mr. Schlesinger has also pointed out that American conservatism was immensely strengthened when it transformed itself from Federalism to Whiggism. In the eighteen-thirties, as he puts it, it changed from broadcloth to homespun. "The metamorphosis revived it politically but ruined it intel-

⁷A. M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Age of Jackson* (Boston, 1945).

lectually. The Federalists had thought about society in an intelligent and hard-boiled way. The Whigs, in scuttling Federalism, replaced it by a social philosophy founded, not on ideas, but on subterfuges and sentimentalities."⁸ But the Whigs learned the techniques of demagoguery from the Jacksonians and set out to guide the turbulent new American democracy along lines that would suit the purposes of business. Surely we should remark that exactly the same metamorphosis took place just a little later in Canadian conservatism. The clear-cut anti-democratic philosophy of Sir Francis Bond Head and the Family Compact Tories was as obsolete and out-of-place in the bustling Canada of the eighteen-fifties as Federalism had been in the United States in the eighteen-twenties. The Macdonald-Cartier Liberal-Conservative party was American Whiggism with a British title. (And no doubt the British label on the outside added considerably to the potency of the American liquor inside the bottle.) The Liberal-Conservatives had made the necessary demagogic adjustments to the democratic spirit of the times; they had a policy of economic expansion to be carried out under the leadership of business with the assistance of government which was an almost exact parallel to Clay's Whig "American System." But there was no Jackson and no Jacksonian "kitchen cabinet" in Canada to counter this Liberal-Conservatism.

The Grits and les Rouges did not quite meet the needs of the situation. What Rougeism, with its body of ideas from the revolutionary Paris of 1848, might have accomplished we cannot say; for it soon withered under the onslaught of the Church. Grittism in Upper Canada was originally a movement inspired by American ideas, as its early fondness for elective institutions and its continuing insistence on "Rep by Pop" show. But Brown's accession tended to shift the inspiration in the British direction. Brown himself became more and more sentimentally British as he grew older. Moreover, as publisher of the *Globe*, he was a business man on the make, and Toronto was a growing business centre. As Toronto grew, and as the *Globe* grew, the original frontier agrarianism of the Grits was imperceptibly changed into something subtly different. As early as January 3, 1857 the *Globe* was declaring: "The schemes of those who have announced that Toronto must aspire no higher than to be 'the Capital of an agricultural District' must be vigorously met and overcome." Brown defeated the radicals from the Peninsula in the great Reform convention of 1859, and by 1867 Grit leaders were more and more becoming urban business and professional men. A party which contained William McMaster of the Bank of Commerce and John Macdonald, the big wholesale merchant, was not likely to be very radical. Oliver Mowat, a shrewd cautious lawyer, was about to take over the direction of its forces in Ontario provincial politics; and its rising hope in the federal sphere was Edward Blake, the leader of the Ontario equity bar. Moreover, as Brown's unhappy experiences with his printers in 1872 were to show, the Reform party under *Globe* inspiration found difficulty in adjusting itself to the new ideas which industrialism was encouraging in the minds of the working class. Blake and Mowat, who dominated Canadian Liberal thinking after Brown, were not American democrats or radicals so much as English Whigs in their temperament, their training, and their political philosophy. For political equality and liberty they were

⁸*Ibid.*, 279.

prepared to fight; economic equality did not move them very deeply. And the same might be said about Laurier who succeeded them.⁹

Another point worth noting is the effect of British influences in slowing down all movements throughout the nineteenth century in the direction of the democratization of politics and society. Inevitably, because of geographical proximity and the mutual interpenetration of the lives of the two North American communities, the urge towards greater democracy was likely to appear in Canada as an American influence; and since the survival of Canada as a separate entity depended on her not being submerged under an American flood, such influences were fought as dangerous to our Canadian ethos. Sir Francis Bond Head and the Tories of his time habitually used the words "democratic" and "republican" as interchangeable. Every Canadian movement of the Left in those days and since has had to meet accusations of Americanism, and in proving its sound British patriotism it has been apt to lose a good deal of its Leftism. Canadian Methodism, for example, widely influenced by its American connections, was on the Reform side of politics until the Ryerson arrangement in the eighteen-thirties with the British Wesleyans put it on the other side.

When we get down to the Confederation period no one can fail to see how markedly the British influence gives a conservative tone to the whole generation of the Fathers. Later Canadians have had to reflect frequently on the sad fact that the "new nationality" was very imperfectly based upon any deep popular feeling. It has occurred to many of them, with the wisdom of hindsight, that Confederation would have been a much stronger structure had the Quebec Resolutions received the ratification of the electorate in each colony in accordance with American precedents. But the British doctrine of legislative sovereignty operated to override all suggestions that the people should be consulted; and Canadian nationality has always been weak in its moral appeal because "We the People" had no formal part in bringing it into being.

Similarly British example was effective in delaying the arrival of manhood suffrage in Canada till toward the end of the century, though the Americans had adopted it in the early part of the century. The ballot did not become part of Canadian law until sanctioned by British precedent in the eighteen-seventies. The Chancery Court which had long been a favourite object of radical attack in Upper Canada remained intact until jurists of the Mother Country had amalgamated the equity and common law jurisdictions there. And that strange constitutional device, the Canadian Senate, with its life appointees, was slipped into our constitution with the plea that appointment by the Crown

⁹On the Liberal party see further F. H. Underhill's articles on:

- (1) "Some Aspects of Upper Canadian Political Opinion in the Decade before Confederation" (*Canadian Historical Association Report*, 1927).
- (2) "Canada's Relations with the Empire as seen by the *Toronto Globe*, 1857-67" (*Canadian Historical Review*, XX, June, 1929).
- (3) "The Development of National Political Parties in Canada" (*Canadian Historical Review*, XVI, Dec., 1935).
- (4) "Edward Blake, the Liberal Party and Unrestricted Reciprocity" (*Canadian Historical Association Report*, 1939).
- (5) "Edward Blake and Canadian Liberal Nationalism" (in R. Flenley, *Essays in Canadian History*, Toronto, 1939).
- (6) "Political Ideas of the Upper Canada Reformers, 1867-78" (*Canadian Historical Association Report*, 1942).
- (7) "The Canadian Party System in Transition" (*Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, IX, Aug., 1943).

was the British way of doing things. John A. Macdonald must have had his tongue in his cheek when he presented this Senate as a protector of provincial rights, its members being appointed by the head of the very federal government against which provincial rights were to be protected. In the privacy of the Quebec Conference, when they were constructing the second chamber, he had remarked to his fellow delegates: "The rights of the minority must be protected, and the rich are always fewer in number than the poor." One wonders what George Brown or Oliver Mowat, the Grit representatives, must have said at this point, or whether the secretary, who caught Macdonald's immortal sentence, failed to take down their comments. Generally speaking, the notable fact is that in all this era of constitution making, and of constitution testing in the decades just after 1867, the voice of democratic radicalism was so weak.

On the other hand, when Britain began to grow really democratic towards the end of the nineteenth century, her example seemed to have little effect upon Canadian liberalism. The two most significant features in internal British politics since the eighteen-eighties have been the rise of industrial labour to a share of power both in the economic and in the political field, and the growing tendency towards collectivism in social policy. We are only beginning to enter upon this stage of development in Canada today. Throughout it has been the conservative trends in English life that we have usually copied. And one of the few sources of innocent amusement left in the present tortured world is to watch the growing embarrassment of all those professional exponents in Canada of the English way of doing things, now that the English way threatens to become less conservative.

* * *

Of course the great force, by far the most important force, weakening liberal and democratic tendencies in Canada after 1867 was the rush to exploit the resources of a rich half continent. This was the age in American history which Parrington has called "The Great Barbecue."

The spirit of the frontier was to flare up in a huge buccaneering orgy. . . . Congress had rich gifts to bestow—in lands, tariffs, subsidies, favors of all sorts; and when influential citizens had made their wishes known to the reigning statesmen, the sympathetic politicians were quick to turn the government into the fairy godmother the voters wanted it to be. A huge barbecue was spread to which all presumably were invited. Not quite all, to be sure; inconspicuous persons, those who were at home on the farm or at work in the mills and offices were overlooked. . . . But all the important people, leading bankers and promoters and business men, received invitations. . . . To a frontier people what was more democratic than a barbecue, and to a paternal age what was more fitting than that the state should provide the beeves for roasting? Let all come and help themselves. . . . But unfortunately what was intended to be jovially democratic was marred by displays of plebeian temper. Suspicious commoners with better eyes than manners discovered the favoritism of the waiters, and drew attention to their own meager helpings and the heaped-up plates of the more favored guests.¹⁰

¹⁰Vernon Louis Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought*, Volume III, *The Beginnings of Critical Realism in America* (New York, 1930), 23.

Parrington's description fits the Canadian situation also, though our barbecue did not get going in full force till after 1896. In the first generation after Confederation, Canadian Liberals wandered mostly in the deserts of opposition because they could not produce any policy which could match in attractiveness the economic expansionism of the Conservatives. They criticized the extravagant pace of Conservative policy, they denounced the corruption of the Macdonald system, they pointed with true prophecy to the danger of building up great business corporations like the C.P.R. which might become more powerful than the national government itself. But the spirit of the Great Barbecue was too strong for them. And when finally they did come into office under Laurier they gave up the struggle. The effort to control this social force of the business-man-on-the-make was abandoned. Their moral abhorrence of the methods of Macdonald gave place with a striking rapidity to an ever deepening cynicism. "You say we should at once set to reform the tariff," Laurier wrote to his chief journalistic supporter after the victory of 1896, "This I consider impossible except after ample discussion with the business men." And until he made the fatal mistake of reciprocity in 1911, the Liberal government was conducted on the basis of ample discussion with the business men.

It is easy to say that this was inevitable in the circumstances of the time. And indeed the remarkable fact about the Canada of the turn of the century is the slowness of other social groups in acquiring political consciousness and organizing movements of revolt against government by business men. American populism was only faintly reflected amongst Canadian farmers until the nineteen-twenties. The Progressive movement which helped to bring Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson to the White House seemed to cause few repercussions north of the border. Everybody in Canada in those days was reading the popular American magazines as they carried on the spectacular campaigns of the muckraking era against the trusts. But this fierce attack next door to us against the domination of society by big business stirred few echoes in Canadian public life. Our Canadian millionaires continued to die in the odour of sanctity. Canadian liberalism in the Laurier era was equally little affected by the contemporary transformation of the British Liberal party into a great radical social-reform movement.

What seems especially to have struck visitors from across the ocean was the absence of any effective labour movement in Canadian politics. Both André Siegfried from France and J. A. Hobson from England remarked upon this phenomenon in the books which they published in 1906. "When the workers of Canada wake up," said Hobson, "they will find that Protection is only one among the several economic fangs fastened in their 'corpus vile' by the little group of railroad men, bankers, lumber men and manufacturing monopolists who own their country."¹¹

The Great Barbecue was still in full swing when these observers studied Canada. As I have said already, liberalism in North America, if it is to mean anything concrete, must mean an attack upon the domination of institutions and ideas by the business man. In this sense Canadian liberalism revived after 1918, to produce results with which we are all familiar. Among those results, however, we can hardly include any advance in the clarity or the realism of the liberal thinking of the so-called Liberal party, however

¹¹J. A. Hobson, *Canada Today* (London, 1906), 47.

much we may be compelled to admire its dexterity in the practical arts of maintaining itself in office. In the realm of political ideas its performance may be correctly described as that of going on and on and on, and up and up and up. But I am now touching upon present-day controversies. And, whatever latitude may be allowed to the political scientist, we all know that the historian cannot deal with current events without soiling the purity of his scientific objectivity.

* * *

In the meantime Canadian historians must continue to study and to write the history of their country. I have devoted these rambling remarks to the subject of political ideas because I have a feeling that Canadian historiography has come to the end of an epoch. For the past twenty or thirty years, most of the best work in Canadian history has been in the economic field. How different groups of Canadians made their living, how a national economy was built up, how the Canadian economy was integrated into a world economy, these topics have been industriously investigated; and we have been given thereby a new and a deeper understanding of the basis of our national life. The climax in this school of activity was reached with the publication of the Carnegie series on Canadian-American relations and of the various volumes connected with the Rowell-Sirois Report.

The best work in the Carnegie collection is for the most part on the economic side. And the volume, published during the past year, which crowns the series—Professor Bartlet Brebner's *North American Triangle*—can hardly be praised too highly for the skill and insight with which the author brings out the pattern of the joint Canadian-American achievement in settling the continent and exploiting its economic resources, and with which he explains the practical working of our peculiar North American techniques and forms of organization. But it is significant that he has little to say about the intellectual history of the two peoples, about education, religion, and such subjects; and especially about the idea of democracy as understood in North America. Materials from research on the intellectual history of Canada were not, as a matter of fact, available to him in any quantity. Volume I of the Rowell-Sirois Report is likewise a brilliant and, within its field, a convincing exercise in the economic interpretation of Canadian history. But it is abstract history without names or real flesh-and-blood individuals, the history of puppets who dance on strings pulled by obscure world forces which they can neither understand nor control; it presents us with a ghostly ballet of bloodless economic categories.

The time seems about due for a new history-writing which will attempt to explain the ideas in the heads of Canadians that caused them to act as they did, their philosophy, why they thought in one way at one period and in a different way at another period. Perhaps when we settle down to this task we shall discover that our ancestors had more ideas in their heads than this paper has been willing to concede them. At any rate, we shall then be able to understand more clearly the place of the Canadian people in the civilization of the liberal-democratic century which lies behind us.

TENDENCIES IN FOURTEENTH-CENTURY CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

By BERTIE WILKINSON
The University of Toronto

No century of English history is in greater need of revision than the fourteenth. The key-note in the modern interpretation was struck by Bishop Stubbs and he was frankly unsympathetic. The century seemed to lack grandeur, the inspiration of great causes and movements. It was not a period of great achievements; it was mainly the working out of ideas which had already triumphed, in principle, in the century before. Politics were, Stubbs believed, as Professor Galbraith has recently repeated, not based on principles, but on personalities. The dominant motives of the century were selfishness and pride.

This view has been generally accepted. Modern writers have added some details but have not questioned the main outline. Professor T. F. Tout and Mr. J. C. Davies suggested a new motive for constitutional struggles, in a clash of systems of government, the "household" system on the one hand, the instrument of the king's prerogative, and the offices "of state" on the other. But this new motive for discord does not provide a great constitutional issue for the fourteenth century comparable to that of the thirteenth; and in any case, its existence, at least in the terms propounded by Tout and Davies, has been questioned, even for the reign of Edward II. No other modern writer has made any significant deviation from Stubbs's tradition. Figgis's stress on the beginnings of Divine Right under Richard II has not been worked out in detail, and rests on a slender foundation. The latest biographer of Richard has largely renounced the idea of finding logic and principles underlying the political struggles of that most important period. The fourteenth century largely remains where Stubbs left it. It was a great age of transition, but its main contribution to the constitution was apparently the provision of somewhat dubious precedents and arguments for the opposition to Charles I.

Despite this, material has been gathered in recent years for some revaluation of the period. There has been a tendency to correct Stubbs's preoccupation with the Commons as the defenders of the nation's liberties, and to give more attention to the royalist case, helped by work on the coronation by Professor Schramm, and on the coronation oath. The problem of war, as a factor in political and constitutional evolution, has received some attention, following the basic work of Dr. Morris. The great problem of the evolution of bureaucracy has been presented in T. F. Tout's *magnum opus*, in the work of some of his students, and by the co-operative Anglo-American project begun by the late Professor Willard. Political theory, given so little prominence by Stubbs, has been added to by R. W. and A. J. Carlyle, C. H. McIlwain, and Passarin D'Entrèves. There have been specialized studies of almost every great political and constitutional crisis of the century, beginning with the accession of Edward II in 1308 and ending with the deposition of Richard II in 1399. All this work has em-

phasized the importance and the stubbornness of the problems of the period. These raised issues which, though partly unperceived by Stubbs, and obscured by personalities and cross-purposes, seem to have been as important as any in the more famous thirteenth century; and they included the tragic precedents of deposition which left an indelible mark on the constitution. Men did not make such shattering breaks with political tradition as these depositions over differences of small moment. The lines of the future constitution of England were being determined just as much in the fourteenth as in any century of English history.

The problem which has received the greatest attention of all is that of parliament, important for an understanding not only of this century, but of all English history. It is still the most stubborn. A failure to understand its true nature in the fourteenth century may have militated against the efforts of both Stubbs and his successors to grasp the principles at issue in the conflicts of the fourteenth century. Stubbs may have been at fault in accepting the claims of the Commons and of the baronial opposition too much at their face value; modern writers may have been even more at fault in their conception of parliament itself. This conception has dominated all the interpretation of the medieval parliament since the writings of Maitland and McIlwain. It is that of parliament as a court, as the High Court of the Realm. It will be suggested below that this concept lies squarely across the path of any attempt to re-interpret the fourteenth century in the light of modern research. It obscures the true nature of the great developments which occurred between 1376 and 1388, and the new relationship which these created between the ruler and the nation. In fact, it obscures the greatest single contribution which the fourteenth century witnessed to the growth of the English constitution.

These are very dogmatic assertions. Whether or not they are true must, obviously, in the present state of our knowledge, be a matter of opinion. I have given elsewhere my reasons for believing that the modern view of parliament as a court as, for instance, it was reflected in the pages of Professor Pollard, has been carried much too far. If my conclusion on this point is wrong, much that follows here will be erroneous. The assumption behind the argument, in the pages which follow, is not only that the medieval parliament was not in essence a court, and was not simply an extension of the council; it is that parliament, as an institution consisting of king lords and commons, as distinct from the king in his council in his parliament, only gradually acquired the attributes and functions of a court. Not only were its judicial functions not essential and primary, they did not at first exist at all. They did not exist in the thirteenth century, for instance. They were acquired in the fourteenth. They had come to be regarded as the essential qualities of parliament long before the seventeenth century. But that was not because they had always been so. It was the result of a constitutional revolution. Without a knowledge of this revolution, the nature of the evolution both of parliament and of the constitution in the fourteenth century must remain obscure. It is precisely this knowledge which the modern theory of parliament denies us. That is why I venture to set it aside, in the pages which follow, more completely and dogmatically than the present state of our studies really allows. I hope, in due course, to be able to present my reasons fully; meanwhile, a

tentative and exploratory interpretation of the fourteenth century, on the basis of a parliament which was primarily a legislative and political assembly in process of acquiring its judicial functions, may not be entirely out of place.

Parliament then, it may be said dogmatically, began in the thirteenth century as a meeting, a colloquy, a *tractatus*, in which the king and the community discussed and agreed upon, the affairs of the realm. It was also the place of a court; but as *Fleta* put it, *habet enim rex curiam suam in consilio suo in parliamentis suis*. The king had his court in his council in his parliaments, and there transacted much judicial business; but it was business transacted by king and council in parliament, not by parliament itself. It was, *Fleta* said, the court *in the presence of* earls, barons and nobles; and it is surprising how this part of *Fleta's* statement has been ignored. The famous struggles centring on *magnum concilium* or parliament in the thirteenth century were in no way concerned with a High Court of parliament. Their greatest single aim was the establishment, in parliament, of a principle similar to that enunciated in the name of Edward I, that what touches all shall be discussed by all. The supreme constitutional achievement of the century was precisely the achievement of this principle relative to parliament, an achievement which lies, somewhat elusively, at the basis of the Montfortian experiments in government, the royalist restoration of 1266, and the New Monarchy, if I may venture so to call it, of Edward I. The supreme achievement of the thirteenth century was the complete adaptation, to the new and fundamental institution of parliament, of the ancient tradition that government was an act of co-operation between monarch and nation, carried out on a basis of discussion and consent.

The reason why this did not satisfy the fourteenth century also, was not that the core of the medieval political tradition was changing, but that it had to be adapted once more, in the fourteenth century as it had been in the thirteenth, to changing institutions, conditions and needs. Just as the informal methods of discussion appertaining in the twelfth century had proved to be no longer adequate in the thirteenth, so the basis of co-operation set up in the thirteenth proved inadequate in the century which followed. In the age of Henry III it was enough for the magnates to strive for the principle of consultation in parliament, leaving the initiative and directive power entirely to the king. The great Edwardian era of statutes, the beginnings of bureaucracy, and the evolution of council and parliament, gradually made this principle, in such a simple form, inadequate as a basis for the constitution. The practice of co-operation between the king and the nation necessitated a more active and constructive participation in government, at least by the magnates, an influence over policy, over the ministers of the Crown. Whether or not these were obtained, would determine whether the English constitution would evolve, in the later Middle Ages, to express the true medieval concept of limited monarchy, out of which democracy would one day be created, or would evolve, through the steadily increasing powers of the central government, to follow the predominant early modern pattern of absolute rule.

It may have been some dim realization of this tremendous constitutional issue, which lay behind the first, extraordinary, opposition to

Edward II. The barons in 1308 went so far as to impose on their new ruler a promise, in the coronation oath, that he would accept any just laws which his subjects would subsequently elect. This remarkable promise, and the baronial attempts to enforce it, escaped the attention of historians for many generations, and their scope and nature are still obviously a matter of doubt. In the main, it seems certain however, the early opposition to Edward II attempted to begin where the reformers of the thirteenth century left off. They carried to its logical conclusion the idea, derived ultimately from *Magna Carta*, of compelling the king himself to enact their reforms. The fatal weakness of this method was that it relied upon, and extolled, the very sovereignty of the ruler which it was attempting to limit; and this weakness was increasingly apparent as the problem of sovereignty emerged as the paramount constitutional question of the age. The method was condemned by the precedents of Henry III and Edward I's reign. And it did not reach the heart of the problem; for the devices adopted to limit the ruler in previous generations—the cleansing of the king's household, political attacks on the king's servants, temporary control over the king's council—were palliatives for misgovernment, but not cures. They had repeatedly been shown to be such in the history of the past hundred years. They were expedients for imposing checks on the monarch, none of them really valid, each of them liable to frustration, in the end, by the unending resources of the Crown. The coronation oath of 1308 gave the barons the shadow of constitutional reform but the substance still eluded them. Precisely the same objection applied even to the famous Declaration of 1308 arrogating to the barons a right of violent opposition to an unjust king. Despite Fritz Kern's approval of the principle of *Widerstandsrecht* contained in it, this Declaration did, in the last analysis, do no more than attempt to legalize rebellion. Under the English constitution this could never be, at bottom, more than a contradiction in terms. And even legalized revolt did not create a new constitution. That had still to be worked out from the discordant elements of the early fourteenth century.

All this explains why, confronted with such bewildering problems, the early opposition to Edward II was, almost of necessity, blundering and futile. The ingredients for a really successful opposition still lay in the future. They were to be found, in the long run, where they had really existed in the previous century, and where alone they could be discovered again in the fourteenth, in parliament, the key institution in the realm. But the theory and practice of parliament were not yet adequate for a great constitutional step forward. Meanwhile, in the constitutional debates of Edward II, the precedents drawn from the great Edwardian era, were all, ultimately, on the side of the monarch. They were, to put it simply, that the king ruled, and the subjects consented; not, as the opposition to Edward II claimed after 1308, that subjects could impose their regulations and concepts of government on the king. That is why the bulk of the nation was compelled, however unwillingly, to support Edward in his destruction of the baronial opposition, including both the Marcher Lords and Thomas of Lancaster, in 1322, and in his formal enunciation, in the same year, of a great and definitive royalist restoration of the constitution, comparable in importance with that which had ended the Montfortian experiments in reform. This was the famous Statute of York.

Few statutes have been so intensively studied as the Statute of York, and yet it is possible that even now its implications have not become fully apparent. It settled the constitution and influenced constitutional issues as perhaps no other single statute did between 1215 and 1399. It was, in substance, as we should expect, merely a re-statement of the traditions of the great Edwardian era. But, by that very fact, it was reactionary in its results, if not in its intentions; it prohibited all further advance along the lines which had been consistently followed by reformers since 1215. It made the imposition of reforming ordinances on the monarch illegal (thus, incidentally, nullifying the effects of Edward II's new form of coronation oath). It debarred all enactments, by whatever sanction, against the position and powers of the monarch. It restored all initiative in parliamentary legislation into the hands of the king. Thus the attempts of the early fourteenth century to meet the changing conditions of the age, by imposing new definitions restrictions and regulations on the ruler, were brought to an abrupt close. Unless the Statute of York were to be annulled—which would need another revolution and would alienate the Commons who had received, in the statute, a new definition of their place in parliament—future constitutional progress would have to be along different and more constructive and original lines.

This is perhaps the most important single explanation of the tragic step of deposition, which was the next contribution of the fourteenth century to constitutional advance. Deposition was perhaps the only logical reply left for the magnates to the Statute of York. The problem facing Isabella and Mortimer, and the anti-royalist coalition which had supported them in the overthrow of Edward II in 1326, was that not only of preserving the fruits of the revolution, but also of undoing some of the consequences of the royalist reaction of 1322 and finding some basis for stability and concord, in a country torn by dissension and threatened with recurrent civil war. The Statute of York itself invalidated in advance all the concessions which the rebels might wring from the unwilling monarch. Nothing could ensure the permanency of Edward's acceptance of their victory, save the destruction of Edward himself. The logic of their situation forced the rebels of 1326 to the deposition, and eventually to the murder, of the king. But it forced them equally insistently to preserve the monarchy and the forms of the constitution, whilst destroying the monarch. It made the revolution of 1326, like that of 1688, so conservative that it might almost have been devised and carried out by the royalists themselves.

This deposition of a king in 1326, for all practical purposes the first in English history, was inevitably, in spite of its conservatism, a landmark in the evolution of the constitution. In the long run, it had consequences which were not far short of disastrous for the ruler. In one sense, from that moment the history of the modern British monarchy may be said to have begun. But it is probable that nothing like this was intended. The watchword of the revolution of 1326, like that of 1066, was continuity. Strong pressure was used on Edward II to obtain his abdication rather than his deposition, and an indispensable condition of his vacation of the throne was the accession of his son. The whole settlement of 1327-30 was, indeed, one of the great compromises of medieval history. The barons renounced their efforts to impose legislative reforms on the monarch. The monarch

accepted at least the intention and spirit of the old baronial programmes of reform. The Statute of York was not rescinded, but then, neither was the fourth clause of Edward II's coronation oath. Great hostility was shown to Edward II himself, but the monarchy itself which, in the last analysis, he died defending, was left substantially intact. Edward III proclaimed his intention of ruling with the co-operation of his magnates and in no other manner. The settlement of 1327 went back for its inspiration, like the Statute of York, to the great age of Edward I, but with a difference. This time the monarch, not the opposition, had been defeated. There could be no going back entirely to the Edwardian era, or even to the Statute of York. Initiation in legislation was, in fact, tacitly conceded to the subjects after 1327, though it normally took the shape of humble petitions by the Commons, not demands or even requests by the Lords. But, apart from this, there was no great innovation that had immediate consequences. Men did not greatly change the monarchy itself because, contrary to a wide-spread opinion, they never, in medieval England, wanted greatly to change it. Despite the fundamental difference, the restoration of the monarchy by Edward III was singularly like that of his grandfather, Edward I.

It was only challenged once, in the years that followed, in 1340 to 1341, and this was due to transient causes, to the failure of Edward in Flanders, his economic embarrassment and, above all, his quarrel with the government which he had left at home. This quarrel was, so far, unique in English history, in that it was a quarrel of the king with his own servants that brought on a political crisis, not an attack by the magnates on the servants of the king. It is notable for the deep tendencies it revealed, within the apparently stabilized constitution, rather than for what was actually achieved. It shows that the deep constitutional problems which had confronted the nation under Edward II had in no way been settled. The compromise of 1327-30 had served an invaluable purpose in giving England a respite from the ceaseless struggles of the first quarter of the century, but it had, after all, only papered the cracks. The nation was still seeking a better share in the government. Lords and Commons took advantage of Edward's quarrel with John Stratford to demand full ministerial responsibility to parliament. They took an important step towards the impeachment of the next generation, by asking for judgment by the Lords on ministers and offenders against Magna Carta. And if they did not actually impose these concessions on the ruler by a reforming ordinance, such as had been prohibited in 1322, they used their right of petition and their control of the purse to exactly the same end. It is no wonder that Edward III in 1341 and 1343 rescinded the concessions which he had been compelled to make in 1341, earning unduly harsh censure from Bishop Stubbs. These demands of 1341 were a flagrant violation of the settlement of 1327-30. If conceded permanently, they would have undone much of the good which that settlement was achieving, and have plunged the country once more into deep political strife. The nation was not yet ready for the advances for which they stood. But they show beyond any question, how urgent the need for advance was becoming, and how Edward III's well-meant and statesman-like efforts at stability and harmony, on the basis of the Edwardian traditions of government, were in reality little more than an effort to stem the tide of constitutional change.

Despite this, Edward achieved remarkable success in the years which followed 1343, and his achievement has received much less appreciation than it has deserved. His Crecy campaign, his Knights of the Round Table, his Order of the Garter, his Act of Treasons, his anti-papal legislation (reminiscent of the Statute of Carlisle of 1307), his adoption of English in the law courts, all form part of a pattern, at the heart of which lies the concept of the new national monarchy, expressing the unity of the king and the people against all outside influences and governments, a pattern which may fairly be said to anticipate, in many respects, that of Henry VIII. This was a great period of English history, as invaluable for the constitution perhaps, and serving something of the same purpose, as that of the Tudors. It could not stave off the deep political and constitutional crisis which followed, but it gave England fifty years of fair government and stability in which she prepared for further constitutional advance.

The first, tentative step, by Lords and Commons, breaking this period of conciliation and co-operation, was the petition against the king's clerical ministers in 1371. The decisive events came in the adoption of impeachment and appeal against the king's friends and servants, in 1376 to 1388. The causes of the failure of the compromise of Edward III's reign lay partly outside the English kingdom, in the deterioration of foreign affairs. But the most important cause of fall was the growing need for a re-definition of constitutional theory and practice, still anchored, by the Statute of York and the compromise of 1327, to traditions and precedents which went back, in their essence, to the personal monarchy of Henry II. A re-definition was at length made possible and, indeed, inevitable, by circumstances which had not existed at the beginning of the century; above all by changes and developments in the structure and practices of parliament. The rapid development of bureaucracy and the powers of the ruler had made the problem of maintaining the effective co-operation of the nation in government extremely urgent, and had made the question of ministerial responsibility the central problem of the constitution. Social and economic changes had increased the power, political experience, and constitutional understanding, of both Lords and Commons, and strengthened their determination to share in national affairs. Parliament itself had grown to be a great and venerable institution, which had made for itself new customs, and established new precedents. The practice of common petitions had been established and with it the initiative of Lords and Commons in legislation. The co-operation of Lords and Commons had become close and effective; and a point had been reached where the cohesion and experience of the latter could give rise to the office of speaker in 1376, the first recorded speaker in history, to give effect to the consensus of opinion, and make effective demands, outside written bills or petitions, on the king. The Lords too, had vastly enhanced their importance in parliament. On the one hand, they had begun to overshadow the council; on the other, they had established precedents, in 1330 and 1341, for giving judgment in parliament on others as well as their peers. In short, there had emerged, what was entirely lacking in the previous century, and even in the reign of the second Edward, the conditions necessary for the true concept of parliament as a court. It was this fact which enabled men to take another step forward in the practice of the constitution, as suggested below.

Before discussing this, a word may be said of other consequences, no less important for the constitution. The evolution of parliamentary democracy in England was to be achieved largely by a process which has, so far as I am aware, been little studied. This was the process by which men came to think of parliament, not in the medieval fashion, as the king discussing and acting with his Lords and Commons, but as the Lords and Commons acting together and separately from the monarch, claiming indeed to impose their will, in the name of England, on the king. The Lords and Commons claimed, in effect if not in theory, to arrogate part of the ancient functions of parliament to themselves. Exactly how this claim grew in England, I am uncertain. Unless I am mistaken, it had made no impression on the theory of the constitution as late as the time of Sir Thomas Smith. Yet it seems likely that its first beginnings must be sought long before the second half of the sixteenth century. It seems certain that the emergence of the concept of the High Court of parliament, in which the Lords were the judges and the Commons could be the accusers, and in which, on occasions, the functions of the king were relegated to the background, contributed powerfully towards this development. And this development was, in the last analysis, as important as the development of the High Court of parliament itself. Its first stages formed part of a great but obscure parliamentary revolution in the fourteenth century, which was as important as that which occurred in any other period, not excepting, perhaps, even that of the Stuarts. At the heart of this revolution, however, without which the rest would hardly have been possible, was the emergence of parliament as a court. Instead of the significant process being, as Pollard imagined, the disappearance of the judicial functions of the assembly in favour of the legislative, the process was almost exactly the reverse. It was this fact which made possible the political revolution of 1376 to 1388 which we may now turn to discuss.

To break the constitutional deadlock of the fourteenth century—for it was a deadlock, however much this fact was disguised by a willingness of both king and nation to compromise—men turned, in 1376 to 1388, from the older, legislative aspect of parliament, to the newer, judicial aspect. They did this in the famous processes of impeachment and appeal. These involved the idea of attacking the king's ministers in parliament, not by compelling the king to pass enactments exiling or punishing them, as the outcome of purely political opposition, but by compelling him to dismiss and punish them as a result of a formal judicial process in a court of law, in parliament that is, the High Court of the Realm. This put the attacks on the king's ministers on a new basis, the basis of law. The opposition could claim to act, even if its claim could be, and was, challenged by the king, within the bounds of the constitution even as defined by the Statute of York. The magnates no longer, in 1376, 1386, and 1388, claimed the privilege of legal revolt, though they did invoke the new precedent of deposition. They broke away from the feudal *Widerstandsrecht* as a basis of opposition, and moved forward to a basis of parliamentary action based, not on legislation, but on law. They sought their old objective of a share in the control over the king's ministers by new and more modern methods. For the first time in English history they made their opposition to the monarch turn, not on rights or custom or the unwritten

feudal compact, but on the law of the land administered in a court. It is true that the law they appealed to was the law and custom of parliament, and not the Common Law. Parliament and the Common Law had not yet made that close alliance which was the basis of the opposition to Charles I. But a long step forward had been taken. Impeachment was to be one of the actual weapons employed in opposition to the Stuarts, and the debates of 1386 to 1388 already have something of the flavour of the debates of 1620 to 1641.

Thus this great step forward in the middle years of Richard II's reign really did change the English constitution. It provided the greatest political and constitutional revolution of the fourteenth century. It was a new and formidable attempt by the nation to achieve a re-statement of the ancient traditions, so as to conform to the conditions of the early modern age. In this, it inevitably presented a sharp threat to the position and claims of the ruler, all the more challenging since these had themselves been steadily expanding, with the growth of the monarchy ever since the accession of Edward I. The new claims of the Lords and Commons to control the king's ministers by judicial processes were every bit as dangerous and unwelcome to the ruler as the earlier efforts to control the king's ministers by other means. At bottom, they were hardly more constitutional. It is true that they evaded the limitations imposed on baronial opposition by the Statute of York, but they could not evade a challenge to the central and essential position of the ruler, which the Statute of York had been intended to maintain. Even judicial processes in parliament needed the agreement and assent of the ruler, if it could be argued—very doubtfully—that they needed nothing more. The king was, as the *Modus Tenendi Parliamentum* said, the head, the beginning and the end of parliament. "In parliament," Sir William Jones said as late as the seventeenth century, "the king is the sole judge, the rest are but advisers." The lords propounded almost exactly the opposite of this in their famous declarations on the nature of the new High Court of Parliament in 1386 and 1388. They were, in effect, claiming the new judicial attributes of parliament as an instrument for the Lords and Commons rather than for the king. Richard II, who realized very clearly all that this new opposition portended for the monarch was called upon to defend his prerogatives in parliament as urgently as Edward II or Charles I. Hence the quarrel between him and the opposition became again, what it had been in the reign of Edward II, a trial of strength, the outcome of which was bound to have tragic consequences, either for the nation or for the crown.

In this struggle, the opposition at first had the advantage, as it had had against Edward; but it could no more maintain its full advantage than it had been able to in 1321, or, for that matter in 1259. Even now, in spite of impeachment and the new self-consciousness of Lords and Commons in parliament, the nation had no real alternative to the ideas of personal monarchy derived from medieval tradition, and no real machinery for enforcing and maintaining its claim to co-operate with the king in policy and administration. It needed two centuries more of political experience and progress before this could be achieved. The opposition to Richard II ended, as it had to end, like that to Edward II, in deposition; but meanwhile it made a notable contribution to the development of the medieval English state.

It settled again, and this time perhaps decisively, the old issue which had confronted England ever since the New Monarchy of Edward I, the issue of the ultimate nature of the monarchy, whether this was to be limited and based on true co-operation between ruler and subject, or whether it would, in England as in France, develop into absolute rule. This issue had, by the reign of Richard II, become insistent and supreme. The ancient, largely informal, co-operation of king and nation of the early Middle Ages—not without its own recurrent crises—had now been destroyed forever by the growth of national bureaucratic monarchy, of large-scale commerce, of “bastard” feudalism, of secularism, and the beginnings of the modern political outlook. The monarch was now strong enough to threaten the liberties of the nation as no early medieval ruler ever could. The Lords and Commons, operating through the changed institutions of parliament and council, were strong enough to endanger the prerogatives of the crown. At bottom, the interests of the king and the subjects were, as they always had been, largely identical; but the nation was confronted with a harder task of re-definition than had ever been encountered in medieval history before. It is no wonder that both Richard and his opponents, during the period 1386 to 1399, fell into the same blunders and excesses which had characterized the reign of Edward II; that the Lords Appellant crushed Richard by threats of deposition and had no mercy on his honest and faithful servants, or that Richard openly leaned, in his last years, towards the practice, if not the theory, of absolute rule. There seemed, as after 1322, to be no middle way, no line of compromise. It is not surprising that, in the end, men once more sought, or acquiesced in, the fatal expediency of deposition.

The precedent of 1327 was, accordingly, revived in 1399, but with a difference. There could, in 1399 as in 1326-7, be no deposition by parliament; but there could be a deposition by something resembling the new processes of law, carried out before the assembled estates. The difference, in this respect, between the deposition of Edward and that of Richard, is the measure of the fourteenth-century contribution to the concept of parliament as the High Court of the Realm. The difference between the part played by the assembled estates in 1327 and 1399, is the measure of the extent to which the Lords and Commons had begun to reach out, even in the fourteenth century, towards the concept of parliament as consisting of themselves claiming rights and privileges and powers which were independent of the king.

Of course the deposition of Richard II could not solve the constitutional problem any more than that of Edward II. We are now reasonably sure that it was not even a “parliamentary” deposition, and did not on that account begin a premature Lancastrian experiment in constitutional monarchy. Even though the estates of parliament played a large part in Richard II’s deposition, his successor was no king by grace of parliament, but rather by the grace of God. He had to try to put together again the pieces of the monarchy which he had momentarily shattered. He was the successor to Edward I and Edward III. He was compelled to take over, substantially, the regality which Richard laid down. How he did this, is beyond the scope of this essay. One thing, however, is certain. His rule had to be a compromise similar to, though not the same as, that after 1326.

Henry IV had triumphed in 1399, but the monarchy he inherited had once more been defeated. Yet in victory or defeat, it was necessary for the constitution. It had to be reinstated. All that men could safely take away from it were Richard's excessive claims. What was left was adequate for all normal purposes of government; adequate, in spite of the Wars of the Roses, to provide England with Tudor popular despotism, and the Stuarts with a formidable case to support their bid for an absolutism based on conciliar government and prerogative courts. But it had nevertheless been decided by the struggles of the fourteenth century that it should be the ancestor of the limited monarchy of modern England. It should be, in essence, the same monarchy as that which Edward II had, in 1308, inherited from his father Edward I.

The fourteenth century had finally established that the Divine Right of Kings would never be acceptable to the English nation. It completed the work of the thirteenth century, the establishment of parliamentary government, by discussion and consent. It did far more than that. Just as it witnessed the beginnings of the modern monarchy, so it witnessed the beginnings of the modern opposition, an opposition bound and limited, as the king was, by subordination to the law. Just as it determined that the former was not to lead, in England, into absolutism so it determined that the latter should not lead to political anarchy. The one decision was made through a new and extreme form of political action—deposition; the other through an institutional innovation—the evolution of a new concept of parliament consisting of king Lords and Commons and constituting the High Court of the Realm. The judicial aspect of parliament was finally correlated with the political; both were conceived as an act of co-operation between the king and the *universitas regni*, completing the institutional framework of the early modern state. The claims of the opposition, as well as of the monarch, it was decided, should be subject to the over-riding concept of the supremacy of parliament including both, the repository not only of politics and legislation, but also of justice and law. If this concept was very slow in maturing, at least the foundations had been laid for it in the doctrines and conflicts of the reign of Richard II.

In their struggles and blunders, both king and people in the fourteenth century were guilty of many excesses. But they did, nevertheless, fight for great principles. The issue was, in truth, far deeper than personalities. The outcome in the fourteenth century, as in the thirteenth, was equally important to the state. If the century still left many constitutional problems unanswered, so does every century. If it ended on a note of discord, and even of defeat, that was mainly because the speed of transition during the period outstripped even the fertility of medieval constitutional inventiveness, not because the medieval tradition had failed. The idea that this was a century of decadence and futility is incomprehensible to those who have studied its many-sided efforts at progress, in politics and religion, economics, scholarship, and the arts. Even the great Peasants' Revolt of 1381 was not a sign of decline and oppression; it was rather a sign that even the unenfranchised masses of England were catching a glimpse of the vision of political power—the nearest they were to get to it until the Reform Act of 1832. The age of Edward III and the English yeomen, of William of Ockham and Duns Scotus, of John

Thoresby, John Wyclif, William Langland, Geoffrey Chaucer, of peasant leaders mystics and Lollards, was surely not an age of stagnation and reaction. The truth of this century is that, in every aspect of its life, it was one of immense creativeness as well as of massive change. It is already regarded as important in history as the age of the beginnings of the modern national state in England, with its commerce, its bureaucracy, its middle class, its secularism, its gunpowder, and its royal navy. It should perhaps also be considered important as the period when the foundations of the modern institution were finally determined. These were to be, in line with the great medieval tradition, the co-operation, under the law, of monarch and nation in government, as expressed in an extended and strengthened central institution, of parliament. This was still, as later in the time of Sir Thomas Smith, "the most high and absolute power of the realm of England," as it always had been; but it was also now "the highest and most authentical court of Englande, by vertue whereof all those things be established . . . and no other means accounted vailable to make any new forfaiture of life, member, or landes of any English man, where there was no lawe ordayned for it before," as it was to remain from that time until the present day.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS IN THE EARLY STUART PERIOD: A SURVEY OF RECENT LITERATURE

By DONALD J. McDOUGALL
The University of Toronto

DURING the past thirty years there has been a marked increase of interest in the history of the Puritan Revolution and its antecedents. The somewhat limited view of the scope of historical study held by most nineteenth-century writers has given place to a broader concept; much new material has been brought to light; and a number of questions to which S. R. Gardiner and his contemporaries gave little consideration have come increasingly to engage the attention of their successors. Among these, none is more important than the change in the position, the powers, and the general character of the House of Commons during the half-century which preceded the meeting of the Long Parliament. In those years the Commons underwent a change not less significant than that which occurred in the fourteenth century, or than that which has taken place since the passage of the first Reform Act in 1832. It has been described by Professor Wallace Notestein as the fashioning of "a new kind of commons, that would by and by make inevitable a new kind of constitution."¹ In its immediate effects on the existing system of government, and in the influence which it would have on the future development of the English constitution, this was perhaps the most decisive change of the early years of the seventeenth century; and much of what has been written on that period during the past generation has dealt directly or indirectly with that central theme.

Material that is in some degree relevant to the subject comes from the work of scholars in many fields. Research in the religious literature of the period, much of it the work of a number of distinguished literary historians, has yielded more exact knowledge concerning the Puritan movement and its influence on social, political, and constitutional development.² The many theories of government and society set forth by religious reformers, philosophers, jurists, and publicists of every kind, have been subjected to more scholarly examination than ever before.³ Most important perhaps in its bearing on the growth of the House of Commons has been the work of a number of economic historians.⁴ Research in this field has gone but a little distance, but enough has been done to suggest some of the motive forces which lay behind the constitutional disputes of the period. Any one of these might be made the subject of such a survey as this, by one who is competent to deal with it. This paper has a more limited objective. Its purpose is simply to

¹W. Notestein, "The Winning of the Initiative by the House of Commons" (*Proceedings of the British Academy*, 1924, 175).

²W. Haller, *The Rise of Puritanism* (New York, 1938); and M. M. Knappen, *Tudor Puritanism* (Chicago, 1939).

³J. W. Allen, *English Political Thought, 1603 to 1660* (London, 1938), I; F. D. Wormuth, *The Royal Prerogative, 1603 to 1649* (Ithaca, 1939).

⁴R. H. Tawney, "The Rise of the Gentry" (*Economic History Review*, II, 1941). Cf. also, R. H. Tawney, "Harrington's Interpretation of his Age" (*Proceedings of British Academy*, 1941, 199-223). J. U. Nef, "Industry and Government in France and England, 1540 to 1640" (*American Philosophical Society Memoirs*, xv, 1940).

review the evidence that has been made available in the past few years on the development of the House of Commons itself. Work on other aspects of the history of the period can be referred to only in so far as it has a direct bearing on that subject.

This investigation of the history of the Commons, so far as it has proceeded, has been mainly the work of a group of American scholars, of whom Professor Notestein is the most active and the most distinguished. In spirit, and to some extent in method, it resembles the work of Professor L. B. Namier, whose detailed studies of the House of Commons, and of the actual mechanics of government in the middle years of the eighteenth century have done much to correct certain long cherished illusions about parliamentary and cabinet government in the years of the American Revolution. The two periods are not unrelated. Many of the features that were to give its peculiar character to the eighteenth-century House of Commons were already discernible in the early Stuart period. In both cases too, some of the realities have been obscured by what would seem to be too simple generalizations about the character of the Commons.

For practical purposes a starting point may be found in a paper published by Professor Notestein in 1916, in which, after renewing the appeal made by Sir Charles Firth for more intensive study of the period, he indicated some of the points on which the work of Gardiner and other liberal historians of the nineteenth century was not altogether satisfactory.⁵ The title of the paper, "The Stuart Period: Unresolved Problems," was in itself suggestive. It paid high tribute to Gardiner's unique achievement in tracing the course of political events during the period which he covered, and in bringing to light a much greater body of evidence than any of his predecessors had used. But it contained a distinct challenge to the view then widely held, especially among English historians, that Gardiner's was the final and the complete history of this period. Apart from its narrow range, and the incompleteness and often unreliable evidence that was available when Gardiner wrote, the history suffered from the author's constant preoccupation with "moral judgment" on the character of the men whose work he was examining.⁶ Much had been done, but there were problems, and these not the least important in the history of the period, to which Gardiner and his fellow liberals gave no answer.

This was not quite the first criticism of the kind, although it was perhaps the most important, judged by the practical results that have followed. In 1905, Professor E. P. Cheyney, whose interests lay in social and industrial history, pointed out that Gardiner's history was little more than a chronological record of a rather limited range of political events. "If carefully examined," he observed, "it will be seen to consist rather of a series of descriptions of a few great events or movements, than of a continuous, well-balanced narrative."⁷

Probably not many who are familiar with Gardiner's work would now dissent from the central point of that criticism. But it was made at a time when very different views were in the ascendant. In a notice of Gardiner's

⁵W. Notestein, "The Stuart Period: Unresolved Problems" (*American Historical Association Report*, 1916, I, 391-9).

⁶*Ibid.*, 392.

⁷E. P. Cheyney, "The England of our Forefathers" (*American Historical Review*, XI, 1905-6, 770).

work published in 1903, Dr. W. H. Hutton, after a casual glance at the more philosophical method of Ranke's history, observed that, "for Englishmen, this is the final history; for fact and for opinion, it will never need to be re-written."⁸ Similar views were expressed very widely in the latter part of Gardiner's life, and in the years immediately following. "We close this further instalment of Dr. Gardiner's work," said a reviewer in 1897, "with renewed conviction of the worthlessness of any other historical method by comparison with his, and with renewed reverence for its author. We cannot but leave him as sole and undisputed arbiter both of the method and of his own achievement."⁹

It was his method, assumed to be radically different from that used by any of his predecessors, that most impressed Gardiner's contemporaries. Recent scholars have been more critical. In 1915 Professor R. G. Usher published an elaborate survey of the history, in which he subjected the "method" to a searching examination, pointed out some of the glaring inconsistencies which resulted from it, and questioned some of Gardiner's conclusions on a number of important issues.¹⁰ His more severe strictures on Gardiner's work have not been very generally accepted; but it was with this criticism, among other things, in mind that Professor Notestein reviewed the whole subject in the following year.

Two points in this criticism merit comment. It is alleged, in the first place, that much of Gardiner's evidence was of a somewhat uncertain character, and that he never subjected his sources to the careful examination which modern scholarship demands where the authenticity of a document is in doubt. He relied in such cases on what he called the "test of probability." If a manuscript or printed speech, which might have been circulated in hundreds by some enterprising scrivener or publisher, contained what he regarded as the probable views of its imputed author, he accepted it as satisfactory evidence. That criticism has been endorsed and greatly strengthened by Professor Notestein and his associates; and in their account of the manner in which the thousands of so-called "separates" were produced, distributed,—often at a price,—and subsequently secured and bound in folios by seventeenth and eighteenth-century collectors, they have demonstrated the unreliability of much of this evidence.¹¹

The second point is equally important. It concerns the foundations upon which Gardiner's account of the constitutional struggle of the early Stuart period is based. It may well be doubted whether any satisfactory history of that struggle can be written without a fairly definite explanation of what the English constitution actually was at the beginning of the period. Nowhere in Gardiner's volumes will there be found any such explanation. In numerous passages he refers to what he calls the "Elizabethan constitution";¹² and it is by the test of fidelity to this ideal constitution that he judges the actions of James I and Charles I in the many crises of their reigns. Yet it is ex-

⁸W. H. Hutton "Samuel Ralson Gardiner" (*Cornhill Magazine*, new series, XV, 788).

⁹Cited by R. G. Usher, *The Historical Method of S. R. Gardiner* (Washington University Studies, 1915), III, part II, no. 1, 19.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 5-159.

¹¹*Commons Debates*, 1629 (edited by W. Notestein and F. H. Relf, Minneapolis, 1921), intro., XX-XLI.

¹²For some examples of different and apparently conflicting uses of this term, cf. Usher, *The Historical Method of S. R. Gardiner*, 26-41.

tremely difficult to know exactly what is meant by this constitution. The complex series of practices, usages, and conventions which determined the relations between the various parts of the Tudor constitution are never explained with anything like the precision which the subject requires.

Most striking perhaps is the absence of any real discussion of the effects of the Reformation on the form and spirit of English government. The brief passage on the ecclesiastical changes in the reign of Henry VIII, contains virtually no reference to the constitutional implications of this revolutionary movement. Neither the Act of Supremacy, which profoundly altered the character of English kingship, and which a modern historian has described as containing the germ of the Civil War in the seventeenth century, nor the change of jurisdiction, which placed the church courts under the direct authority of the king and created the condition for one of the major conflicts of the reign of James I,¹³ receive more than passing notice. Above all, there is a complete absence of any discussion of the legislative sovereignty of "king in parliament," first established and most strikingly demonstrated by this series of enactments.

In reality Gardiner's view of the development of Parliament seems to have been very simple. Preoccupation with the element of continuity, and a disposition to accept at their face value the appeals to precedents made by the leaders of the House of Commons tended to obscure the significance of positive changes that were taking place throughout the whole period. It would no doubt be possible to select a number of statements from the history that would admit of differing interpretations; but the substance of Gardiner's view may be fairly judged from a few passages in the opening pages of his first volume.

"Edward I realised," he says, "as a result of the early consolidation of state and nation, that, however necessary a strong royal authority still was, the duty of directing the course of progress could be safely entrusted to the nation itself." The change was not accomplished without difficulty; and it was with evident reluctance that Edward accepted some of the implications, in particular the surrender of all power of arbitrary taxation. But, Gardiner adds, "he had his reward. The Parliament of England is the noblest monument ever reared by mortal man. . . . Many things have changed, but on all main points the Parliament of England as it exists to-day is the same as that which gathered round the great Plantagenet."¹⁴

The answer must depend in some degree upon the interpretation given to the term "main points." To most students of the constitution, it will probably appear that the power exercised by the House of Commons in the nineteenth century—the power, for example, to dictate the terms of the Reform Act and to coerce the other branches of Parliament into acceptance of those terms—gave to that body a character very different from that which it had possessed in the reign of Edward I; and the distribution of legislative powers among the component parts of the sovereign Parliament must surely be regarded as one of the main points in any study of the constitution. This was the basic issue in the struggles of the early seventeenth century. It was not stated in those terms, at least not until the eve of the Civil War; and when the claim was made for what was described, not very accurately, as the

¹³A. F. Pollard, *The Evolution of Parliament* (London, 1920), 214.

¹⁴S. R. Gardiner, *History of England, 1603 to 1642* (London, 1887), I, 1-3.

"sovereignty of parliament," by such publicists as Prynne and Parker,¹⁵ it was put in a form which went far to distort the earlier history of the constitution. The implications of their action were hardly perceived even by the most far-sighted of the men who led the House of Commons to its new supremacy; and at least two centuries were to pass, until the era of the first Reform Act, before those implications were fully worked out. But it was in the opening decades of the Stuart period, culminating with the decisive change in 1641, that the House of Commons won the power that it was not again to relinquish, the power to determine in the last analysis the laws under which the people of England should live.

That issue was latent in the constitutional situation created by the establishment of the legislative sovereignty of "king in parliament" during the reign of Henry VIII. Its emergence within less than a century was a natural consequence of political, religious, and economic development in the interval. It was due in part to discontent with the incompetence and misrule of the Stuart kings and many of their ministers; in part to the dissatisfaction of religious reformers, who desired some change in the state ecclesiastical, or of intolerant zealots, who desired wholly to transform that state and to impose their own harsh and illiberal rule on the nation; and in part to the gradual breakdown of the patch-work financial system which had served the Tudors, with the resultant demand for larger and more frequent parliamentary grants, and the increasing resort, in the absence of such grants, to irregular and arbitrary modes of taxation. But behind these particular issues, to which Gardiner and other liberal historians have given almost exclusive attention, lay a deeper and more significant change in English society itself. The economic development of the Tudor period—the expansion of commerce, the growth of manufacturing industry on a relatively large scale,¹⁶ and the reorganization of agriculture in many parts of the country under the direction of the gentry had brought into prominence a class of men whose interests were no longer adequately served by the existing political system. It was from the groups who financed and controlled these enterprises that the membership of the House of Commons was almost exclusively drawn; and by the beginning of the seventeenth century their interests had assumed a form which, at least in their judgment, necessitated a larger measure of control over government policy than had been possible under the Tudor System.

The early Tudor monarchs had combined political and economic power in such a manner as to preclude the possibility of effective opposition. "Few rulers," says a recent writer, "have acted more remorselessly on the maxim that the foundations of political authority are economic." Through the augmentation of the royal demesne, they had secured large revenues independent of parliamentary control, and the extensive patronage that went with the possession of manors in all parts of the country. "They had been powerful as kings, partly because unrivalled as landowners."¹⁷ Their successors were unable to retain these advantages. Financial stringency compelled the Crown to dispose of lands to the value of more than 2 million pounds between

¹⁵J. W. Allen, *English Political Thought*, 436 ff; and W. K. Jordan, *Men of Substance* (Chicago, 1942), 140 ff.

¹⁶Nef, "Industry and Government in France and England," specially chaps. I and III.

¹⁷F. C. Dietz, *English Finance, 1485 to 1558*. Cited by R. H. Tawney, "The Rise of the Gentry," 24.

1570 and 1640; and the beneficiaries of these transactions were in the main the landed gentry and their allies among the commercial and industrial *entrepreneurs*.¹⁸ Nor was the monarchy alone in feeling the effects of this new economic pressure. Throughout the upper strata of the social pyramid there was going on a steady process, described by Professor Tawney as one of "erosion and reconstruction," the result of which was the concentration of property and economic power in the hands of the middle ranks of landowners, merchants, lawyers, and industrialists. The change is illustrated by the history of the manors confiscated from the church in the reign of Henry VIII. Large numbers of these, which had originally gone to members of the new Tudor nobility, had, by the end of the century, passed to the ownership of the gentry.¹⁹

Contemporaries were deeply impressed with this development. The increasing wealth of the middle ranks, the men "situated neither in the lowest ground nor in the highest mountains, but in the valleys between both," was noted by Raleigh as one of the striking social phenomena of his time. One observer as early as 1600 estimated that the aggregate income of the gentry was three times that of the peers, bishops, deans and chapters, and richer yeomen together.²⁰ It was this change in the social structure and in the distribution of landed property which led Harrington to his novel conclusions concerning the origins of the war, and which convinced him that a republic or commonwealth was the only form of government that could henceforth sustain itself in England.²¹

* * *

By the end of the sixteenth century English agriculture had shed most of its feudal characteristics, and had become very largely a capitalistic enterprise. Landowners were among the largest investors in the new industries, and in many of the commercial ventures of the period.²² Their ranks were constantly swelled by newcomers who had made their fortunes in business or in the practice of the law. "By the middle years of James I's reign, if not earlier," says Professor Tawney, "it is difficult to find a prominent London capitalist who is not also a substantial landowner."²³ Not the least influential of these new landowners were the successful lawyers. Contemporaries placed the incomes of leading barristers in the reign of Elizabeth at almost fantastic figures; and not all of their income was derived from professional fees. Popham and Ellesmere made fortunes out of land transactions in the reign of James I; and the great Chief Justice himself, described by Tawney as "the odious but indispensable Coke," acquired more than fifty manors in the course of his public career and became one of the wealthiest and most powerful of the middle rank of landowners.²⁴

¹⁸Tawney, "Harrington's Interpretation of His Age" (*Proceedings of British Academy*, 1941, 206 ff.).

¹⁹For evidence from some Midland counties cf. Tawney, "The Rise of the Gentry," 28.

²⁰Camden Miscellany, XVI, 1936; quoted in Tawney, "The Rise of the Gentry," 5.

²¹"Wherefore, the dissolution of this government caused the war, not the war the dissolution of this government."

²²Nef, "Industry and Government in France and England," 11 ff.

²³For an interesting example see the history of the Robinson family, Jordan, *Men of Substance*, chap. III.

²⁴Tawney, "The Rise of the Gentry," 18.

"It is not surprising," says Professor Notestein, "that in the struggle with James, the lawyers found themselves on the same side of the fence with the gentry." That was a change from the Tudor era, and it did not pass without notice. A royalist writer early in the new reign observed that the king's emphasis on his prerogative and on the rights of the church had "much abated the comings in" of the lawyers, and that these gentlemen were all too ready to support the claims of the Commons "with their cases, antiquities, records, statutes, precedents and stories."²⁵ The alliance was no doubt natural; but it is not too much to suppose that it was in some measure strengthened by the common economic interests of both groups.

The influence of these changes on the character of the House of Commons cannot be precisely defined, but it was certainly not negligible. The framework of oligarchy was taking shape, and the ideas that were to determine the policy of the ruling classes for a century and more were already in the ascendant. The opinions of two scholars who have made the subject their own may be quoted. "The more intimately an industry,—agriculture or any other,—depends upon the market," says Professor Tawney, "the more closely is it affected by the policy of government, and the more determined do those engaged in it become to control policy. The fact that *entrepreneur* dominated over *rentier* interests in the house of commons is therefore a point of some importance."²⁶

To the same purpose, but with the emphasis on the social philosophy that was becoming prevalent among the dominant groups in English society, is the comment of Professor Nef.

English merchants and improving landlords were beginning to think they had found a better guide to state policy than had been known in earlier times. They held a different view of the ends of the state from that taught by philosophers and theologians from Aristotle to Richard Hooker. Hitherto it had been taken for granted that the greatest good was to be derived from according material wealth a subordinate place in the order of goods. The merchants, the improving landlords and the philosophers who expressed their views were coming to believe the greatest good was to be derived by allowing free play within the state to enlightened material self-interest.²⁷

It was in such an environment that the House of Commons made its great advance in the early seventeenth century. The institutional changes need not be considered in detail. That field has been surveyed in Professor Notestein's masterly essay on "The Winning of the Initiative," which has become essential reading for every student of the period. The details are being filled in by other writers. Through the publication of sources not before available, or but imperfectly utilized, material is being provided for a more intensive study of the actual proceedings of the House than has hitherto been possible.²⁸ What is emerging from these studies is a portrait of the Commons, fuller, more convincing, and more definitely related to cur-

²⁵Notestein, "The Winning of the Initiative by the House of Commons," 162; cf. also T. Plucknett, *A Short History of the Common Law* (London, 1940), 46 ff.

²⁶Tawney, "The Rise of the Gentry," 34.

²⁷Nef, "Industry and Government in France and England," 130.

²⁸*Commons Debates*, 1621 (edited by W. Notestein and F. H. Relf, 7 vols., New Haven, 1935); *Commons Debates*, 1629.

rent political and social conditions than has heretofore existed. It was a House composed in the main of fairly average human beings, with the material interests, the ideals, and the ambitions of ordinary men, but with greater opportunities for advancing their interests and for giving effect to their ideals than had been enjoyed by any of their predecessors. Widening political experience, expert leadership, supplied by the lawyers and by the representatives of the new business interests, and greatly improved procedure gave them a new self-reliance and a skill in the conduct of public affairs that had been wanting in the past.

It was becoming very largely a business man's house. Interest in Puritan reforms, or at least in limiting the ecclesiastical authority of the Crown and the church, formed a bond of union among many of its members. Common economic interests were perhaps equally important and certainly more durable as a bond of union. And it was becoming essentially a modern House of Commons. Despite the constant appeal of the lawyers to medieval precedents, it was a House which had a nearer affinity with that led by Walpole and Pitt than with that which had existed in the fourteenth century. For it was no longer a branch of a medieval Parliament, Coke's pedantry to the contrary notwithstanding. It was a component part of the omnicompetent Parliament of the modern English state, in process of assuming to itself the substance of sovereign power in that state. "The leading members of the commons," observed Hume, "men of an independent genius and large views, began to regulate their opinions, more by the future consequences which they foresaw than by the former precedents which were set before them; and they less aspired at maintaining the ancient constitution than at establishing a new one, and a freer, and a better."

* * *

The practical results achieved by the Commons in the first quarter-century of Stuart rule can be stated very briefly. They amounted in effect to the breakdown of almost all the important conventions of the Tudor constitution. By 1629 very little remained of the elaborate system of controls, through which the Tudors had managed elections, influenced the composition of the House, and guided its deliberations through the privy councillors and officials who were regularly provided with seats. The process was hastened by the ineptitude of the Stuart kings, and by their ignorance of the system of government which they were called upon to administer. But that was merely a negative factor. The real force determining the change was the aggressive action of the House itself.

They established control over their own membership. Before the end of James's reign the Crown had been obliged to discontinue the practice of adding to the membership of the House by charters to favoured municipalities. For a time thereafter the House took over this function itself. Resolutions of the Commons reviving ancient parliamentary boroughs which had long ceased to elect members, added several names to the list of places that were to figure prominently among the rotten boroughs of the next century.²⁹ Early in their history moreover, many of the parliamentary boroughs established by the Tudor monarchs passed under the control of neighbouring peers and gentry; and the control thus established was not again relinquished.³⁰ The

²⁹E. Porritt, *The Unreformed House of Commons* (Cambridge, 1903), 382.

³⁰W. Holdsworth, *History of English Law* (London, 1924), IV, 94 and 96.

system of patronage associated with eighteenth-century political management was taking shape even before the Puritan Revolution.

Within the House itself there were equally significant changes. The development of an efficient procedure gave to the House a degree of cohesion hitherto unknown, and deprived the Speaker of most of the authority by which he had formerly regulated the course and conduct of business.³¹ Through the organization of committees, in particular the "committee of the whole," the leaders of the House took control of legislation and of all other parliamentary business out of the hands of the servants of the Crown.

The privy councillors, who had been the key men in the House since the days of Henry VIII and Thomas Cromwell, were reduced to impotence. In the reign of Elizabeth, it was customary, when nominating a committee, to select first "all those Privy Councillors that be of the House." By the reign of Charles I these men were not only excluded from all important committees, but it had become almost impossible for one of them to speak his mind freely on the floor of the House without encountering strong, and often disorderly opposition. They were informed that, whereas the private member represented "the country," they represented no one but themselves and the court; and the House did not scruple to twist its rules of debate in order to reduce them to silence.³²

The breakdown of these conventions led to an almost complete separation of executive and legislature. The House of Commons became an organized opposition, incapable as yet of assuming responsibility for the conduct of government, but able, especially through its control of taxation, to check and frustrate the actions of the king and his council.³³ Through the publication of various types of parliamentary documents moreover, the country party in the House was endeavouring to build for itself a body of support throughout the nation. Such a practice involved a serious departure from the rules governing the secrecy of parliamentary proceedings; but there was a strong desire among the members to make their opinions known to a wider public and an evident demand among some sections of the public for such information. Before 1640 the practice of circulating petitions, remonstrances, legal arguments, and to an increasing extent, the ordinary speeches of members, had become very general.

The object was achieved in one of two ways. The more normal method was to secure the insertion of a speech in the clerk's book, with subsequent authorization for printing and distribution among the members of the House. A less regular method, but one which became very general in the early Stuart period, was for the member to hand out a manuscript of his prepared speech, to be copied by other members, or to be printed and circulated throughout the country. There were occasional protests against such a practice, but it was apparently achieving results desired by the majority in the House, and no serious effort was made to check it. At the same time the House was doing all in its power to prevent the distribution of speeches by the king or any of his servants. "The truth was of course," says Professor Notestein, "that the

³¹*Ibid.*, VI, 88-92.

³²D. H. Willson, *The Privy Councillors in the House of Commons, 1624 to 1629* (Minneapolis, 1940), *passim*.

³³It is estimated that the real income of the Crown in 1640 was hardly more than it had been a century before. Nef, "Industry and Government in France and England," 129.

country party in parliament wished to put its case before the public, and did not like to see the king's case so put. Hence their inconsistency regarding the rules of secrecy."³⁴

The history of the House of Commons in the early seventeenth century is in reality a study in the basic mechanics of responsible government. The first step towards the establishment of such a system of government was the dissolution of the conventions through which the monarchical and conciliar government of the Tudor era had operated; and the achievement of the Commons can be properly understood only after a thorough investigation of those conventions. "Conventions," says Sir William Holdsworth, "must grow up at all times and in all places where the powers of government are vested in different persons or bodies,—where, in other words, there is a mixed constitution."³⁵ At no time in the history of the English constitution have these conventions been more important than in the Tudor era. At no time have they been more rapidly or more completely altered than in the period immediately following.

An understanding of these conventions is therefore, no less necessary than an exact knowledge of the medieval precedents to which Coke and his fellow antiquaries were wont to appeal. It is perhaps even more necessary; for the House of Commons in the seventeenth century was part of a Parliament possessed of powers which no medieval Parliament had exercised or claimed. It is essential moreover, that it be recognized as a part, and not as the whole. The history of the seventeenth century has too long been confused by the loose habit of using the word "parliament" to designate the House of Commons, thereby giving the word a meaning which its history does not support.

The conventions of the constitution have been variously defined. A. V. Dicey's definition, as "in the main, rules for regulating the exercise of the prerogative," is clearly inadequate. Sir William Holdsworth has defined them as "rules to ensure that the constitution works in practice in accordance with the prevailing constitutional theories of the time." Professor Jennings has broadened that definition. "It is not so much the prevailing constitutional theory that matters," he says, "as the prevailing social desires."

The conventions of the Tudor constitution satisfied prevailing social desires. Before many years of the seventeenth century had passed, the social desires of the dominant groups in England had so altered that these conventions were no longer acceptable. The average member of the House of Commons probably had no very definite ideas as to the form of government which he would prefer; and even among such leaders as Sandys, Coke, Wentworth, and Elliott there was clearly no agreement on ultimate ends. But circumstances enabled the House of Commons in these years to carry through the first of a series of changes that would eventually result in the establishment of the modern type of responsible government.

It is evident that the definitive history of the seventeenth century has not yet been written. Professor Notestein, to whose work every student of the period is so deeply indebted, has summarized the position as it was in 1916, and as it remains with some qualification, at the present time; and this survey may conclude with his statement.

³⁴*Commons Debates*, 1629, intro., XX-XLI.

³⁵Quoted in W. I. Jennings, *The Law and the Constitution* (London, 1933), 72.

By the use of parliamentary material opened since Gardiner wrote and a constant lookout for new sources, by a more thorough analysis of the sources which Gardiner used and a finer discrimination in sifting them, by a closer relating of Stuart parliaments to those of earlier times, and by an investigation of many aspects of the history still unstudied, it may be possible not only to get closer even than Gardiner to that sought-for truth of events, but to make ready for those wider interpretations, for that historical philosophy which Gardiner shunned.³⁶

³⁶Notestein, "The Stuart Period: Unresolved Problems," 300.

THE WESTERN PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT, 1919-1921

By W. L. MORTON

The University of Manitoba

THE Progressive Movement in the West was dual in origin and nature. In one aspect it was an economic protest; in another it was a political revolt. A phase of agrarian resistance to the National Policy of 1878, it was also, and equally, an attempt to destroy the old national parties. The two aspects unite in the belief of all Progressives, both moderate and extreme, that the old parties were equally committed to maintaining the National Policy and indifferent to the ways in which the "big interests" of protection and monopoly used government for their own ends.

At the root of the sectional conflict, from which the Progressive Movement in part sprang, was the National Policy of 1878. Such conflict is partly the result of the hardships and imperfect adaptations of the frontier, but it also arises from the incidence of national policies.¹ The sectional corn develops where the national shoe pinches. The National Policy, that brilliant improvisation of Sir John A. Macdonald, had grown under the master politician's hand, under the stimulus of depression and under the promptings of political appetite, until it had become a veritable Canadian System Henry Clay might have envied. Explicit in it was the promise that everybody should have something from its operation; implicit in it—its inarticulate major premise indeed—was the promise that when the infant industries it fostered had reached maturity, protection would be needed no more.

This, however, was but a graceful tribute to the laissez-faire doctrine of the day. This same doctrine it was which prevented the western wheat grower from demanding that he, too, should benefit directly from the operation of the National Policy. That he did benefit from the system as a whole, a complex of land settlement, railway construction, and moderate tariff protection, is not to be denied. But the wheat grower, building the wheat economy from homestead to terminal elevator in a few swift years, was caught in a complex of production and marketing costs, land values, railway rates, elevator charges, and interest rates. He fought to lower all these costs by economic organization and by political pressure. He saw them all as parts of a system which exploited him. He was prevented, by his direct experience of it, and by the prevailing doctrine of laissez-faire, from perceiving that the system might confer reciprocal benefits on him. Accordingly, he hated and fought it as a whole. Of the National Policy, however, the tariff was politically the most conspicuous element. Hence the political battle was fought around the tariff; it became the symbol of the wheat growers' exploitation and frustration, alleged and actual. Like all symbols, it over-simplified the complexities it symbolized.

This clash of interest had, of course, to be taken into account by the national political parties. The Liberal-Conservatives, as creators of the National Policy, had little choice but to extol its merits even in regions where

¹Cf. Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Significance of Sections in American History* (New York, 1932), 314.

they seemed somewhat dim. They could stress its promise that a good time was coming for all, they could add that meanwhile the Yankees must be held at bay. When the Liberals quietly appropriated the National Policy after attaining national power in 1896, the task of the Conservatives became much easier. Not only could the Liberals be accused of having abandoned their principles; they could even be accused of unduly prolonging the adolescence of infant industries. A western Conservative, Mr. Arthur Meighen, could indict the Laurier administration on the charge of being maintained in power "behind ramparts of gold"² erected by the "interests." This echo of the "cross of gold" was not ineffective in the West, where the charge that there was no real difference between the parties on the tariff not only promoted the growth of third party sentiment, but also prolonged the life of western conservatism.

The Liberals, for their part, had not only abandoned "continentalism" in the Convention of 1893, but with the possession of power had developed that moderation without which a nation-wide majority may not be won or kept in a country of sectional interests.³ Liberal speakers might proclaim that the party was the low tariff party; Fielding might make the master stroke of the British preferential tariff; certain items might be put on the free list here, the rates might be lowered on certain others there; but the Liberal party had become a national party, with all the powers and responsibilities of government, among them the maintenance and elaboration of the now historic National Policy. In consequence each national party began to appear more and more in the eyes of the wheat grower as an "organized hypocrisy dedicated to getting and holding office,"⁴ and the conditions were created for a third party movement in the West.

The tariff, then, was a major predisposing cause of a third party movement in the West. Down to 1906 the British preference and other concessions of the Fielding tariff, together with reiterated promises of further reductions, kept the western Liberals within the fold. The completion in that year, however, of the three-decker tariff marked the beginning of more serious discontent. It grew with the offer of reciprocity in the Payne-Aldrich tariff of 1909. With the increase of agricultural indebtedness, concomitant with the settlement of the West, and the disappearance of the advantageous price differential between agricultural prices and those of manufactured goods, on which the wheat boom had taken its rise, the discontent deepened. It found expression through the grain growers' organizations, those "impressive foci of progressive ideas."⁵ In 1909 came the organization of the Canadian Council of Agriculture, in 1910 Laurier's tour of the West,⁶ and the Siege of Ottawa by the organized farmers. Plainly, the West was demanding its due at last. The Liberal party, which

²Hansard, 1910-11, I, 1918.

³Wilfred E. Binkley, *American Political Parties* (New York, 1944)—"...Madison's principle that a nation wide majority can agree only on a moderate program," 87; also 17-18.

⁴Dafoe Library of the *Winnipeg Free Press*, Dafoe Papers, Dafoe to Sir Clifford Sifton, July 21, 1919; on the prospects of re-organizing the Liberal party.

⁵*Manitoba Free Press*, April 10, 1917, 9.

⁶*Grain Growers' Guide*, September 14, 1910, 13. Fred Kirkham, advocate of a third party, wrote to the editor from Saltcoats, Saskatchewan: "If the memorials presented to Sir Wilfrid Laurier have failed to imbue him with the determination to battle with the vested interests of the East to grant our just requests, we have no alternative but to become democratic insurgents, and form a new party and find a new general to fight under. We must be courageous in politics before Laurier will treat with us as a big community of votes to be reckoned with."

had lost support in Ontario in every election since 1896, which saw its hold in Quebec threatened by the Nationalists under Bourassa, could not afford to lose the support of a new and rapidly growing section. In 1911 the helm was put hard over for reciprocity, and Liberal prospects brightened in the West.⁷ But this partial return to continentalism in economic policy was too severe a strain for a party which had become committed as deeply as its rival to the National Policy. The "Eighteen Liberals" of Toronto, among them Sir Clifford Sifton, broke with the party, and it went down to defeat under a Nationalist and a National Policy cross-fire. At the same time the Conservative party in the West, particularly in Saskatchewan and Alberta, suffered strains and defections which were to show in a lowered vitality in succeeding elections. But the offer of reciprocity remained on the statute books of the United States for another decade, and year by year the grain growers in convention demanded that the offer be taken up.

The demand of the western agrarians for the lowering of the tariff, however, was by no means an only factor in the rise of the third party. Into the West after 1896 poured immigrants from the United States and Great Britain. Most of the Americans came from the Middle West and the trans-Mississippi region. Many brought with them the experience and the political philosophy of the farmers' organizations and the third parties of those regions. Perhaps the clearest manifestation of their influence on the political development of the West was the demand for direct legislation which found expression in those forums of agrarian opinions, the grain growers' conventions, and which also found its way to the statute books of the three Western Provinces. From the British Isles came labour and socialist influences, felt rather in labour and urban circles, but not without effect among the farmers. These populist and socialist influences were mild; their exponents were in a minority. Nonetheless, they did much to give western discontent a vocabulary of grievance. Above all, they combined to repudiate the politics of expediency practised by the national parties, to denounce those parties as indifferently the tools of the "big interests," and to demand that the farmer free himself from the toils of the old parties and set up a third party, democratic, doctrinaire, and occupational.⁸

In the Canadian West this teaching fell on a soil made favourable not only by a growing disbelief in the likelihood of either of the national parties lowering the tariff, but also by a political temper different from that of Eastern Canada. (One exception must be made to this statement, namely, the old Canadian West in peninsular Ontario, from which, indeed, the original settlement of the West had been largely drawn.) This difference may be broadly expressed by saying that the political temper of the eastern provinces, both French and English, is whiggish. Government there rests on compact, the

⁷Public Archives of Canada, Laurier Papers, 3089, J. W. Dafoe to Laurier, April 28, 1911. "In my judgment reciprocity has changed the whole political situation in the West. Until it was announced the drift out West was undoubtedly against the government; but now it is just other way about."

⁸*United Farmers of Alberta, Annual Report*, 1910, 43. "Moved by the Vermilion Union: Resolved, that ten farmers, as members of Parliament with votes would have more weight in shaping the laws and influencing government than one thousand delegates as petitioners:

Therefore be it further resolved that the farmers, to secure this end, should vote for farmers only to represent them in Parliament and vote as a unit and cease dividing their voting power. Carried."

vested and legal rights of provinces, of minorities, of corporations.⁹ The political temper of the West, on the other hand, is democratic; government there rests on the will of the sovereign people, a will direct, simple, and no respecter of rights except those demonstrably and momentarily popular. Of this Jacksonian, Clear Grit democracy, reinforced by American populism and English radicalism, the Progressive Movement was an authentic expression.

No better example of this difference of temper exists, of course, than the Manitoba school question. Manitoba was founded on a balance of French and English elements; this balance was expressed in the compact of the original Manitoba Act, the essential point in which was the guarantee of the educational privileges of the two language and religious groups. The balance was destroyed by the Ontario immigration of the eighteen-seventies and eighties; in 1890 Manitoba liberalism swept away the educational privileges of the French minority and introduced the "national" school, the chief agency of equalitarian democracy. This set in train a series of repercussions which, through the struggle over the Autonomy Bills in 1905, the introduction of compulsory education by the Liberal party in Manitoba in 1916, and the friction caused by Regulation 17 in Ontario, led up to the split in the Liberal party between the western and the Quebec Liberals on the Lapointe resolution in the federal Parliament in 1916. This split not only foreshadowed and prepared the way for that on conscription; it also contributed to the break-up of the old parties which opened the way to the rise of the Progressive party after 1919.¹⁰ The western Liberals, that is to say, were turning against Laurier because they feared Nationalist domination of the party.

Thus it was that the ground was prepared for the West to throw its weight behind Union Government, first suggested as a war measure, then persisted in to prevent a Liberal victory under Laurier. Western Liberals and radicals did so with much reluctance and many misgivings. An independent movement was already taking root.¹¹ For the Liberal party, an electoral victory was in sight, following a succession of provincial victories and the discontent with the Borden Government's conduct of the war.¹²

This probable Liberal victory, to be based on anti-conscription sentiment in Quebec and low tariff sentiment in the West, was averted by the formation of the Union Government. The issue in that political transformation was whether the three western Liberal governments could be detached from the

⁹I am indebted to Professor J. R. Mallory of Brandon College, now of McGill, for a discussion clarifying this point.

¹⁰*Manitoba Free Press*, May 13, 1916. Editorial, "Consequences." "Whatever may be the political consequences of this blunder to Liberalism in Canada at large, Western Liberalism will not suffer if it adheres to the independence which its representatives have displayed at Ottawa this week. These developments at the capital must tend to strengthen the feeling which has been growing steadily for years that Western Liberals need not look to the East, at present, for effective and progressive leadership... Canadian public life will thus be given what it sorely needs, ... a group of convinced radicals... To your tents, O Israel!"

¹¹*Ibid.*, June 28, 1917, 9. "The Saskatchewan Victory." "The Canadian West is in the mood to break away from past affiliations and traditions and inaugurate a new political era of sturdy support for an advanced and radical programme. The break-up of parties has given the West its opportunity; and there is no doubt it will take advantage of it." At least four independent candidates had been nominated in the West before June, 1917, in provincial and federal seats. In December, 1916, the Canadian Council of Agriculture had issued the first Farmers' Platform.

¹²Henry Borden (ed.), *Robert Laird Borden: His Memoirs* (Toronto, 1938) II, 749-50, J. W. Dafoe to Borden, September 29, 1917.

federal party. But the attempt made at the Winnipeg convention in August, 1917, to prepare the way for this change was defeated by the official Liberals.¹³ The insurgents refused to accept the verdict of the convention; and by negotiations, the course of which is by no means clear, the support of the three western administrations and of the farmers' organizations was won for Union Government. Thus the leadership of the West was captured, and assurance was made doubly sure by the Wartime Elections Act. At the same time, the nascent third party movement was absorbed by the Union Government, and the Liberal party in the West was wrecked by the issue of conscription, as the Conservative party had been mortally wounded by reciprocity.

Though the Union Government was constituted as a "win the war" administration, which should still partisan and sectional strife, other hopes had gone to its making. It was thought that a non-partisan administration might also be an opportunity to carry certain reforms, such as that of civil service recruitment, that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for a partisan government to carry. There was also, and inevitably, the tariff. The Union Government was not publicly pledged to tariff reform, but there can be no doubt that western sentiment had forced Unionist candidates to declare themselves on the tariff; indeed many western Unionists were low tariff Liberals, or even outright independents. The eastern industrialists, on the other hand, were alert to see that the weighty western wing of the Cabinet should not induce the government to make concessions to the West. Thus there was an uneasy truce on the tariff question during the remainder of the war, the issue lying dormant but menacing the unity of the Government and its majority once the pressure of war should be removed. The test was to come with the first peace budget, that of 1919.

These, then, were the underlying causes of the rise of the western Progressive Movement. In 1919 they came to the surface, unchanged in themselves but now operating in a heated and surcharged atmosphere. That there would have been a Progressive Movement in any event is not to be doubted; the war and the events of the post-war years served to give it explosive force.

Certain elements in this surcharged atmosphere were general, others peculiar to the farmer, in effect. Chief of the general elements was the fact that the War of 1914-18 had been fought without economic controls of any significance. The result was inflation with all the stresses and strains inflation sets up in the body economic and social. The high cost of living, as it was called, was an invariable theme of speakers of the day, particularly of spokesmen of labour and the farmer. The farmer was quite prepared to believe that he, as usual, was especially the victim of these circumstances, and would point to the "pork profiteers," to clinch his contention. Inflation was at the root of the general unrest of the day, and the influence of the Russian Revolution, the radical tone of many organizations and individuals, the Winnipeg strike, and the growth of the labour movement are to be ascribed to inflation rather than to any native predisposition to radical courses.

Among the farmers' special grievances was the conscription of farmers'

¹³Dafoe Papers, Dafoe to Augustus Bridle, June 14, 1921. "The Western Liberal Convention was a bomb which went off in the hands of its makers. It was decided upon at Ottawa by a group of conscription Liberals; the intention was to bring into existence a Western Liberal group free from Laurier's control who would be prepared to consider coalition with Borden on its merits, but the Liberal machine in the West went out and captured the delegates with the result that the convention was strongly pro-Laurier."

sons in 1918. The farming population of English Canada, on the whole had supported conscription, but with two qualifications. One was that there should also be "conscription of wealth," by which a progressive income tax was meant. The other was that the farms should not be stripped of their supply of labour, a not unreasonable condition in view of the urgent need of producing food. But the military situation in the spring of 1918 led to the revocation of the order-in-council exempting farmers' sons from military service. The result was a bitter outcry from the farmers, the great delegation to Ottawa in May, 1918, and an abiding resentment against the Union Government and all its works, especially in Ontario.

In the West itself, drouth, especially in southern Alberta, had come to harass a farm population already sorely tried. Suffice it to indicate that in the Lethbridge area of southern Alberta, the average yield of wheat between 1908 and 1921 ranged from sixty-three bushels to the acre in 1915 to two in 1918, and eight in 1921.¹⁴ This was the extreme, but the whole West in varying degrees suffered a similar fluctuation in yield. It was a rehearsal of the disaster of the nineteen-thirties.

To the hazards of nature were to be added the hazards of the market. In 1917 the government had fixed the price of wheat to keep it from going higher, and had established a Wheat Board to market the crops of the war years. Now that peace had come, was wheat once more to be sold on the open market, or would the government fix the price and continue to market the crops through the Wheat Board, at least until the transition from war to peace was accomplished? Here was a chance to make the National Policy a matter of immediate benefit and concern to the western farmer, a chance not undiscerned by shrewd defenders of the National Policy.¹⁵ Here also, under the stimulus of war, was the beginning of the transition from the old Jeffersonian and laissez-faire tradition of the frontier West, to the new West of wheat pools, floor prices, and the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation. The point of principle was clearly grasped by the farmers, but their response was confused. The Manitoba Grain Growers and the United Farmers of Alberta declined in annual convention to ask the government to continue the Wheat Board, but this decision was severely criticized, one might almost say, was repudiated, by the rank and file of the membership. The Saskatchewan Grain Growers, who met later, emphatically demanded that the Wheat Board be continued. In the upshot it was, but only for the crop yield of 1919, and in 1920 it was liquidated. From this action came much of the drive, indeed the final impetus, of the Progressive Movement.¹⁶ Thereafter the western farmer was caught between fixed debt charges and high costs on one hand and falling prices on the other; his position seemed to him desperate. From his despair came first, the Progressive electoral sweep in the West, and then the economic action which created the wheat pools.

Finally, there was the question of tariff revision. It was, however, no longer the simple clash of sectional interests it had been. The customs tariff

¹⁴*Report of the Survey Board for Southern Alberta*, January, 1922.

¹⁵*Hansard*, 1919, 1, 558. Colonel J. A. Currie (Simcoe) "I am quite in agreement with the hon. member for Maple Creek (J. A. Maharg) when he says we should fix a price for the wheat of the West. That is in line with the National Policy." See also the Right Honourable Arthur Meighen's proposal for a modified Wheat Board in his speech at Portage la Prairie during the campaign of 1921. *Canadian Annual Review*, 1921, 449-50.

¹⁶*Cf.* Vernon C. Fowke, *Canadian Agricultural Policy* (Toronto, 1946), 268.

had been increased to help finance the war. Any revision now would affect governmental financing of the war debt, and also the financial resources of private individuals and corporations in the post-war period. In short, the question had now become, what place should tariff revision have in reconstruction?

It was to this question that the Union Government had to address itself, while preparing the budget of 1919 under the vigilant eyes of the farmers' organizations on the one side and of the Canadian Manufacturers' Association on the other. The decision was, in effect, to postpone the issue, on the ground that 1919 was, to all intents and purposes, a war year and that only a very moderate revision should be attempted. The decision was not unreasonable, and was clearly intended to be a compromise between eastern and western views on the tariff.¹⁷ But western supporters of the Union Government were in a very vulnerable position, as the McMaster amendment to the motion to go into Committee of Supply was to show.¹⁸ The pressure from the West for a major lowering of the tariff was mounting and becoming intense. In the outcome, the Honourable Thomas A. Crerar, Minister of Agriculture, resigned on the ground that the revision undertaken in the budget was insufficient. In the vote on the budget he was joined by nine western Unionists. This was the beginning of the parliamentary Progressive party.

The position of the remaining western Unionists became increasingly difficult, though also their pressure contributed to the moderate revision of 1919.¹⁹ The fate of R. C. Henders is very much in point. Henders had been, as President of the Manitoba Grain Growers, an ardent and outspoken agrarian. In 1916 he had been nominated as an independent candidate for Macdonald. In 1917 he accepted nomination as Unionist candidate and was elected. In 1919 he voted with the Government on the budget, on the ground that this was in effect a war budget, and the time premature for a revision of the tariff. In 1920 the United Farmers of Manitoba, following the action of their executive, "repudiated his stand, accepted his resignation, and reaffirmed [their] confidence in the principles of the Farmers' Platform."²⁰ In 1921 he vanished from political ken. An honest man had taken a politically mistaken line and was mercilessly held to account. Such was the fate of western Unionists who did not cross the floor or find refuge in the Senate. Western low tariff sentiment would admit of no equivocation.

The third party movement, stirring in the West before 1917 but absorbed and over-ridden by the Unionist Government, was now free to resume its course with a favourable wind fanned by inflation, short crops, and post-war discontent. A chart had already been provided. The Canadian Council of Agriculture had in 1916 taken cognizance of the mounting demand that political action be taken by the farmers. Without committing the Council

¹⁷The changes were as follows: the 7½ per cent increase for war purposes was removed from agricultural implements and certain necessities of life; the 5 per cent war duty was modified; an income tax was levied.

¹⁸Fourteen western Unionists voted for the amendment. *Hansard*, 1919, IV, 3,678.

¹⁹*Hansard*, 1919, IV, 3475. W. D. Cowan, Unionist (Regina). "I believe that the changes which have been made in the tariff have been made entirely because of the agitation which has been carried on by the West. We have had, for the first time, I fancy, in the history of Parliament, a western caucus and in that we have been united. Old time Liberals united with old time Conservatives. On the one point that they should try to get substantial reductions in the tariffs. . . ."

²⁰*Canadian Annual Review*, 1920, 741.

itself, it prepared the Farmers' Platform as a programme which the farmers' organizations might endorse and which they might press upon the government. The events of 1917 diverted attention from it, but in 1918 it was revised and enlarged, and in 1919 was adopted by the farmers' organizations. In substance, the platform called for a League of Nations, dominion autonomy, free trade with Great Britain, reciprocity with the United States, a lowering of the general tariff, graduated income, inheritance, and corporation taxes, public ownership of a wide range of utilities, and certain reforms designed to bring about a greater measure of democracy, such as reform of the senate, abolition of titles, and the institution of direct legislation and proportional representation.²¹ The platform gave the incoherent western discontent a rallying point and a programme, and was the occasion for the organized farmers entering federal politics. Its title, "The New National Policy," was a gage of battle thrown down before the defenders of the old National Policy, a challenge, direct and explicit, to make that policy national indeed.

This decision to enter federal politics was opportune beyond the dream of seasoned politicians. The prairie was afire in a rising wind, and soon the flames were flaring from one end of the country to the other. In October, 1919, the United Farmers of Ontario carried forty-six seats in a house of 111, and formed an administration. Later in the same month O. R. Gould, farmers' candidate in the federal seat of Assiniboia, defeated W. R. Motherwell, Liberal stalwart and a founder of the Grain Growers' Association, by a majority of 5,224.²² A few days later Alex Moore carried Cochrane in a provincial by-election for the United Farmers of Alberta. In 1920 the organized farmers carried nine seats in Manitoba, seven in Nova Scotia, and ten in New Brunswick.²³ By-election after by-election went against the Government, usually to farmer candidates, until the smashing climax of the Medicine Hat by-election of June, 1921, when Robert Gardiner of the U.F.A. defeated a popular Unionist candidate by a majority of 9,764.²⁴ Even the Liberals' tariff plank of 1919 did little to check the sweep of the flames. The political prophets were estimating that of the forty-three seats west of the lakes, the Progressives would carry from thirty-five to forty.²⁵

All was propitious, then, for the entry of the Progressives into federal politics. There they might hope to hold the balance of power, or even emerge as the largest group. The work of organization was pushed steadily. In December, 1920, the Canadian Council of Agriculture recognized the third party in the House of Commons as the exponent of the new national policy and endorsed the members' choice of the Honourable T. A. Crerar as leader.²⁶ During 1920 and 1921 Progressive candidates were nominated by local conventions in all federal constituencies in the West.

✓ Two major difficulties, however, were arising to embarrass the Progressives in their bid for national power. The first was the charge that they were a class party. The second was the demand that political action be taken in the

²¹See *ibid.*, 1919, for text. 365-8.

²²*Parliamentary Companion*, 1921, 196.

²³*Manitoba Free Press*, February 25, 1921; *Grain Growers' Guide*, August 4, 1920, 4, and October 27, 1920, 5.

²⁴*Parliamentary Companion*, 1922, 247.

²⁵Dafoe Papers, Dafoe to Sir Clifford Sifton, January 20, 1920.

²⁶*Grain Growers' Guide*, December 15, 1920, 3. Resolution of executive of the Canadian Council of Agriculture in meeting of December 7-9, 1920.

provincial as well as the federal field.²⁷ These embarrassments were eventually to split the Movement, defeat its bid for national power, and reduce it to the status of a sectional party.

The origin of these divisions in the Movement may best be examined by turning to provincial politics in the West. That the entrance into federal politics could not be kept separate from a demand that political action be taken in the provinces, arose in part from the federal composition of national parties. Any federal political movement is driven to attempt the capture of provincial governments, in order to acquire the means, that is to say, the patronage, whereby to build an effective political organization. It is not to be supposed that this political maxim was unknown to the leaders of the Progressive Movement. They hoped, however, that national success would be followed by a voluntary adherence of the western governments, which would render capture by storm unnecessary.

The Progressive Movement, at the same time, was a genuine attempt to destroy machine politics, and there was in its leadership a sincere reluctance to accept the facts of political life. They hoped to lead a popular movement, to which the farmers' economic organizations would furnish whatever direction was necessary. It was the zeal of their followers, eager to destroy the old parties wherever they existed, that carried the Progressive Movement into provincial politics.

Province by province, the leaders were compelled to bow to the pressure of the rank and file, and allow the organized farmers to enter the provincial arenas. The methods and the results, however, were by no means identical, for they were conditioned by the different political histories of the three provinces.

In Manitoba the dominating fact was that from 1899 until 1915 the province had been governed by the Conservative Roblin administration. The sheer power and efficiency of the Roblin-Rogers organization, perhaps the classic example of the political machine in Canadian history, accounts in great part for the victory of the anti-reciprocity campaign in Manitoba in 1911. Its spectacular demise in the odour of scandal in 1915 left the provincial Conservative party badly shattered. Henceforth there were many loose Conservative votes in the most conservative of the Prairie Provinces, a province a whole generation older than the other two, and during that generation the very image and transcript of Ontario. But the succeeding Liberal Government, that of the Honourable T. C. Norris, was reformist and progressive. There was little the Grain Growers could ask of the provincial administration that it was not prepared to grant. Why then should the organized farmers oppose the Norris Government? The answer was that the Progressive Movement was, for many Progressives, a revolt against the old party system, and the provincial Liberal organization had been affiliated with the federal Liberals. It might, indeed, become a major buttress of liberalism as the breach between the Laurier and the Unionist Liberal closed. If the old parties were to be defeated at Ottawa, they must be rooted out at the source of their strength in the provinces. Out of this conflict, largely one between leaders and rank and

²⁷Dafoe Papers, Dafoe to Sir Clifford Sifton, January 26, 1921. "Crerar's only troubles out here arise from the ardor with which certain elements in his following insist upon organizing a purely class movement against the three local governments, thereby tending to antagonize the very elements which Crerar is trying, by broadening its basis, to add to his party."

file, came the decision of the new United Farmers of Manitoba in 1920 that the organization as such should not enter provincial politics, but that in the constituencies the locals might hold conventions, nominate candidates, and organize. If a majority of constituencies should prove to be in favour of political action, then the executive of the United Farmers would call a provincial convention to draft a platform.²⁸ As a result, political action was taken locally, and nine farmer representatives were elected to the Manitoba legislature in 1920.²⁹ As a result of this success, the U.F.M. placed the resources of the organization behind the farmers' political action,³⁰ and in the election of 1922 the farmers won a plurality of seats in the legislature. The suspected *rapprochement* of the Norris Government with the federal Liberals may have contributed to its defeat.³¹

In Saskatchewan and Alberta the dominating factor was that at the creation of the two provinces in 1905 the federal Liberal government used its influence to establish Liberal administrations. In Canada the possession of power is all but decisive. Governments fall not so much by the assaults of their enemies as through their own internal decay. From 1905 until 1921 the Liberals ruled in Alberta; from 1905 until 1929 they were in power in Saskatchewan. Moreover, in both, the Conservative party was cut off from patronage and unnaturally compelled to be a party of provincial rights. Both provincial Conservative parties declined from 1911 on, and rapidly after the provincial elections of 1917. In these provinces too, the administrations were careful to govern in harmony with the wishes of the organized farmers. Why then should the farmers enter provincial politics against the Liberal government? Again the answer is that the provincial Liberal parties were affiliated with the federal party, and were examples of the machine politics which Progressives hoped to destroy, politics rendered noisome by the corruption arising from the scramble for the resources of the West, and the political ruthlessness of the professional politicians of the day.

Down to 1917 the political developments of the two provinces were alike, but a remarkable diversion occurs thereafter. In Saskatchewan the Liberal party enjoyed shrewd leadership, considerable administrative ability, and a fine political organization. Threatened by scandal in 1917, it made a remarkable recovery under Premier William Martin. In that almost wholly rural province, the Liberal government was a government of the grain growers. Leadership, as in the instance of the Honourable Charles A. Dunning, graduated from the Association to the government. The slightest wish of the Saskatchewan Grain Growers became law with as much dispatch as the conventions of government allow.³² When the demand for provincial political action arose, Premier Martin met it, in the Preeceville speech of May, 1920,

²⁸*United Farmers of Manitoba Year Book*, 1920, 67.

²⁹*Grain Growers' Guide*, July 7, 1920, 6. Editorial, "The Manitoba Election." "The United Farmers of Manitoba, as an organization, took no part in the election, and each constituency where farmer candidates were nominated and elected acted entirely on its own initiative."

³⁰*Ibid.*, January 19, 1921, 3.

³¹*Manitoba Free Press*, April 28, 1922. Dafoe Papers, Dafoe to Sir Clifford Sifton, July 7, 1922.

³²*Minutes of the Annual Convention of the Saskatchewan Grain Growers' Association*, February 18-21, 1919, 4. Report of Premier Wm. Martin's address. "There are questions now coming before you affecting the welfare of the whole community of the Province. It is the policy of the present government and will continue to be the policy of the present government to carry out these suggestions."

by dissociating the provincial from the federal party. At the same time the weight of the executive of the Grain Growers was thrown against intervention as a separate party in provincial politics. As in Manitoba, when the demand, partly under pressure from the Non-Partisan League, became irresistible, it was referred to the locals.³³ The locals gave little response during 1920-1, and an attempt of third party men in 1921 to commit the central organization to political action was foiled.³⁴ As a result, the provincial Progressive Movement in Saskatchewan became largely an attempt at organization by independents, under the leadership of Harris Turner of Saskatoon.³⁵ Before organization could be well begun, Premier Martin dissolved the legislature and headed off the movement by a snap election. This was decisive. Only thirteen independents were returned, to a great extent, it would seem, by Conservative votes, for the provincial Conservative party simply did not contest the election. Thus the Liberal administration in Saskatchewan survived the Progressive rising, but at the price of severing temporarily its ties with the federal party.

In Alberta the same story was to have a very different outcome. Not only was the Liberal party of that province less fortunate in its leadership, though no less realistic in its tactics, not only did it suffer division by the quarrel over the Alberta Great Waterways Railway scandal, which created a weakness in the party that the division into Laurier and Unionist Liberals did nothing to mend;³⁶ but the farmer organization of that province was separate in its leadership from the government, and that leadership was from 1915 the leadership of Henry Wise Wood. In Alberta, the forceful personalities were outside the government; in Saskatchewan, they were, on the whole, in the government or close to it. Alberta lost the brilliant A. L. Sifton to the Union Government in 1917, and Alberta alone possessed a Henry Wise Wood. Wood and the executive of the United Farmers of Alberta were no more anxious than other leaders of the farm organizations to go into provincial politics. He, indeed, was on principle opposed to going into politics at all. The drive for a third, independent, farmer party, however, developed much greater force in Alberta than elsewhere. This was partly because the decline of the Conservative party was even more pronounced in Alberta than in Saskatchewan. It was also because the Non-Partisan League became more powerful in that province than in Saskatchewan. American populism and British radicalism had freer play in frontier Alberta than in older Saskatchewan. The Non-Partisan League, for example, captured two provincial seats in Alberta in 1917, whereas it had captured only one in Saskatchewan in the same year, and that by a fluke. The League went on to threaten to capture the locals of the U.F.A. by conversion and infiltration. This was a threat that could not be ignored, because it was in and through the locals that the farmers' organiza-

³³*Ibid.*, February 9-13, 1920, 114-19.

³⁴*Ibid.*, January 31-February 4, 1921. The debate on provincial political action was involved; a motion to enter provincial politics as an organization was defeated (118) and a motion to support action by constituencies was, it would seem, shelved (93).

³⁵*Saskatoon Daily Star*, June 1, 1921. Report of the convention of independents at Saskatoon, May 31, 1921.

³⁶John Blue, *Alberta Past and Present* (Chicago, 1924), 125. "The session of 1910 witnessed a perturbation and upheaval that split the Liberal party into two factions, which more than a decade afterwards regarded each other with some jealousy and distrust."

tions lived. Wood and the U.F.A. leaderships were therefore caught on the horns of a dilemma. They knew that political action had invariably ruined farm organizations in the past, as the Farmers' Alliance in the United States had gone to wreck in the Populist party. They knew also that they might lose control of the U.F.A. if the Non-Partisan League obtained control of a majority of locals and assumed leadership of the drive for political action. Wood solved the dilemma by his concept of "group government", and in doing so crystallized the strong tendency of the Progressive Movement, a tendency which owed much to the Non-Partisan League, to become a class movement, deeply averse to lawyers, bankers, and politicians. The U.F.A. would take political action, but it would take it as an organization. It would admit only farmers to its ranks; it would nominate only farmers for election; its representation in the legislature would constitute a separate group, co-operating with other groups but not combining with any to constitute a political party. Guided by this concept, the U.F.A. in 1919 entered politics, both federal and provincial.³⁷ In 1921 it won a majority of the seats in the Alberta legislature.

These varying fortunes of the Progressive Movement in the three provinces were significant for the character of the federal Progressive party. Broadly speaking, two concepts of the character and future of the party prevailed among its members. One, which may be termed the Manitoba view, was that the Progressive Movement was one of insurgent liberalism, which might have the happy result of recapturing the federal Liberal party from the control of the conservative and protectionist Liberals of the East. This was the view, for example, of J. W. Dafoe, a mentor of Progressivism. It aimed at building up a national, popular movement by "broadening out," by "opening the door" to all sympathizers. The Saskatchewan federal Progressives also accepted this view, the more so as the provincial movement had been headed off for a decade. The other concept may be called the Alberta concept. It was that the Progressive Movement was an occupational or class movement, capable of extension by group organization to other economic classes, but not itself concerned with bringing about such extension. Farmer must represent farmer, the group must act as a group.

It may be noted in passing that neither view of the Progressive Movement demands an explicit farmer-labour alliance. Why Progressivism did not develop this characteristic of the earlier Populist party and the later Co-operative Commonwealth Federation cannot be explained here, but it may be said that the leadership of both wings of the Movement was averse to an open alliance with labour.

Here again is the two-fold character of the Progressive Movement postulated in the opening paragraph. Progressivism which was an economic protest, seeking a natural remedy by political action little more unconventional than a revolt from caucus rule, is here termed Manitoban. Progressivism which was doctrinaire, class conscious, and heterodox, is here called Albertan. The former assumed that exploitation would cease in a society made competitive by the abolition of protection; the latter proposed to produce a harmony of interests by putting an end to competition by means of the co-operation of organized groups. Both tendencies, of course, existed all across the Movement. Each was personified and had as respective protagonists the Honourable T. A. Career and Henry Wise Wood.

³⁷*United Farmers of Alberta, Annual Report, 1919, 52-3.*

The extremes, however, were fundamental and irreconcilable. Manitoban Progressivism sought economic ends through conventional political means and admitted of compromise with the old parties. Albertan Progressivism sought much the same economic ends, but also sought to transform the conditions of politics. In this it was closer to the essential nature of Progressivism, with its innate distrust of elected representatives and of party organization.³⁸ Its pledging of candidates, its frequent use of the signed recall, its levy on members for campaign funds, its predilection for direct legislation and for proportional representation, establish its fundamental character. That in so conducting itself it was to give rise to forms of political organization which old line politicians were to envy, is one of those little ironies which delight the sardonic observer.

An examination of the course of the general election of 1921 adds little to the exposition of the theme. As revealed in the campaign literature, it turned on the issues of protection and of the class doctrines of Henry Wise Wood. Prime Minister Meighen, first of those western men with eastern principles to be called to head the Conservative party, put on the full armour of protection, and fought the western revolt in defence of the National Policy. It was courageous, it was magnificent, but it was not successful. His party attacked the Progressives as free traders seeking to destroy the National Policy for selfish class advantage. Mr. W. L. Mackenzie King stood firmly on the Liberal platform of 1919, which, marvelously contrived, faced squarely all points of the political compass at once. Liberal strategy was to avoid a sharp stand, to pose as the farmers' friend—"There never was a Farmers' Party while the Liberals were in power"³⁹—and to denounce the class character of Progressivism. Mr. Crerar was in the embarrassing position of a leader whose followers persist in treading on his heels, but he fought the good fight with dignity and moderation, protesting that his was not a class movement.

In the upshot, the Progressives carried sixty-five seats, and emerged as the second largest group in the House. Coalition with the Liberals was seriously considered and was rejected only at the last moment, presumably because Messrs. Crerar and Drury could not obtain from Mr. King those pledges which would have ensured the identity of the group and the curbing of the protectionist elements in the Liberal Cabinet. This decision marked the beginning of the disintegration of the Movement, for the Progressives neither imposed their policies on the Liberals nor definitely became a parliamentary party seeking office. With that fatal tendency of third parties to avoid responsibility, of which George Langley had warned a decade before,⁴⁰ they declined to become even the official opposition.

Thereafter Manitoban Progressivism lost its bright speed amid the sands

³⁸*Grain Growers' Guide*, March 5, 1919, 26. Article by Roderick McKenzie on "Political Action." "The purpose of the movement inaugurated by the farmers is that whenever the time comes to make a choice of representation to parliament, the electors get together to make their selection."

³⁹P.A.C., Pamphlet no. 5081, *Group Government Compared with Responsible Government*.

⁴⁰*Grain Growers' Guide*, September 21, 1910, 13-14 "It may be urged that a separate farmers' party might influence the government even if it did not become strong enough to take on itself the actual work of governing. The answer to that is this. The legitimate objective of a political party is to control the legislative and administrative functions. Without [that] objective it cannot exist for any length of time. . . ."

and shallows of official Liberalism. Albertan Progressivism, represented by the Ginger Group, the federal U.F.A. members and a few others, alone survived the decay of Progressive zeal, and remained for fourteen years to lend distinction to the national councils, and to bear in its organization the seeds at once of Social Credit and the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation.

DISCUSSION

Professor Masters asked why the speaker had made no mention of heterodox monetary theories in connexion with this movement, since such ideas have been common to all Western progressive movements. He also pointed out that whereas the labour organizations were the possible nucleus of a political party, both labour and farmers reacted against each other, and weakened the Progressive movement in so doing.

Mr. Rosenberg asked Professor Morton to explain Mr. Garland's role in the Progressive movement, particularly his defection from it.

Professor Talman asked if there were any La Follette influence on this movement. He asked the speaker to indicate the sources of his information.

Professor Morton in reply to these several questions stated that there was little or no trace of "funny money" in the movement.¹ He knew no explanation for this lack. He traced Mr. Garland's defection to Irish nationalist feeling. He saw no direct connexion between later American progressivism and the Progressive movement in Canada but he stated that there were strong connexions between earlier American populism and Canadian progressivism. He said his sources had been chiefly magazine and newspaper files, with some reliance upon oral discussion with surviving participants. He has found almost no private papers of Henry Wise Wood.

Professor Sage asked if there were any connexion of the United Farmers of Alberta with single tax ideas?

Professor Morton replied that such ideas had had considerable influence before 1914, chiefly upon municipal legislation, but that they had petered out after the last war.

Mr. George Ferguson stated that George Coote had ideas about "funny money," as did other members of the "Ginger group." He asked if Professor Morton had any more information about the failure of the Progressive movement in Saskatchewan. The explanation based on the abhorrence of the prairie farmers for corruption cannot be considered adequate. Alberta and Saskatchewan should be compared on this score.

Mr. George Hoadley asserted that Henry Wise Wood had no private ideas favouring "funny money." He pointed out that the Progressives (Farmers' Party) split on the question of Dominion-provincial relations. He stated that Wood was opposed to political action, and that only after six meetings of the farmers did he agree to such action.

Mr. McGibbon discussed the significance of the split in the Farmers' Party between the supporters of Mr. Bevington, and those of Mr. Greenfield, at the time when the Premier had to have a seat in the legislature. He emphasized

¹This observation was meant to apply to the years before 1921. It must of course, be corrected in the light of Dr. MacGibbon's statement.

that Mr. Bevington was a "funny money" man, and that he was greatly disappointed not to be elected.

Professor Rolph wanted to have information about the struggle for Progressive leadership after Mr. Crerar.

Mr. George Hoadley reiterated his assertion tht the Progressives did not have "funny money" ideas.

Professor Underhill argued that there was a good deal of "funny money" in the United Farmers. He named Messrs. Gardiner and Spencer as advocates of such ideas.

Mr. George Ferguson pointed out that the Progressive movement, in dying, sowed the seeds of the C.C.F. and the Social Credit parties.

Mr. George Hoadley affirmed, "We didn't promise them anything wth respect to money for we knew that you couldn't do it; but the people hoped."

CULTURAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF FRENCH-CANADIAN NATIONALISM

By JEAN-C. BONENFANT, *Quebec Provincial Library*
and
JEAN-C. FALARDEAU, *Laval University*

THIS paper attempts to single out some basic points of reference for a sociological analysis of French-Canadian nationalism.¹ Our specific purpose is to consider this development from its origins, in terms of its successive symbols, leaders, trends, and expressions; to analyse the psychological, social, and political factors which made it possible at different periods, as well as the institutional or associational devices which canalized it. Particular reference is made to the various segments of the local society which it actually touched. The attempt is broad and perhaps too ambitious. This essay can hardly be more than a sketchy survey and it may very well frustrate both the historians and the sociologists. It can though, at least raise questions if it does not bring coherent answers. This in itself, we assume, may be worthwhile, particularly so if the historians' and the sociologists' interest is stimulated toward further investigation of this complex aspect of French-Canadian history.

For the sake of clarity, an important distinction must first be made between nationalism, as such, and patriotism. Basically, patriotism means devotion to one's country. It is a sentiment of loyalty by virtue of which one feels identified with the political community.² It implies a spontaneous reference to the sharing of a common soil, language, culture, history, folkways, customs, and values, all of which result in a sense of pride as well as a sense of duty to the group. Sociologically, it means the satisfaction of belonging, on the national level, to a "we-group" and to live with the "insiders," as Sumner puts it, "in a relation of peace, order, law, government and industry to each other."³

On the other hand, neither the word nor the fact of nationalism are simple things. Historically, the word was born in most languages around the turn of the nineteenth century to give expression to an individual or collective phenomenon which had oftentimes existed long before. Its meanings have nowadays in many countries become subtly varied and are apt to create great confusion. This has happened in Canada and especially in French Canada. Thus, very often, nationalism may refer only to an acute sense of group-consciousness developed among a people and it can hardly be differentiated from plain patriotism. It implies "the tendency to place a particularly excessive, exaggerated, and exclusive emphasis on the value of the nation at the expense of other values, which leads to a vain and unfortunate overestimation of one's nation and thus to a detracting of

¹Cf. the Abbé Arthur Maheux, "Le Nationalisme canadien-français à l'aurore du XXe siècle" (*Canadian Historical Association Report*, 1945, 58-74).

²Francis W. Coker, article on "Patriotism" (*Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, XI, 26).

³W. G. Sumner *Folkways* (Boston, 1906), 12.

others.”⁴ Nationalism in this sense generally also implies a closer drawing together within a group, most frequently within the framework of a political structure, with its leaders, its symbols, and its historical myths. It can be defensive, militant, offensive or bitterly aggressive. It is connected more closely with the notion of “race” and, to that extent, springs from or leads to ethnocentrism and chauvinisms of all sorts. It is also very often related to the idea of a “national mission,” supposedly vested by God in the group conceived as the object of divine election and the true bearer of a millennial responsibility of some sort. The people comes to consider itself, to use Dostoievski’s word, a “God-bearing” people.

Such may be the political or sociological components of nationalism. We have to see to what extent French-Canadian nationalism historically has combined these elements in a more or less continuous pattern in the course of its successive phases. These dialectical phases fall, in our opinion, under three characteristic headings: (1) the preliminary growing of defensive nationalism with Papineau, followed by the crystallization of constitutional nationalism under the Union régime; (2) the rebound of nationalism on the racial level during the Mercier episode, around 1885; (3) finally, the “Canadian,” anti-imperialist nationalism of Bourassa, at the beginning of this century till the end of the First World War.

I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL NATIONALISM

(1) *The Growing of Defensive Nationalism*

It is true that the complicated canvas of history often makes it hard to single out the threads of patriotism from those of nationalism. They intertwine and may be reciprocal functions of each other. Their difference may not amount to much more than that between shades along the spectrum. Even so, one could hardly say that nationalism existed in French Canada before the moment of the British conquest. Patriotism itself, during the French régime, was more latent than explicit. The soil-tilling habitants, the adventurers, the soldiers, the bureaucratic seigneurs as well as the clergy, busy as they were at their respective parts in the defence and the shaping of a growing society nevertheless developed, during this century and a half, collective traits which made the French of Canada different from those of France. Montcalm in his diary notices many biases and resentments of the “Canadians” against the French.

Group-consciousness and patriotic feeling really developed only after the British conquest, as a result of isolation, contrast, and struggle with the culturally-alien conquering group. The history of the French-Canadian society during the first thirty or forty years of English domination is one of great internal diversity and gradual shifting of attitudes. The incoming English-speaking group was, on the whole, of two sorts. There were, first, the politically liberal-minded British military officers and functionaries sent to Canada in the last period of George II who tried, often with partial success, to gain the sympathy of the local population. There were, on the other hand, the merchants, and the adventurers, mostly from New England, who descended on the new British colony and showed openly

⁴Max Hildebert Boehm, article on “Nationalism” (*Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, XI, 231).

hostile ambitions and attitudes toward both the local population and even the British administrators. French-Canadian attitudes toward the "English" developed variously among the segments of an emerging new French-Canadian society. The clergy, still imbued with the absolutist tradition of the French monarchy, ideologically linked with Rome and always respectful of the established authority, accepted the British government of the country with moderation, strength, and tact and did more than any other group to rally the rural mass to the conqueror and have them accept the new régime. The local nobility, professionally a functionary caste which, it is now acknowledged, remained in much greater numbers than had been formerly assumed, found great affinities with the English aristocracy of functionaries and professional soldiers. There were gradually English-French intermarriages. There were also some between English and the two other important French-Canadian upper social classes, the wealthy merchants and the professional group. These people were almost all on the side of the British governors and administrators, and against the Anglo-American party. They remained however critical of the new régime as well as of its functionaries whenever they felt these were wrong. The significant fact is that this process of gradual identification of the well-to-do French Canadians with the British ruling group also meant an ever-widening gap between the French-Canadian rural and city masses and their intellectual or commercial leaders—a gap which became even greater than the one which had existed during the French régime.⁵

During the last part of the eighteenth and the first part of the nineteenth centuries, especially around the time of the Quebec Act of 1774 and the Constitution of 1791, national solidarity grew into an acute form of political consciousness. French Canadians sensitively felt their minority political status while, at the same time, they remained quite naturally aware of being what Everett-C. Hughes describes as "the charter members" of the country.⁶ This was a period of strife against the ruling power, stimulated by the struggle for the recognition of civil and constitutional rights.⁷ This culminated in the events of 1837-8 and the name of Papineau dominates this period. Papineau later became a violent symbol of nationalism and it is generally assumed that he was himself a nationalist, that French-Canadian nationalism actually originated from him. Filteau in his *Histoire des Patriotes* overly stresses this idea.⁸ Papineau was actually a nationalist but we may question whether, in the first part of his life, that is, the active part which he lived here before his stay in Paris and which is really important in our history, he was profoundly under the influence of contemporary European trends of thought regarding the principle of na-

⁵Léon Gérin, "L'Intérêt sociologique de notre histoire au lendemain de la conquête" (*Revue Trimestrielle Canadienne*, I, mai, 1915, 3 ff.).

⁶Everett C. Hughes, *Rencontre de deux mondes* (Montreal, 1946), foreword.

⁷It has been suggested that the year 1806 in which the first issue of the newspaper *Le Canadien* was published might be considered as the original date in the history of French-Canadian nationalism. The actual role of the press in French Canada's political life will be better appreciated when the complete history of French-Canadian newspapers will have been systematically studied as an integral part of our total social history. See Séraphin Marion, *Lettres canadiennes d'autrefois* (Ottawa, 1939).

⁸Gérard Filteau, *Histoire des Patriotes* (vols., Montreal, 1939), especially vol. I, book II; vol. III, book VIII, ch. I, II.

tionality.⁹ He was rather a great parliamentary liberal, a great patriot forced by the circumstances to be a nationalist.

During the elections of 1827, the former Canadian party became officially known, under the lead of Papineau, as the Patriots' party, being, as they said, "the friends of the king, of the constitution and of the country."¹⁰ A few years later, the party adopted a rallying flag which consisted of three horizontal stripes bearing the colours of green, white, and red, not dissimilar to the French revolutionary tricolour. The party was reshaped and systematically organized for national political action in 1834 at the moment of the "92 Resolutions." It then included a most impressive array of political leaders and orators: Lafontaine, Viger, Morin, Nelson, Duvernay, Parent, and, above all, Papineau. Its philosophy was largely derived from the prevalent continental catchwords of social progress, democracy, reform, and liberty. It was liberal with a view to integrating the Canadian tradition into a fully worked out framework of British parliamentary institutions. Some newspapers shared its cause and diffused its ideas among the population: in Montreal, the *Vindicator*, *La Minerve* published by Duvernay and having as its regular collaborators most of the leaders of the Patriots' party; in Quebec the *Liberal*, *Le Canadien*, published by the firmly reasonable Etienne Parent who had coined as his motto the patriotic slogan: "Nos institutions, notre langue et nos droits"; the *Echo du Pays*, the *Township Reformer*, *Le Fantasque* etc. Besides, the party included as its central feature the overall body of the *Comité Central et Permanent* which centralized information and propaganda and which, through the channels of a hierarchical structure of local sub-committees, had the duty of organizing meetings, providing speakers and literature, and otherwise uniting and stimulating the "popular forces."

The so-called nationalism of Papineau and of his followers expressed itself on the political and economic levels. Economically, the Patriots' attitude took the form of boycotting British products. But, on the whole, in our opinion, the events of 1837-8 were of too local a character, and too hopeless to be described as a large-scale nationalist movement. The aggressive and intensive patriotism of Papineau and of his followers represents, more truly, an extreme form of the reaction of a minority group deprived of their rights and struggling for recognition.

Another movement, grown out of the events of 1837-8, deserves special mention. It is the Saint-Jean-Baptiste Society which originated in Montreal in 1834 owing to the initiative of Duvernay and Jacques Viger and first took the form of banquets gathered to "unite the French Canadians and

⁹Papineau and his lieutenants were undoubtedly acquainted with the contemporary French political theories. Lamennais's *Les paroles d'un croyant* was being circulated and read in Canada at that time. A copy of this book, published in 1834, now part of the Chauveau Collection at the Quebec Provincial Parliament Library, bears the following handwritten note by Chauveau: "importé en grande quantité à cette époque (1835) par les chefs du mouvement et distribué dans toutes les campagnes du Canada. Ou plutôt imprimé à Montréal?"

The two names which occur most often in Papineau's letters of this period are those of Lamennais and, especially, Jefferson. The influence of the Jeffersonian ideology on the contemporary Canadian political leaders is of no small significance and should be studied more thoroughly.

¹⁰Filteau, *Histoire des Patriotes*, I, 129.

give them a rallying cry."¹¹ The meetings were stopped during the dark days of "37-8," then resumed in Quebec in 1842, and finally again in Montreal. The Saint-Jean-Baptiste Society was hoped, in the minds of its founders, to be the first great associational device binding strongly together the masses and the *élite* amongst French Canadians who had gradually drifted more and more apart. It was rationalized as the sanction of a "sacred alliance" between these two groups and was even, afterwards, compared to the Magna Carta which had sanctioned the alliance between the Norman barons and the Britons.¹² The Saint-Jean-Baptiste Society had a motto, a flag, an emblem, and a definite patriotic purpose. The motto was that of "Nos institutions, notre langue et nos droits," which Duvernay borrowed from Etienne Parent. The flag had the same green, white, and red colours as the Patriots' flag. The emblem was the maple leaf, conceived as "the symbol of the destiny of the French-Canadian people." As Viger had said at the first national banquet in Montreal (later to be quoted by numberless speakers again and again): "This tree—the maple—which grows in our valleys . . . at first young and beaten by the storm, pines away, painfully feeding itself from the earth, but it soon springs up, tall and strong, and faces the tempest and triumphs over the wind which can not shake it any more. The maple is the king of our forest; it is the symbol of the Canadian people."¹³ It is mostly from the ranks of the Saint-Jean-Baptiste Society that the leaders of the patriots' party's Permanent Committee came and, to that extent, the Saint-Jean-Baptiste Society originally had for a while a semi-political character. This Society also did much, from the very beginning, to make explicit and to overemphasize the unconscious relationship which always exists between national feeling and religion. Simultaneously, through its annual lyrical speeches and demonstrations, it glorified and popularized, along with a true reverence for tradition and the institutions of the past, an emotional and myth-like interpretation of the historical development of the French Canadians, which later developed into the recurrent theme of a "national mission" of the people.

These features of early official French-Canadian patriotism are symptomatic of one basic stratum of collective feeling on which, under the stimulus of politically defined situations of "national emergency," nationalist leaders were later able to capitalize and to which they could give stereotyped, exuberant forms.

(2) *Constitutional Nationalism under the Union Régime*

It appears that Quebec nationalism as a political expression of the French Canadians on the Canadian scene actually came to life against the assimilation attempt of the Union Act. The Durham Report and the Union Act had left the French Canadians in a state of great pessimism, which

¹¹H.-J.-J.-B. Chouinard, *Annales de la Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Québec* (vol. IV, Quebec, 1902), La Cie d'Imprimerie du "Soleil," 1903, 307-10.

¹²Speech by the Honourable Chapleau, Montreal, June 15, 1884, reproduced in *Grand Cinquantenaire de la Saint-Jean-Baptiste, 1834-84, compilé d'après les rapports de "L'Etendard," présenté par H. Giroux* (Montreal, 1884), 35.

¹³Quoted by Amédée Robitaille, "La Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste" (in H.-J.-J.-B. Chouinard (ed.), *Fête Nationale des Canadiens-Français célébrée à Québec, 1881-84* (Quebec, 1890), 435.

can not be described more dramatically than by Etienne Parent's article in *Le Canadien* of October, 1839. After having recalled that French Canadians had faith in the establishment, in Lower Canada, of an independent nation different from those of the surrounding states, Parent goes on, in an unexpectedly pessimistic mood, to say that French Canadians, in their own interest as well as that of their children, have nothing more to do than "work as hard as they can to bring forth an assimilation which will crush the barrier separating them from the population pressing upon them from every side."¹⁴

French-Canadian nationalism then took a strong political orientation within the context of British parliamentary institutions. This marks a turning point in the history of group relations in Canada. Lafontaine was responsible for it. He and many other contemporary French-Canadian political leaders were, above all, clever jurists and they enjoyed, along with their patriotic feelings, playing the game of British political institutions. It was felt necessary in the British world, about this time, to sanction the principle of ministerial responsibility, that is, of the control of the executive by the people's representatives. The Durham Report acknowledged the necessity of applying this principle in the colonies as it had been in the metropolis a few years earlier. Lafontaine understood that ministerial responsibility would mean partial control of the executive by the French-Canadian representatives and, to attain his aim, he had the extraordinary opportunity of being able to become allied with the Reformers of Upper Canada. Once the political victory was obtained, it had important consequences on every level of the public administration. French Canadians experienced a considerable development under the Union Régime. It seems as though the nationalism of former years had, during that period, become less aggressive, less vocal, and more oriented toward practical developments in the educational, municipal, and agricultural fields. The ethnic groups in Canada then seem to have come to a sort of equilibrium which made possible the bargaining which preceded Confederation.

Without going too far beyond the scope of this study, we must briefly mention here certain features of contemporary French-Canadian life which may help us grasp in truer perspective the series of political events we have to investigate. The population of the whole of Canada, according to the 1861 census, was 2,507,657, of whom 883,568 were French-speaking. Lower Canada alone had a population of 1,100,000, of whom 75 per cent, viz. 847,000 were French. The province was almost exclusively rural, despite the constant flow of emigration toward, first, the United States, then, in a scattered fashion, toward the new West. There were only three or four communities deserving the name of cities: Montreal, with a population of 90,333; Québec, with 58,319, Three-Rivers, and Sorel. Numerous classical colleges had been founded in the province, either by the local secular clergy or by teaching orders from Europe: Nicolet in 1804, Saint-Hyacinthe in 1811, Sainte-Thérèse and Chambly in 1824, Joliette in 1846, Sainte-Marie in Montreal in 1850. The *École Littéraire* of Quebec had been fostering an ardent group of writers, poets, historians, and novelists,

¹⁴Quoted by Filteau, *Histoire des Patriotes*, III, 244-5.

like Garneau, Gérin-Lajoie, LaRue, Crémazie, and others,¹⁵ who exalted the ideals, the symbols and the values of the French Canadians: the history of the race, the Mother Country, the Roman Catholic Church, the language and the folklore, the cult of the soil. The voluminous writings of Garneau and Ferland aroused interest around 1860 in the reading and the teaching of Canadian history. Text-books for college students were published which consisted mostly, at first, of chronological tables, deliberately underlining the ecclesiastical and religious landmarks of the history of the French in Canada.¹⁶

Less refreshing than these blossoming literary achievements were the ideological cleavages which had been, for some time, splitting, in harsh controversies, notable portions of the French-Canadian *élite* of journalists, political writers, and politicians. Let us evoke only the clash between the two schools of thought, the ultramontanes and the liberals, which were very influential in conditioning the emergence of the two main political parties of the Conservatives and the Liberals. Mgr Bourget, the authoritarian Bishop of Montreal, nonetheless a pro-Patriot, had been the leader of the local Catholic reaction to the French Revolutions of 1830 and 1848 and he did much to infuse such views in the Quebec mentality by his importation of teaching orders: Jesuits, Christian Brothers, etc., all of whom were imbued with the idea that the new democracy was incompatible with Catholicism. When Papineau indoctrinated the "rouges" with the new democratic ideas after his return from Paris, the long struggle began between the ultramontanes and the liberals. The latter were thought of as too radical, too democratically-minded, too free-thinking and anticlerical.¹⁷ The historical fights between their extreme wing, the *Institut Canadien* and Mgr Bourget are well known. Out of their milder wing came men like Laurier. But, curiously enough, as Mason Wade points out, ultramontanism which was anti-nationalist in Europe became highly nationalist in Canada, while the liberal, Gallican-minded group were internationalist.¹⁸ The fusion of political ideas with religious ones, with Catholicism yielding to nationalistic symbols in case of conflict, is evident in Mgr Laflèche, Mgr Bourget's righthand man, who was inspired by the idea of Rohrbacher, an apologist for the Catholic reaction to the events of 1830 and 1848.¹⁹ Mgr Laflèche is among the earliest, if not the first, to overemphasize the idea that the French Canadians constitute a Catholic nation, that they have a

¹⁵See J. Huston (ed.), *Le Répertoire national ou Recueil de littérature canadienne* (4 vols., Montreal, 1848); also *La Littérature Canadienne de 1850 à 1860, publiée par la Direction du "Foyer Canadien"* (2 vols., Quebec, 1863).

¹⁶Among some typical historical text-books see: *Histoire abrégé du Canada* (Montreal, 1865); the Abbé C. H. Laverdière, *Histoire du Canada* (Quebec, 1877); Hubert LaRue, *Histoire populaire du Canada* (Quebec, 1875); the Abbé Provancher, *Histoire du Canada, Le premier cours* (Quebec, 1884); the Abbé David Gosselin, *Tablettes chronologiques et alphabétiques des principaux événements de l'histoire du Canada* (Quebec, 1887). Also, the pioneering pedagogical essay, *Guide de l'instituteur*, by F. X. Valade first published in Montreal in 1843 and re-edited many times.

¹⁷For an elaborate analysis of the influence of European intellectual liberalism in French Canada, see Marcel Trudel, *L'Influence de Voltaire au Canada* (2 vols., Montreal, 1945).

¹⁸H. Mason Wade, *The French-Canadian Outlook: A Brief Account of The Unknown North Americans*, to be published in the summer of 1946, New York.

¹⁹See Robert Rumilly, *Mgr Laflèche et son temps* (Montreal, 1938), chap. II, III, *passim*.

providential mission and that, as such, it is their duty, to remain defensively self-centred under the leadership of their bishops who, as leaders of the sacred society stand above the political leaders in temporal affairs. It is amid these controversies that political conservatism grew up, whose politicians, during so many years, fought fights which Mercier was later to describe as "fratricides."

II. THE REBOUND OF POLITICAL NATIONALISM ON THE RACIAL LEVEL DURING THE MERCIER EPISODE, 1885

The equilibrium already mentioned between English and French lasted for a few years in Canada after Confederation. French Canadians seemed politically happy to grow within their new provincial institutions and, in Ottawa, they played an important role within the powerful Conservative party. This equilibrium was broken by events happening not inside, but outside Quebec, viz., by facts inherent in the spreading and growth of the French-speaking population in the rest of Canada. The Quebec reaction to these events crystallized around Mercier:

Honoré Mercier already had strong nationalist tendencies. He was, as early as 1871, one of the original members of the first political group to be officially known as the "national" movement. The latter was composed of young liberals and eager conservatives who were all ardent patriots. Its inception was due to the partial dissatisfaction with federal economic policies, particularly to resentment against the recent inclusion, under the name of Manitoba, of the former North West Territories into Confederation. This event had a bad press in Quebec owing to the fear of spoliation of the rights of the French-Canadian minority in this area. The aim of the rising national movement was to create a "united French-Canadian front erasing the former party lines, for the defense of French-Canadian rights." The original platform of the party emphasized, along with an elaborate programme of electoral reform and administrative readjustments, the ideas of provincial autonomy, decentralization, tariff protection, and opposition to the Canadian Pacific project.

It was actually the outcome of the Riel affair, in 1885, which stimulated Mercier's nationalist movement. The execution of Riel in November, 1885 created great irritation among the Quebec population against the federal Conservative Cabinet of Sir John A. Macdonald and especially against its French-Canadian ministers, Langevin, Caron, and Chapleau. Riel, although a semi-neurotic and megalomaniac character with whom the French-Canadian Bishop of Saint-Boniface, Mgr Taché, had had trouble, was built up by the press and the politicians into a "racial" symbol. Being, as he was, the chief of the French half-breeds of the West, he stood as a "French" martyr, a "brother" (—"Louis Riel, mon frère"—Mercier would repeatedly proclaim—)²⁰ who had, in the hands of fanatic Orangists, been the victim of an unjust trial and condemned to unjust death. Popular meetings were held in a great many communities and villages.²¹ There was an uproar throughout the province. It was at the first of these meetings,

²⁰See *Discours prononcé par l'Honorable M. Mercier à l'Assemblée Législative de Québec, 7 mai 1886, sur la question Riel* (Quebec, 1886), 15 ff.

²¹*Ibid.*, 40 ff.

in Montreal, that Mercier announced the formation of a new great national party which would gather in all those who resented the Riel "outrage." The first objective would be to overthrow, by all constitutional means possible, the Macdonald Government. The national movement thus reinforced and capitalized on the dramatic re-birth of the French-Canadian feeling of solidarity created by the "affair." The political offensive, led by Mercier, included all the Liberals, the Nationalist Conservatives detached from their party by the Riel affair, and the Ultramontanes of Quebec and Montreal, against the die-hard Conservatives, the Ultramontanes of Three-Rivers and the English-speaking Quebec minority. Mercier, in 1886, as leader of the national party, won the election which was to make him, for five years, a leader and active symbol of French-Canadian political unity.

Mercier's nationalist movement was rhetorical and political. It was opposed to the Ottawa Conservatives. It also materialized in positive action. With the help of Sir Oliver Mowat, Premier of Ontario in whom he found an ally against Sir John A. Macdonald, Mercier took pleasure in re-affirming the rights of the provinces. He also interestingly enough foreshadowed the future political theories of Bourassa on two main points: (1) the interest of French Canadians in Canada outside Quebec; (2) the opposition to British imperialism of a new brand then being put forward by Joseph Chamberlain. Speeches made by Mercier on many occasions unmistakably illustrate the extent to which the last forms of his own nationalism connect up with Bourassa's nationalism to come.²² Mercier's nationalism, spectacular and political as it was, aroused a certain amount of popular fervour but did not reach down to a very large portion of the population. It was Mercier as a man who was popular—to the point of becoming legendary even during his lifetime—rather than his nationalism. The tempo and intensity of communication with the country were not what they are today. Moreover, the main political issue which the always influential clergy had been stressing to the rural and even the urban population for years was anti-liberalism. It was mostly among college and university students that the *rationale* of nationalism could gain adherents. Mercier's slogans and catchwords were spread by the press, especially by the two exclusively "national" newspapers, *La Vérité* in Quebec and *L'Étendard* in Montreal. Both stood for "national" causes like provincial autonomy, the development of agriculture, the protection of French minorities outside Quebec, the official recognition of the French language, etc.

Other factors also did much to popularize the word "national" with a French-Canadian connotation. Again, the Saint-Jean Baptist Society,

²²See for example, a speech made at the Windsor Hotel on April 10, 1888, where Mercier said: "The situation is serious; we are facing the greatest danger ever faced by our political structure; we are asked to participate in a regime which can not but bear the most disastrous consequences for us. So far, we have lived a colonial life; today, we are forced against our will to assume the responsibilities and dangers of a sovereign state which will not be ours, to expose ourselves to the vicissitudes of peace and war between the world's great powers and to the demanding necessities of military service as it exists in Europe; a political regime is imposed upon us which, through conscription, could scatter our sons from the Polar icelands to the burning sands of the Sahara,—a regime which would condemn us to the compulsory tribute of blood and money and would tear from us our sons, the hope of our country and the consolation of our old days, to precipitate them into far-away and bloody wars which we could neither prevent nor stop. . . ." *Biographie, Conférences, etc., de l'Hon. Honoré Mercier* (Montreal, 1890).

for one, with its festive annual meetings officially gathering representatives from all the significant walks of French-Canadian life—clergy, politicians of all colours, journalists, writers, professionals, merchants, and students—was potent in developing an impressive nationalist symbolism for mass consumption. It has already been suggested that the slightly nationalist view of French-Canadian history originally implied the notion of a special divine mission granted to the French Canadians in North America. Such a view is a natural outcome of the theological-mindedness of the French-Canadian clerical leaders, particularly of those who shared the conception of history of Bossuet and De Maistre, according to whom Providence intervenes directly in human affairs, or, as Alfred de Vigny pleasantly remarked, “plays checkers with kings and people.” The idea of a French-Canadian providential mission was recurrent in the writings of such men as Fréchette and the Abbé Casgrain who wrote that the French Canadians would “lead back under the aegis of Catholicism the errant peoples of the New-World.” This idea had by this time, become an oratorical commonplace. In 1879, Mgr Lafèche, in a letter to the President of the Saint-Jean-Baptiste Society of Quebec, was saying: “I am of those who firmly believe that nations have a providential mission and that nothing can stop in their march those which tend constantly, without deviating to right or to left, toward the end which has been prescribed for them, no more than anything can save those which have prevaricated and finally left the paths which the Providence has traced for them. The teaching of the Church is, on this point, in harmony with that of history.”²³ This *leit motiv* is amplified in such famous speeches as that of Justice A. B. Routhier at the national convention of the Saint-Jean-Baptiste Society in Quebec, in 1880;²⁴ and in sermons preached on Saint-Jean-Baptiste days in Montreal, Quebec, and elsewhere, even outside the province, by lyrical guest orators.²⁵ A frequent implication of these religious deliveries is that an additional evidence of the French Canadians’ inescapable divine mission lies in the fact that France has abdicated, in modern times, by becoming secular and atheistic, her former God-given mission on earth. They held that it is now up to French Canada to take on where old France has left off. An outstanding figure among the religious orators was Mgr L. A. Paquet who was to become French Canada’s foremost theologian and whose sermons on Saint-Jean-Baptiste days in 1887,²⁶ and especially in 1902 remain the classics of patriotic literature and messianic nationalism. On the last occasion of the celebration of the Quebec Saint-Jean-Baptiste Society’s diamond jubilee, Mgr Paquet held that not only does each nation have its providential mission but that some of them have the honour of being called to a sort of priesthood

²³Chouinard, *Fête Nationale des Canadiens-Français*.

²⁴*Ibid.*, 292.

²⁵See the following: the Abbé Bauer, “Discours prononcé dans l’église de Windsor, Ontario, le 25 juin 1883,” reported by H.-J.-J.-B. Chouinard, *Fête Nationale des Canadiens-Français*, 20; the Abbé Rouleau, sermon on June 24, 1884 in Montreal, reported in *Grand Cinquantenaire de la St-Jean-Baptiste, compilé d’après les rapports de “L’Eten-dard,”* 5; the Abbé Odilon Paradis, “Sermon de la Saint-Jean-Baptiste prêché à Québec le 24 juin 1887,” in *Fête Nationale des Canadiens-Français*, 122 ff.

²⁶Mgr. L. A. Paquet, *Discours et Allocutions*, (Quebec, 1915).

among the others. They have a divine "vocation" and such is the case of the French-Canadian people.²⁷

Thus there evolved a French-Canadian body of national thought closely integrating the sacred with the secular. This philosophy, officially voiced by the clerical leaders, was implicitly or explicitly taken up and played upon with symphonic variations by the political leaders whose desire to utilize the national feeling made them sensitive to the people's accepted definition of national life. This trend of thought is sociologically significant because it helps us understand how the kind of halo which magnified Bourassa into a mystic figure could ever be possible.

III. THE CANADIAN, ANTI-IMPERIALIST NATIONALISM: BOURASSA

Whenever Quebec nationalism is referred to, it is chiefly in connection with the Bourassa-worshipping movement which was born around the turn of the century and was to disappear or substantially transform itself at the end of the First World War. This period offers us the paradox of a man, Bourassa, who, on the one hand, came closest to being the French-Canadian equivalent of a charismatic leader and whose nationalism, on the other hand, had officially little more than a broad Canadian connotation. Nationalism in this tumultuous phase took the form of a revival, gathering a wide range of supporters and followers, ideological, mystical, and political. It is a phase of, first, militant and aggressive, then opportunistic nationalism.

Recent events in Canadian life had once more intensified the French-Canadian sense of solidarity. The way in which the Manitoba school question was being unsettled since 1890 and, finally decided in a way unfavourable to the French-speaking minority, became a matter of national discussion. The Canadian "racial" conflict sprang to a new height. The Quebec French Canadians, on the whole, took sides with their ostracized compatriots while, on the other side, an extremist English-speaking group outside Quebec entrenched itself behind an anti-French attitude not unrelated, as has been pointed out by many students of Canadian affairs, to the anti-Catholic dissatisfaction aroused among many Anglo-Protestant groups by Mercier's indemnity to the Jesuits, in 1888. It was in large part around the Manitoba school question that Laurier had become Prime Minister in 1896. Later, in 1899, the Canadian official decision to participate in the South African War caused the recrudescence of a strong anti-imperialistic wave. Bourassa immediately resigned his seat in protest.

The *Ligue Nationaliste* (Nationalist League) grew up in Montreal, around 1900 out of meetings organized by a group of combative patriots dissatisfied with the national attitude of the two great parties.²⁸ Bourassa was their idol. The League was officially founded at a great mass meeting in Montreal in 1903 and, in 1904, Asselin started publishing its official newspaper, *Le Nationaliste*. This nationalist revival was consciously

²⁷*Ibid.*, 181 ff. A special edition for college use with analytical notes and comments has been made of this sermon by Canon Emile Chartier, under the title of *Bréviaire du patriote canadien-français* (Montreal, 1925).

²⁸See Armand Lavergne, *Trente Ans de vie nationale* (Montreal, 1934), chap. vii.

strongly linked with the past.²⁹ Bourassa did not forget that he was Papineau's grandson and his lieutenants never missed a chance of recalling it. The political programme of the movement centred around the basic themes of integral bilingualism, anti-imperialism, the autonomy of Canada within the Empire and the autonomy of the province within Canada, opposition to mass European immigration, and the settlement of the minority school problems. The League also campaigned for the reorientation along nationalist lines of French-Canadian economic life. It was supported, on many issues, by a great number of the Quebec newspapers among which were *L'Événement*, in Quebec, *L'Action Sociale* founded in 1908, *La Vérité* edited by Omer Héroux, and *La Libre Parole*.

In 1904 there was also founded in Montreal, under the auspices of the Jesuits, the *ACJC* (Catholic Association of the Canadian Youth) which was a non-political association but which soon gave strong ideological support and dynamic following to the nationalist movement. It aimed at including all the male youth of the province, but at the beginning and for a long time afterwards consisted only of college study groups. Their official purpose, under the motto of "Piety, Study, Action," was the study of national problems, but they soon began echoing the political campaigns of Bourassa and participating in organized, large-scale nationalist action and public demonstrations of their own. They organized campaigns for the recognition of bilingualism. They popularized the hero-worshipping of myth-transformed historical characters like Dollard, and of "national" defenders or "martyrs" like Papineau, Riel, etc. They generally appealed to public opinion for defensive action against all enemies of the French Canadians.

There existed then in Quebec, for the first time, a rather strongly organized body of nationalist political action which was active in federal, provincial, and even municipal elections. As suggested, it was still more a movement than a party in the true meaning of the word. Bourassa, for one, always protested that he had never wanted to create a real party but it remains a fact that the movement of his followers played an important role between the Conservative and the Liberal parties. It is as a political group that nationalism drew to itself many political opportunists who saw in it the only means of fighting against Laurier who had become the idol of the whole province while the Conservatives alone could hardly do anything about it. On the other hand, the Liberal party was experiencing the handicap of all strong parties that remain long in power. The young Liberals were getting more independent and felt themselves, although to a lesser extent than the Conservatives, the appeal of Bourassa's nationalism. Many provincial political leaders sided in with the nationalists. One remembers the historical political campaigns of 1910-11, against Laurier's navy programme and participation in imperial wars. The atmosphere was

²⁹See a speech delivered by Armand Lavergne in Montreal at the fifth anniversary banquet of *Le Devoir*. Lavergne, after having evoked 1837-8, Mercier, and Riel, goes on to say: "But we were determined to persist, for, in this Nationalist League, we were studying a little of the history of our country; we had remembered the schools of New-Brunswick, the Riel affair, the Manitoba schools, the abolition of the French language in Manitoba and in the North West territories, the settlement of the Manitoba question, the sending of troops to South Africa, the intensive immigration intended to drown us. . . ." *Cinquième Anniversaire du Devoir* (Montreal, 1915), 15.

fierce and mystical. LaVergne, one of the champions of the movement, refers to himself and Bourassa as the then "bishops" of nationalism.³⁰ This climax culminated in the defeat of Laurier in 1911. Soon after, when in power, many of the former nationalist, "raisin-blue" Conservatives forgot their recent golden alliance with the nationalist movement.

French-Canadian nationalism during this whole period was given a manifold content by the various groups who directly or indirectly felt bound to it. Bourassa's followers on various levels interpreted his postulates according to their own respective perspectives, from mild anti-British feeling to ultra-nationalism. He was the prophet whose teachings are faithfully distorted by his proselytic disciples.

Formally, Bourassa's personal interpretation of nationalism forms a well-integrated ideology in which the French-Canadian approach as such is only secondary, the main emphasis being made on a broad Canadianism. First of all, Bourassa was never a separatist himself. Separatism at that time was represented by a lone wolf whom Bourassa occasionally attacked, J.-P. Tardivel, editor of the newspaper *La Vérité*.³¹ Bourassa was, above all, historically always a fierce "Canada-firster," in a constitutional and emotional way. His statements on this can be found anywhere in his innumerable writings and particularly in his articles in *Le Devoir*, the daily newspaper he founded in 1910. In a pamphlet on the 1911 tariff agreement between Canada and the United States Bourassa wrote that: "The general and superior interests of Canada must have priority over the more particular class or provincial interests; they must be not left under the predominance of American industry and transport; they must not be subordinated to a false imperial idea either. Now or never is the time to say: Canada to the Canadians and, in so saying, to yield neither to the Americans nor to the other parts of the Empire. Such is the true nationalist doctrine. It is as such that we have suggested its adoption long before the founding of *Le Devoir*."³² "His concept of Canadian citizenship and Canadian patriotism is similarly well known. "We do not have the right," he says in a speech in Montreal in 1915, "to make Canada an exclusively French country more than the Anglo-Canadians have the right to make it

³⁰*Ibid.*, 195.

³¹Tardivel, published in 1895, a "prophetic" novel entitled *Pour la Patrie* in which are described political events taking place in 1946 and leading to the establishment of a French state in North America. In one of his last articles before his death Tardivel wrote: "It is true that we thought seriously of asking the British Crown, which guaranteed us the practice of our religion and our national liberty, to safeguard us effectively against the fanatic element of this country. . . . But perhaps could we be given the permission to suggest a solution to the problem, that is, to reshape the Dominion on a new basis and to subdivide it into two or more Confederations. The province of Quebec, plus the French parts of Ontario and New Brunswick, could form one Confederation; the rest of the Maritime Provinces, another one; the English part of Ontario and the West, a third one. Quebec and the Eastern provinces could perhaps even constitute a single Confederation, their material interest being identical enough. . . ." *La Vérité*, 15 avril, 1905.

³²Henri Bourassa, *La Convention douanière entre le Canada et les États-Unis, sa nature, ses conséquences* (Montreal, 1911). See also the booklet advertising the concern *La Publicité* which was to publish *Le Devoir* and containing a programme of which one article emphasized "the most complete autonomy for Canada compatible with the faithfulness to the British Crown." Also, *La Politique de l'Angleterre avant et après la guerre* (Montreal, 1914).

an English country. . . .³³ And, again in his pamphlets entitled *Independence or Imperial Partnership?*

. . . the preservation and simultaneous growth of two national languages and two different types of mental culture, far from being an *obstacle* to the progress of Canada, *constitute its most powerful factor and our greatest national asset*. The moment the English-speaking majority have found that much, they will make this other discovery: that the French Canadians are much more *Canadien* than *French*, and therefore, once left alone in the development of their *ethnic* propensities, always prepared to cooperate with the English majority, provided the latter prove also that they are more *Canadian* than *English* or *Imperial*. Then, the racial quarrel will be at an end or very near it. *So long as the majority of Canadians have two countries, one here and one in Europe, national unity will remain a myth and a constant source of internecine quarrels.*³⁴

Bourassa's doctrinal nationalism awakened in Quebec diverse echoes which are still hard to appraise justly. The most crucial social class to consider in this connection is the clergy. From the very beginning of the nationalist movement, at the time of the South African war, diverse attitudes are noticeable among the clergy, one would almost say, between the higher and the lower clergy. The clergy, in general, shared the feelings of the people who were anti-imperialist and sympathetic to the Boers, while the bishops and the Church official spokesmen expressed loyalty to the British Crown.³⁵ It is indubitable that the rural and the urban as well as the teaching clergy in the colleges were later gradually moved by Bourassa when he crusaded for the western schools, for the rights of the French language, and for a provincial policy of a wider and more technical colonization and also when he showed a personal attitude of submissiveness to the Church.³⁶ His famous speech at the Montreal Eucharistic Congress in 1910 which identified the Catholic faith of the French Canadians with the French language and, later, the intellectual charm of *Le Devoir*, were influential in seducing the clergy. They, in their turn, were influential in galvanizing their flock or their students with messianic symbols. There was also, in 1910 in Quebec, the much-publicized first Congress of the French Language in America (Congrès de la Langue française en Amérique) which gathered, in a fascinating context, delegates from all the

³³*L'Accord avec les Anglo-Canadiens*, reproduced in *Le cinquième Anniversaire du Devoir* (Montreal, 1915), 59.

³⁴*Independence of Imperial Partnership? A Study of "The problem of the Commonwealth"*, by Mr. Lionel Curtis, (Montreal, 1916), 54. See also *Le Patriotisme canadien-français, ce qu'il est, ce qu'il doit être* (Montreal, 1902).

³⁵There was published in Quebec city at that time, by an Ultramontane priest, the Abbé David Gosselin, a weekly called *La Semaine Religieuse*. Many of its articles for the years 1899-1900 express attitudes strikingly anti-British and sympathetic to the Boers. A long serial article published anonymously in *La Semaine Religieuse* in 1900 under the title of "L'Anglomanie au Canada: Quelques conjectures sur l'issue de la lutte entre les deux races," was particularly bitter and hopeful for the humiliation of the "English race." English-Canadian newspapers protested. Mgr Bruchési Archbishop of Montreal, wrote a letter to the *Herald* denouncing the articles of *La Semaine Religieuse* (*Herald*, January 12, 1900). Three days later, the Archbishop of Quebec, Cardinal Bégin, congratulated Mgr Bruchési for his letter to the *Herald* and took the opportunity of expressing his unalterable loyalty to the British Crown.

³⁶Henri Bourassa's speech at the Fifth Anniversary banquet of *Le Devoir*, 68 ff.

French-speaking groups in North America and helped sublimate official clerical inhibitions. When the 1914 war broke out and when passions became aroused it was discovered that a great part of the clergy was nationalist.³⁷ The Church hierarchy, however, as soon as the end of September, 1914, published a joint pastoral letter stressing the fact that Canada's destiny was linked with that of England.³⁸ Typical divergent attitudes of the lower clergy are revealed in the polemics between two anonymous priests one of them attacking Bourassa and nationalism, the other vigorously defending the "true French-Canadian patriotism."³⁹

Given the direct influence of the clergy over the rural population and the appeal of the nationalist political campaigns, the country became, more than ever, consciously exalted by ambivalent patriotic symbols.⁴⁰ The permeation of nationalism into the cities is harder to appreciate. There, more than in the country, the political campaigns left their imprint. Young intellectuals, were, on the whole, vibrating in unison with Bourassa's ideas. In the last years of the nationalist saw-dust trail, it was the "school question," still more than the imperialist problem, which made of Bourassa a sort of champion of French Canadians. It was the Ontario school problem, the Regulation XVII, which, more than the war itself, did bring about the "clash" between the two Canadian "races." To this vicarious struggle, the French Canadians gave various meanings according to the stereotypes of their respective milieus. Hugh MacLennan's Marius Tallard is symptomatic of one, but only one, of them.

To sum up, one might say that Bourassa was the catalytic spirit who precipitated sour patriotism into a rationalized objective. French-Canadian collective thought could not, after this period, be the same. One of the very last official expressions of this phase was the motion presented by J. N. Francoeur, member for Lotbinière, in the Quebec legislature in January 1918.⁴¹ This was the anti-climatic episode of a period of dynamism and frustration.

³⁷See Ferdinand Roy, *L'Appel aux armes et la Réponse canadienne-française* (Quebec, 1917).

³⁸Elizabeth Armstrong, *The Crisis of Quebec 1914-18* (New York, 1937).

³⁹The Abbé d'Amours, in a series of letters published in *La Presse* of Montreal, vigorously denounced Bourassa, nationalism, and the lack of loyalty to England (cf. *Où allons-nous? Le Nationalisme canadien. Lettres de "Un patriote" publiées dans le journal "La Presse," augmentées d'une introduction, d'additions et d'appendices documentaires* (Montreal, 1916). To this, the Jesuit Hermas Lalande answered in a sour and heavily serious booklet which resumed the whole nationalist argumentation (cf. Jean Vindex, *Halte-Là! Patriote. Que penser de notre école politico-théologique? De l'impérialisme qu'elle professe? Du Nationalisme qu'elle censure?* Rimouski, 1917).

⁴⁰As soon as the South African War began, collective protests started coming from rural parishes and small centres. For example, in a then small Eastern Township community which seems to be not very far from the contemporary Cantonville described in Everett C. Hughes's *French Canada in Transition*, at a mass meeting held on June 19, 1902, some 5,000 French Canadians representing ninety-three townships who were addressed by Bourassa, voted a collective motion "inviting the citizens of all the parishes of Nicolet to protest against the Imperial campaign and to adopt resolutions approving the position taken by Sir Wilfrid Laurier in his reply to the Secretary of the Colonies, that is to say, no contribution to the wars of England." *The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs* (Toronto, 1902), 140.

⁴¹This motion stated "That this House is of opinion that the Province of Quebec would be disposed to accept the breaking of the Confederation Pact of 1867 if, in the other provinces, it is believed that she is an obstacle to the union, progress and development of Canada."

Already, another type of exclusively French-Canadian centred nationalist movement was expressing itself. The Abbé Groulx had started his lectures and public speeches. The *Action Française* began to be published in 1917. A considerable nationalist and parochial literature began to appear — Groulx's books, Brother Marie-Victorin's short stories, etc.—another phase was emerging which is too close to be considered objectively. It constitutes a landmark at which we must stop.

* * *

The history of French-Canadian nationalism, which still has to be written, appears to us, like the social history of any minority group, as a combative, stubbornly composed, unfinished symphony. It offers a wide field of investigation to historians, to political scientists, to sociologists, to economists, and to social psychologists. We notice that its growth has not been in a rectilinear, regularly widening pattern. It has been sporadic. A relevant way to approach it, in our opinion, is to see it as an acute political form of the French Canadians' interpretation of their minority status in a painfully growing country. It has emerged under the stimulus of events outside Quebec which were interpreted, either as threats to or as breaches of promise of, the covenant assumed to sanction the recognition of the French Canadians as equal partners in the life of the nation. It has also emerged as a by-product of the self-centredness of the French-Canadian group, ideologically and culturally guided by a segregating clergy. It has been historically a paramount factor in the social outlook of Quebec. Like any social problem, it must be considered neither through an apologetic nor an antipathetic looking-glass.

DISCUSSION

Professor Masters laid emphasis upon the frankness with which the authors had attacked their subject. He thought that this paper would constitute a landmark in the history of this Association. He went on to point out that it was anomalous for the French Canadians, who are the most North American of Canadians, to favour retention of colonial vestiges such as the appeals to the Privy Council. The French Canadians do not need such vestigial safeguards. Their true security lies in the fact that they are more than three million strong, and a well-organized, well-led group. It would be more consistent of French-Canadian *nationalistes* to favour dropping such vestiges.

Professor Scott noted that the Knights of Labor spread from the United States into Quebec in the eighteen-eighties, and brought with them an international outlook amongst the working classes. He asked if the *nationaliste* cause among the French Canadians was in any sense associated with a class appeal. He wondered if the co-operative movement, especially M. Desjardins and the Caisses Populaires, were connected with the *nationaliste* development.

Professor Falardeau replied that the Church hierarchy had crushed the growth of the Knights of Labor, but that the movement had made an impression upon thinking workers in Quebec. He stated that the Caisses Populaires had been organized because Desjardins recognized the misery of the rural population, and feared the flow of population to the United States.

Capitaine-Abbé Maheux congratulated Professor Falardeau upon the paper. He stated that for further information upon the *Caisses Desjardins* the authors could see the Abbé Grondin at Lévis since he has all of Desjardins's papers. There was nothing *nationaliste* about that development. He felt, however, that further consideration ought to be given to the concept of the "special mission" of the French Canadians, an idea which was at one time a great subject for college themes. He compared this concept with the American idea of "Manifest Destiny."

Professor Saunders asked if the appearance of an anti-clerical movement in French Canada would reduce the sense of "special mission" amongst French Canadians; or would it result in the substitution of a more secular concept of "mission"—the superiority of French culture, for example—for the traditional religious concept. He noted that a sense of special mission is common to most modern nationalist movements.

Capitaine-Abbé Maheux said that modern students know little of the older idea of "providential mission." He stated that existing anti-clerical feeling in French Canada is aroused by what is considered too great clerical interference in administrative affairs, and certain financial arrangements.

Mr. Mason Wade queried whether there was any connection between French-Canadian ideas of special mission and American ideas of "Manifest Destiny." He said that the Knights of Labor movement in Quebec had no *nationaliste* context. The first *syndicat national* was founded in 1905, ten years after the end of the Knights of Labor. He pointed out that the chief French influence upon Papineau, before he went abroad, was Lammenais's book, *Paroles d'un croyant*. Papineau was strongly influenced by Jefferson's writings. He considered that the *Caisses Populaires* had no *nationaliste* aspect at the beginning but that there was a certain *nationaliste* infiltration afterwards. He suggested that *nationalisme* amongst French-Canadian youth in such organizations as the A.C.J.C. is to be compared with the radicalism of adolescent English-Canadian youth.

Professor Soward discussed the growing tendency in Latin America to look to Quebec for cultural and religious leadership. He cited Cuba, Chile, Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil as especially concerned in this trend. Cardinal Villeneuve's recent visit to Mexico, and the exchange of students between Mexico and Quebec are further examples. This development is related to the growing French-Canadian desire for Latin solidarity in this hemisphere. French Canadians now exhibit a strong interest in Latin American culture. Many are learning Spanish and Portuguese. Many are travelling to Latin America. That area is becoming attractive to French Canadians interested in a diplomatic career. Latin American students are coming to Montreal and Quebec. There is steadily increasing support in French Canada for Pan-American Union and continental solidarity.

Professor Lower stated that there had been a divergence evident between *nationalisme* and clericalism in French Canada for a century and more. This was to be seen in the careers of Papineau, Dorion, and the *Parti rouge*. He believed that differing rates of development in various aspects of life are at the bottom of misunderstanding between French and English Canadians; for instance, whereas French Canadians have lagged behind their English-speaking compatriots in economic and political development, it has been quite otherwise in social and cultural affairs in which the French

Canadians commenced self-conscious development more than a century ago whilst the English Canadians are only starting at that point nowadays.

Professor Rothney emphasized that French-Canadian *nationalisme* is vital because it is native. Anti-clericalism in French Canada, on the other hand, has been an import from Europe. There is no need for a *nationaliste* in French Canada to be an anti-clerical. He challenged the identification that had been made between ultramontanism and French-Canadian *nationalisme*, and between Gallicanism and internationalism. He said that *nationalisme* became associated with provincial autonomy only with *Mercier*, and that even *Mercier* was not consistently in favour of such a bond. He stated that *Bourassa* denies that his *nationalisme* is like *Mercier's*, holding that it is Canadian rather than provincial in outlook. He questioned the idea that *Bourassa's* *nationalisme* died after the last war. Rather it took new forms. *Bourassa* is not to be considered as anti-British, nor are *nationalistes* in general, but they do want the British conception of liberty established in Canada.

Lieutenant-Colonel Stanley asked why nationalist movements in Quebec had not produced similar developments elsewhere, among the Acadians, for instance.

Professor Falardeau replied that they had so done, and gave as an example the Université Saint-Joseph at Memramcook, New Brunswick, which he declared to be the centre of Acadian self-consciousness and cultural aspirations. The co-operative movement in that area has also assumed something of a *nationaliste* aspect.

Capitaine-Abbé Maheux added that the Acadians have only recently gained leaders. Previously their students have been educated in Quebec. Under new leadership they are entering the *nationaliste* stage.

Lieutenant Richardson asked if the development of *nationalisme* could be dated from the establishment of the Assembly in 1791, or later.

Professor Falardeau replied that it is impossible to set any exact date for the beginning of such a movement though it is possible to give dates for the appearance of open expressions of these ideas. Such expressions came at a later time.

THE NATURE OF AN OFFICIAL HISTORY

By COLONEL C. P. STACEY
Director of the Army Historical Section

My chief object today is to describe and discuss the plans which have been made for the preparation of an Official History of the Canadian Army's part in the recent war, and some of the special problems that arise in connection with it. I hope, however, that I shall be forgiven if I stray beyond these bounds and attempt also some more generalized discussion of the nature of official military histories, the theories that appear to have inspired those produced in the past, and the broad problems and functions of that special and perhaps somewhat peculiar class of historians who are employed by the state.

A rapid glance at the history of official histories indicates that the state became involved in historiography—as in a good many other forms of activity—only in comparatively recent times. British soldiers succeeded in defeating the armies of Louis XIV and Napoleon without the assistance of official accounts of earlier wars, and apparently felt no need for the preparation of any chronicle of their own exploits beyond that contained in their own despatches. The cult of official history as it has developed in more modern times is clearly a product of the steadily increasing complexity of war and of the growing recognition of the practical contribution which the scientific study of warfare is likely to make to success on the battlefield. The Germans, as is not surprising, set the example. “Before every man who would be a Leader of Armies,” said their great strategist Schlieffen in 1910 “lies a book entitled ‘The History of War’.” The Prussian General Staff was preparing studies of the Seven Years’ War and the Napoleonic Wars as early as the eighteen-twenties; the Austrians produced, beginning in 1863, an official account of the campaigns of Prince Eugene; and both Prussians and Austrians prepared rival official histories of their war against each other in 1866 as soon as it was over.

British undertakings of this sort were few and sporadic until the close of the Victorian era. The first actual British official history of a complete campaign seems to have been the “Record” of the Abyssinian Expedition of 1867-8 which was produced by the Topographical and Statistical Department of the War Office in 1870. There was as yet no General Staff and no Historical Section. These things came into existence only in the course of the fundamental and salutary reorganization of the British military system, which was undertaken (largely on German models) at the close of the South African War. As a result of the recommendations of the Esher Committee (1904), a proper General Staff was organized, and one of its functions as defined by the Committee was the supervision of work on military history. The actual preparation of major histories was normally carried out, however, on the Cabinet, rather than the departmental level; the Committee of Imperial Defence came into existence in 1903, and the Historical Section subsequently set up was incorporated in its secretariat.

A perfect spate of official histories now set in. A very detailed *History of the War in South Africa, 1899-1902* was "compiled by direction of His Majesty's Government" and published in 1906-10. A British Official History of the Russo-Japanese War was produced shortly afterwards. Even minor campaigns received attention: for instance, in 1907 the War Office produced an Official History of the recent operations against the Mad Mullah in Somaliland.

All these somewhat elaborate productions were evidently primarily designed to serve a rather limited military purpose: the effective study of campaigns by prospective commanders and staff officers. The same object was, presumably, the dominant consideration in planning the series of detailed and admirable histories which has since been produced by the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence in connection with the Great War of 1914-19. Those volumes are doubtless familiar to this audience. They come from many different hands and are necessarily, therefore, somewhat uneven in quality and style; but they are an invaluable mine of accurate information concerning the operations of the British Armies and their adversaries in that tremendous conflict. Some of them are distinctly "readable" in the sense of being interesting for more than the mere information they contain; for example, anyone with an eye for good writing and an appreciation of historical drama could certainly read General Aspinall-Oglander's volumes on Gallipoli with both pleasure and profit. Nevertheless, it may be questioned whether many people apart from soldiers and military students have read these histories at all, let alone read them with care. Even among army officers, I think it safe to say, they have served chiefly as works for occasional reference.

These Official Histories of the past are productions which compel respect. Their authors kept before them the highest ideals of accuracy and completeness. They are supported by detailed documentary appendices of great value to students of strategy, tactics, and military administration; and they are illustrated by very numerous and very detailed maps.

Thanks to these very excellences, however, the writing of these histories has been expensive in both time and money. The production of history on such lines is a slow business, and it has unfortunately become steadily slower as wars have grown larger and more complex and the paper records of them have assumed more and more mountainous proportions. The Official History of the South African War was completed only in 1910, eight years after the Treaty of Vereeniging; and when the second war with Germany broke out in 1939 the British Official History of the first one, which had ended twenty-one years before, was still some distance from completion. Our own Canadian experience serves to illustrate the difficulties. Colonel A. Fortescue Duguid, who had been Director of the Historical Section of the General Staff since 1921, was formally appointed Official Historian in 1932; and he found himself charged with many other tasks besides the enormous one of distilling an Official History from the mass of military papers left over from the war. The consequence was that Volume I of the General Series of the Official History appeared only in 1938. This volume was one of the soundest pieces of historical work ever produced in Canada. But before Volume II was ready for the press another war broke out, and the Historical Section assumed various func-

tions connected with the immediate crisis and was forced to suspend work on the War of 1914-19. The Department of National Defence and the Canadian commanders thus entered the new war without the advantage — which would not have been wholly insignificant — of having for their guidance a complete organized account of the problems encountered by Canadians in the previous war and the manner in which those problems were overcome. The British and Canadian policy on Official Histories had not succeeded in meeting in full measure the strictly military needs which it was designed to serve.

In the light of this experience, the problem has been reconsidered during the months since the defeat of Germany and Japan. Both soldiers and civilians, in both Canada and the United Kingdom, have questioned the value of histories so detailed that they take decades to produce and, when produced, reach only a limited public; and the opinion appears to be pretty generally held that, whether or not a very detailed history is ultimately published, there should be an immediate effort to make available at the earliest possible date an authentic *outline* history for the information of the public (including the men who fought, whose ideas of the large pattern of events to which their own local efforts contributed are often extremely vague). Such an outline, while less valuable for military purposes than the detailed histories which cannot in any case be completed for years to come, would have some utility for official reference and for the purposes of military instruction. This point of view has been accepted in the United Kingdom. A recent discussion in the British House of Commons served to advise the public that the British government proposes to produce at an early date a series of "popular" histories along these lines; at a later time, presumably, an Official History of a more traditional type may see the light.

In Canada there are clearly particularly cogent arguments for a similar policy. We Canadians, in this twentieth century, have been obliged by circumstances to devote an extraordinarily large proportion of our time and our national resources to the business of waging war. We nevertheless remain a very unmilitary people — more so, even, than the people of the United Kingdom. Canadian literature on questions of defence scarcely exists at all; and many Canadians, in spite of having lived through two great wars, display a degree of ignorance on military matters great and small that sometimes seems hardly credible. Now from some points of view this is, at least superficially, a happy situation; it reflects the comfortable divorcement of our Canadian small-town past from the turmoil of world politics. (In the town of Mariposa, one remembers, Stephen Leacock found only one small evidence of military activity: the "pictures of South Africa and the departure of the Canadians" that hung on Judge Pepperleigh's library wall.) No sane man would care to see this easy-going traditional civilianism replaced by any sort of militarism, Prussian or quasi-Prussian. *That*, however, is a singularly improbable development; and it seems legitimate to argue that the people of modern Canada, a country whose young men have fought two bloody wars within the space of a single generation, a country which claims the status of at least a "middle" power in world affairs, a country which has lately found itself obliged to increase its peace-time military establishments quite materially, now require to be far better informed than they have been in the past on military matters.

They will have to go on forming judgments on such matters for many years to come; and if they are to form judgments worthy of an intelligent democracy, they must surely have available, for their guidance and consideration, authentic summaries of recent military history in a form comprehensible by the ordinary citizen. I have had no hesitation, in these circumstances, in recommending that our Official Army Histories should be written for a wide rather than a narrow audience—for all Canadians interested in public affairs, rather than merely for officers and military students.

The question may of course be asked, if histories are to be addressed to the general public, why should they be *official* histories at all? The answer is, I think, fairly obvious. It is the earnest hope of the Canadian General Staff that Canadian historical scholars in the future will be much more disposed than in the past to work on military subjects; and such scholars can count, now and always, on the fullest assistance possible from the Historical Section. Nevertheless, it must be clear that there are a good many considerations which make it impossible to accord civilian scholars anything but very limited access to our recent military records for some time to come. The choice, therefore, so far as the use of official records is concerned, is between histories produced officially and no histories at all.

The project for the Official History of the Canadian Army in the War of 1939-45 which the Minister of National Defence has approved, provides for publication by stages. What may for convenience be called the first stage, which is not formally part of the Official History at all, is already virtually completed. During the last period of the war the Department of National Defence decided to publish, under the title, "The Canadian Army at War," a series of informative booklets modelled on those produced by the United Kingdom Ministry of Information for the various service Departments. Our booklets were written by the Historical Section of the General Staff. The war had ended before the first of them, *The Canadians in Britain, 1939-44*, could reach the booksellers; but it was decided to proceed with the idea, which offered the best means of placing authentic official information about our Army's work before the public at an early date. *The Canadians in Britain* was finally published in November, 1945. The second booklet, *From Pachino to Ortona*, appeared in January of this year; and the third, *Canada's Battle in Normandy*, is now on the verge of publication. These little books, published by the King's Printer in an attractive *format* with numerous illustrations, cost only 25 cents for the paper-bound edition, and 50 cents for the cloth one; the object has been to make it possible for every Canadian to own them if he wants to; and by the middle of May a total of some 15,000 copies had been distributed, chiefly by public sale.

To cover the whole of the Army's part in the war in booklets of this sort would be a considerable undertaking and would interfere with other historical work of a more formal nature. As it is, the three published booklets cover the static period in England and the opening phases of our two main campaigns. It has accordingly been decided not to extend this series further. Instead we will concentrate upon the production, for publication at the earliest possible date, of a comprehensive Official Historical Sketch covering in one volume, in broad outline, what seem the most im-

portant activities of the Canadian Army in the late war. Such a volume clearly cannot include everything; and it is accordingly to be primarily a story of activities *overseas*, and in the main a story of *campaigns*. Questions of organization and policy will be dealt with, at this stage, only to the extent necessary to provide a framework to hold the narrative of operations together. The Sketch will be written in a manner designed to be comprehensible by the most unmilitary reader; like the booklets already published, it will be made as attractive as possible in both *format* and price; it will be illustrated with paintings by Canadian War Artists; and we hope that it will be possible to place it in the hands of the public about a year from now. Of the ten chapters proposed, three are already drafted.

It is obvious, of course, that this Sketch can be only an interim report. It will be too brief, and published too early, to be complete in any respect whatever. It will be a summary based mainly upon an incomplete examination of our own sources of information; for there is no hope that by the time it goes to press we will have been able to prepare complete "preliminary narratives" from our own documents, let alone the enormous mass of German papers which have only lately begun to become available for consultation. But it will be something; and it will perhaps be useful to general historians, and particularly I hope to those who write history for the schools.

The final stage of the Official History is envisaged as a work in four volumes, to be published, we hope — I say we hope — in about five years. The proposed arrangement of the volumes, at present purely tentative, is as follows. Volume I will deal with the concentration of the Canadian Army Overseas in the United Kingdom and with events in Britain and operations based on Britain previous to the beginning of our two main campaigns. The chief operational highlight will be the Dieppe raid. Volume II will tell the story of the Canadian campaigns in Sicily and Italy. Volume III will deal similarly with the campaign in North-West Europe in 1944-5. Volume IV will be concerned with general military policy as it affected the growth, organization, and employment of the Canadian Army; with events in and about Canada; and with operations based on Canada, including Hong Kong and Kiska.

It will be apparent that this "final" history is still not conceived as a work written in tremendous detail. The person who wishes to know where a certain platoon of a certain battalion was at a certain hour will be referred to the regimental historian (and in the light of the considerable number of regimental histories already published, and the many others known to be projected, he may not be disappointed). But it is hoped to produce a book, based upon wide examination of both Allied and enemy sources, which, *in essentials*, will be both complete and accurate. It will still, like the preliminary Sketch, be directed mainly at the intelligent general reader rather than the military student; it will be written in a strictly non-technical manner and will leave specialized aspects to be dealt with in separate studies; but it is hoped nevertheless that it will not be without value to the Canadian Staff College and to other institutions of military education.

The basis of this Official History will be the detailed preliminary narratives which are already far advanced and which were in fact well begun before the end of hostilities. It must be emphasized that we should have

no hope whatever of completing the history within the limits of time which I have suggested, had it not been for the historical work carried on during the war both in Canada and overseas. This work has been described in an article in the *Canadian Historical Review*, September, 1945, and there is no need to dwell further upon it here. It must be pointed out, however, that this preparatory work is one very great advantage which the historians of the War of 1939-45 have had over those of the preceding one. These detailed preliminary narratives, which have been in preparation since 1942, are really organized summaries of the evidence. They are not intended for publication and will never be published; but they will be permanently available for official reference and will afford military officers and other public servants much information which is too confidential, too technical, or simply too dull for inclusion in a history intended primarily for the general reader.

One special point is worthy of mention. The war was won by inter-service co-operation; and from every point of view it is important that the history should register this fact in unmistakable terms. Indeed, if it were practicable, it would be desirable that there should be one history for the three services, not three separate histories; but in Canada it is not practicable. The Canadian Army always watched with more than ordinary interest the operations of its sister Canadian services; and I doubt whether those sister services have ever fully realized just how deep and genuine was the satisfaction which Canadian soldiers felt on the occasions when they found themselves supported by Canadian naval vessels or units of the R.C.A.F. Unfortunately, those occasions were all too few. The Army's path seldom crossed that of the R.C.N. (D Day in Normandy was one of the brilliant and very satisfactory exceptions); and while we saw rather more of the R.C.A.F. we never saw as much as we should have liked. (For some reason, it was 84 Group, R.A.F., which supported the First Canadian Army in North-West Europe; 83 Group, which contained the Canadian units, went to the Second British Army.) So we really have no choice; we have three separate stories to tell, and we must write three separate histories.

In the preparation of these preliminary studies, and in every other aspect of our work, we have had the immeasurable advantage of the services of a staff largely composed of trained and experienced professional historians, accustomed to the business of producing coherent narratives from vast and apparently unmanageable masses of source material. Many of these scholars are now returning to the universities or to other civil employment. It is proper at this time and place to acknowledge the Army's deep debt to these people. Their work will continue to bear fruit as the volumes of the History are published year by year.

The problem of organization to provide for writing the history of the War of 1939-45 in the shortest possible time, while simultaneously completing that of the War of 1914-19 and carrying on the considerable miscellaneous work of the Historical Section, has been carefully considered. The solution adopted by the Chief of the General Staff has been to set Colonel Duguid free from the general duties connected with the appointment of Director of the Historical Section in order that he may devote the whole of his attention to his work as Official Historian of the War of 1914-19.

The publication of additional volumes of the history of that war may now be expected at early dates. At the same time, I have been appointed Official Historian of the Canadian Army for the War of 1939-45, combining this appointment with that of Director. To prevent the recurrence of a situation in which miscellaneous duties interfere seriously with the actual work of writing, the Section has been provided with an Executive Officer of senior rank, whose duty it is to carry the burden of administration and in general to supervise all the functions of the Section not directly connected with the production of history for publication. For the moment, the bulk of our Canadian operational records remains in England and our narratives of operations are being drafted there, while work on policy aspects is done in Ottawa.

In spite of all the work already done, the task confronting us is of staggering proportions. The mass of documents which must be sifted is so huge as to defy adjectival description. The papers relating merely to the detail of Canadian operations are in all conscience vast enough in themselves; we have in our hands approximately 100,000 Canadian monthly war diaries, and many of them are very large. (They fill 600 cabinets at Ottawa today, and there are hundreds more in London.) But we have also to relate our own operations to those of the forces of other countries, and particularly to place them in the proper framework with respect to higher Allied command; this means reference to the voluminous British and American sources, though it is hoped that consultation of the narratives prepared by our opposite numbers at London and Washington will meet most of our needs. Discussion of questions of policy involves the examination of many thousands of files at all levels, ranging from those of field divisions to those of government departments at Ottawa. And, finally, we must provide for investigating the papers collected by an enemy who, fortunately or unfortunately, was remarkably diligent and systematic in recording events, and whose vast accumulations of military records are now in Allied hands. I think it well to admit that we shall never be able to read *all* these various papers in detail; to do so would take at least fifty years. But we must do our best to ensure that no document really significant for our purposes goes unnoticed. We shall try to keep before us that law of diminishing returns well known to every historian; we will not suspend our researches on any subject, if we can help it, until they have reached the point where the returns from the investigation have ceased to be really important.

Another form of evidence is the personal recollections of participants. During the war, Historical Officers in the field interviewed hundreds of officers and other ranks who possessed special knowledge, and the memoranda of these interviews are valuable sources of information. Since the fighting ended, we have talked to many more individuals about incidents on which, for some reason, documentary evidence is fragmentary. It is our custom, also, to circulate accounts of operations in draft to various participants to obtain their comments. (Our experience so far, however, is that such comments only occasionally add materially to our knowledge.) The incidents on which personal evidence has been most valuable have been those operations where many men became prisoners. In such cases we were able to obtain full details of the action only after the return of

these men, or some of them. For example, various aspects of the Dieppe raid (notably the action of the tanks) remained obscure until the repatriation of our first group of prisoners in October, 1943.

The personal recollections of individuals long after the event occasionally constitute something of a problem. Mr. Dooley once gave advice to historians which was very sound. I quote from memory; but my recollection is that he said, "If ye *must* write history, be sure to write the history iv remote peeriods; ye will be much less liable to interruptions by thim that were there." Unfortunately, an Official Historian in the circumstances which I have outlined cannot act on this excellent counsel; and already we are growing accustomed to interruptions. The interrupters, however, sometimes fail, to a somewhat remarkable extent, to agree among themselves; and their disagreement with the written records is frequently even wider. On the whole, our experience merely reinforces an ancient maxim: two sentences scrawled on a scrap of paper on the evening of the battle are worth two thousand words of comment produced two years later. I should be sorry, nevertheless, to give the impression that our critics and commentators have been ill-natured or that we are ungrateful to them. We have received, on the whole, quite as much charity as we deserve; and the deep and helpful interest which many soldiers and ex-soldiers have taken in our work is one more evidence of the peculiar historical-mindedness of the Canadian Army.

The topics which the historian must treat are as various as the sources are vast. They range from strategy and high policy at one extreme to tactical and administrative detail at the other; so that the historian may find himself dealing, one week, with the allied strategic problem in the Normandy bridgehead, or with the overall employment of the Canadian Army; while the next week he may be concerned with the question of how many tanks got over the sea-wall at Dieppe, or the condition of the plumbing in certain barracks at Aldershot during the famous winter of 1939-40. Relating Canadian operations and activities to the larger general picture of the Allied effort is a particularly thorny problem. It is not our business, very fortunately, to write the whole history of the war; and yet we *must* write so much of it as will serve to indicate why things were done, to prevent any impression that the Canadians were operating in a vacuum, and to establish the manner in which their efforts contributed to the common victory. Of all the aspects of our complicated task, this perhaps is the one calling for the surest judgment and the highest degree of art.

I have said enough to indicate that the writing of an Official History of the Canadian Army in the war of 1939-45, considered merely from an academic point of view, constitutes an extraordinarily absorbing and complex exercise in historiography. The task, however, is not one that can be comprehended within the limits of any such point of view. We have to tell, for the Canadians of today and of days to come, the story of a tremendous human enterprise—the part played by Canada in the defence of freedom against the bloodiest tyrannies of modern times. It was the greatest undertaking in our national history, and in that undertaking the Army's part was—shall we say—one of some eminence. In no previous conflict did the military forces of Canada serve in so many lands and in such varied roles. Canadian soldiers fought the Japanese in Asia and the Germans and Italians

in Africa. They took part in expeditions to the Arctic archipelago of Spitsbergen and to the fog-bound Aleutians; they did duty from Iceland to the coast of South America; they helped to extend the rock-hewn defences of Gibraltar. They were among the foremost of the defenders of the United Kingdom in the dark time when it was Europe's last citadel of freedom. They bore the brunt of the largest and most significant of the Allies' raids against that continent's bristling coast in the days when the arrogant enemy controlled it from the North Cape to the Pyrenees. Above all, they played great parts in two of the three European campaigns which produced the total defeat of Hitler's Germany; they fought for twenty grim and glorious months in Sicily and Italy, and were in the front of the fight in the last mighty struggle in North-West Europe from the Norman beaches to Luneburg Heath. It is an imperial theme; such an outpouring of courage, skill, and energy, with the whole map of the world and the most shattering political upheaval in human records for its background, would seem to be material for poetry rather than for the slow pen of the military historian. Some day, perhaps, the poet will arise who can do it justice; in the meantime, the historian can only do his best.

What a weight of responsibility, then, falls upon those people who, with what must seem almost incredible temerity and presumption, take it upon themselves to write the history of that Army! It is no light thing to venture, the making of a book worthy of the men who fought the lonely battle at Hong Kong and waged the grim encounter on the shingle of Dieppe; who routed the paratroops from the ruins of Ortona and beat the fanatical S.S. back mile by mile down the long road to Falaise; who broke the Hitler and Gothic Lines; who opened the Scheldt and cleared the Hochwald; who battled in the mountains of Sicily, on the flats of the Lombard Plain and the polders of Holland, and through the German forests; who won too many victories to catalogue, and brought credit to their country wherever they set the print of their hobnailed boots. This army is already almost a thing of the past. Many thousands of those who made its reputation lie in foreign fields; and the survivors are dispersed about the Dominion and the world. It is for us to ensure that their countrymen do not forget the things they did. It will not be easy to find words to tell the story. There are times when phrases out of the past seem more suitable than anything found in modern speech; and we propose to set upon the flyleaf of this history, words written by Lord Howard of Effingham of the men whom he led out to meet the Armada in 1588:

God send me to see such company again
when need is.

DISCUSSION*

Professor Preston pointed out that there was a good deal of certain kinds of information concerning personalities, motives for action, and the like that is interesting and important but which cannot be included in any official histories. He cited one striking instance. The three speakers all agreed.

Professor Trotter remarked that Professor F. H. Underhill, President

of the Canadian Historical Association, was the first historian to record the Canadian military effort of the last World War.

Mr. Lightbody discussed the present attempts being made in the United States to co-ordinate the work of all defence forces in one government department as one of the results of war experience. He noted that the Navy was most hostile to these efforts.

Professor Rolph wished to know if any attempt was to be made in the projected one-volume history of the Canadian Army's part in this war to evaluate the measure of success achieved by the Canadians.

Colonel Stacey replied that it was too early to express many opinions on this subject. Possibly there would be some attempt to evaluate in the larger history to appear in five years' time. However, the real job of the Official Military Historian is to show what actually happened. In so doing, he can pave the way for freer commentary and assessment by others.

Mr. W. G. Bassett affirmed that the problem of convoys went back to 1690 so far as the British navy was concerned. He stated that the "naval mind" had been a major problem in creating a new system of convoy protection.

Mr. J. Spring suggested that in the United States there was a more civilian attitude than in Canada or Great Britain towards the selection of officers. This is indicated, he said, in the readiness to use all educational means in the selection.

Colonel Stacey indicated that such aspects of the Canadian mind as the last speaker was concerned with could best be investigated by civilians when the military historians had provided the material.

Professor Wilkinson commended *Colonel Stacey* upon the speed with which the Army Historical Section was carrying on its work, but suggested that there ought to be better publicity for the short, popular volumes that are being issued by this Section.

Colonel Stacey replied that all credit for the efficiency of this Section was due to the foresight of the leaders of the Canadian Army, who saw from the beginning the need for competent historical recording of Canadian military efforts.

*This discussion also refers to the two following articles on related subjects: "Some Aspects of the Battle of the Atlantic" by Gilbert Norman Tucker; and "The Evolution of the Royal Canadian Air Force" by Wing Commander F. H. Hitchins.

SOME ASPECTS OF THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC

By GILBERT NORMAN TUCKER
Director of the Naval Historical Section

THE Battle of the Atlantic during the recent war was principally a campaign by U-boats against allied merchant shipping, and a defence of that shipping by various means. Raider warfare against trade has been the expedient of the weaker naval power. The principal weapon employed for this purpose was, in sailing days the frigate, later the cruiser, and latest of all the submarine reinforced in the Second World War by the bomber. Several measures of defence have been employed against the raider, the most successful being the escorted convoy. This practice of sailing merchantmen in a group accompanied by warships, during hostilities, goes back to ancient times and was a normal procedure during the naval wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The submarine as used by Germany and her allies in the First and Second World Wars was the most successful type of commerce raider ever let loose upon the seas, and during the First War, convoying was generally introduced in the threatened areas. The considerable success which the convoy system scored in 1917 and 1918, and the development of the asdic detector, caused the submarine as a raider to be underestimated between the two wars. Nevertheless, when the Second World War began, shipping on the more important and vulnerable routes was immediately placed in convoy.

Commerce raiding by submarines and the countermeasures which it called forth, in both the world wars, possessed three very striking characteristics which were almost unique in the whole domain of warfare. Submarines, whether employed directly or in retaliatory measures, were not a shield against other submarines: the effective opponents of the U-boat were units wholly unlike herself. The submarine, moreover, was the poor man's weapon if ever there was one; for the men and materials which were necessary to maintain a given offensive by submarines against shipping were hugely out of proportion with those needed for meeting such an attack. The third characteristic was that undersea warfare was inevitably inhumane. It was normally impracticable for a submarine to capture a merchant ship and send her in as a prize. Assuming that the warfare was to be carried on at all, the only feasible procedure was to sink her; in which case, as also in that of a warship sunk by a submarine, the undersea attacker had small means of providing for the safety of the victim's crew.

The general type of submarine which has made history as a raider, was developed during the First World War and, improved though not radically changed, was employed by the Germans throughout the Second. Unlike all surface warships, this submarine could operate for long periods in the vicinity of an overwhelmingly superior enemy force. For its tonnage, moreover, it possessed a most remarkable combination of striking power, surface speed, invulnerability, and endurance.

In both of the great twentieth-century wars, anti-submarine patrol or escort vessels were required in very large numbers, and they had to be ex-

tremely manoeuvrable vessels, two considerations that made small size obligatory. An effective armament for them could be both light and limited, and could therefore be mounted in a vessel of very modest tonnage. For open-sea work, however, they needed to be large enough to combine adequate speed with endurance and seaworthiness. For anti-submarine work during the Second World War, the Royal Canadian Navy used destroyers, frigates, corvettes, minesweepers of the Bangor and Algerine types, Fairmile motor launches, and, early in the war, converted yachts.

Of all these types there is one that perhaps calls for special attention. When the war began the Admiralty had designs for several types of anti-submarine vessel. The ships of each type were less effective than destroyers, but much easier to produce and man in large numbers. Many years before the war the Smith's Dock Company of South Bank near Middlesbrough, Yorkshire, had begun to design whalecatchers suited to the South Atlantic whale fishery. The hunting of whales and of submarines have much in common, and the Admiralty adopted one of the Smith's Dock designs, modified to meet naval needs, for use against submarines in coastal waters. In the summer of 1939, with the international-relations barometer portentously low and still falling, a group of Canadian business men and engineers went to Great Britain in order to make an inventory of types of war material that could be produced in the Dominion. They returned to Canada a few days before the invasion of Poland, bringing with them, among other things, plans of the Admiralty's version of the Smith's Dock whalecatcher. This design was adopted by the Naval Service, and incorporated in the first war-time shipbuilding programme. Whalecatchers of this type came to be the most numerous and best-known class of operating ship in the Royal Canadian Navy. Early in the war the designation of "whalecatcher" for this variety of vessel was replaced by that of "corvette."

This ubiquitous little warship is roughly depicted by the following figures: displacement, 1,085 tons; length, 205 feet; beam, 33 feet; draught, 16 feet; principal armament, 1 - 4-inch gun and about 90 depth charges; maximum speed, 15-17 knots. It also carried an asdic set. The corvette might be described as the smallest vessel into which could be put the minimum requirements for dealing unassisted with a submarine and for remaining at sea. For its size it was remarkably seaworthy, being reasonably safe in any storm and not very susceptible to weather damage: its propensity to pitch and toss, however, was justly notorious. The corvettes were by no means ideal anti-submarine vessels; yet they successfully filled a most dangerous breach, in circumstances where superior ships might well have failed because they were too few.

As in almost every other branch of warfare during the recent hostilities, the techniques employed by the U-boats and their opponents respectively were constantly changing. The approved tactical procedure of today might have to be abandoned tomorrow, while time and again a new and improved weapon or other mechanical device tilted the scales sharply in favour of one side or the other. The rules of the game, therefore, changed continually as first-rate minds on both sides, with all the resources of science at their disposal, sought to steal a march on the enemy or devise a means of counter-acting his latest move. Many of the general statements in this paper allow for the particular process of evolution that lies behind each of them, but

do not describe it. Like portraits, they tend to be more static than their subjects, and to reinforce the thesis that brevity is the enemy of precision. He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone.

The Battle of the Atlantic largely consisted in the defence, apart from troop convoys, of two eastbound convoy series, HX and SC, and of two west-bound ones, ON and ONS. In general, convoys in these series were escorted in the waters west of Cape Race, Newfoundland, by warships of the Western Local (later Western) Escort Force, and to the eastward of that point, all the way across, by vessels of the Mid-Ocean Escort Groups. Convoys were divided into classes according to speed: for example, convoys in the HX series contained ships able to maintain speeds of between 9 (later 10) and 15 knots; while the SC convoys were limited to ships with speeds ranging from 7.5 (later 8) to 9 (later 10) knots. At all times, however, ships with a speed of 15 knots or over usually sailed independently and without escort, their speed affording them adequate protection. Ships in convoy normally sailed in several or many parallel columns, and a convoy in the open sea was much wider than it was long, usually in the ratio of three or four to one. In the transatlantic convoys the standard distance between columns was a thousand yards, while the interval between ships in the same column was six hundred yards. In the course of the war, merchant ships with additional functions—rescue ships for picking up and looking after survivors, ships equipped to fly off one or more airplanes, tankers especially fitted for supplying oil to the escort ships at sea, and rescue tugs—were attached to most of the important convoys. A convoy was supervised by a Commodore of Convoy, who was usually, on the transatlantic routes, a retired naval officer of high rank. He in turn was subordinate to the senior officer of the escort, whereby it often happened that a former Rear Admiral was receiving instructions from a Lieutenant Commander.

Anti-submarine vessels were kept in permanent groups as far as possible, because good team work, the importance of which as the war progressed was more and more heavily stressed, was greatly dependent upon the ships concerned being well accustomed to acting together. Through the earlier part of the war all the available groups acted as escorts, providing a protective screen around each convoy. Escorting was primarily a defensive function that kept the warships of the escort, which were often greatly outnumbered by the attacking U-boats, tied by a short leash to their convoy. In accord with a well-established principle of war, therefore, as soon as a sufficient number of anti-submarine vessels had become available, independent groups were organized to act offensively. These groups ranged freely to seek and attack U-boats, and they were not obliged to break off an action lest a convoy be left insufficiently protected. Sometimes they closed a seriously threatened convoy, a proceeding which not only enabled them to reinforce its hard-pressed escort, but also brought them to an area that contained an appetizing concentration of U-boats. At a late stage in the hostilities, the gods of the offensive received a genuflection that ought to have satisfied even the most jealous of them, when a convoy intended to serve as bait was occasionally routed straight into a known concentration of enemy submarines. Shortly before the war ended, however, the Germans were producing U-boats of revolutionary design, which

would almost certainly have re-cast the Battle of the Atlantic in a shape most detrimental to the interests of the anti-Axis nations.

As the war progressed, the need of air protection for convoys against U-boats had become ever more apparent and pressing. The airplane was in a class by itself for covering a large area of sea, and for instant attack on a surfaced submarine. As far as direct protection of convoys was concerned the greatest advantage of air cover came from the ability of aircraft to circle rapidly around a convoy, well out beyond the screen of escort ships. By this means, submarines in the general neighbourhood of a convoy could often be forced to submerge and stay submerged; and throughout every minute that such a U-boat spent beneath the surface, it was steadily falling astern of the convoy. For until almost the end of the war the speed of a submerged U-boat was less than that of a slow merchant ship. So vulnerable did convoys without protection from the air prove to be, that in spite of the greatest difficulties the transatlantic ones were given air cover farther and farther out to sea, and finally the whole way across.

The provision by Canada of large numbers of new warships and of men to man them, entailed an expansion of the existing naval bases and the forming of new ones. Among these latter works of creation, there was one whose story is especially relevant to the Battle of the Atlantic. Until late in 1940 the German submarines had operated for the most part near the British Isles, and naval escorts had ordinarily accompanied convoys only as far as 15° west. With the passage of time, however, various conditions made it both practicable and desirable for the U-boats to operate farther to the west, and by the end of 1940, the Royal Navy was forced to escort convoys all the way to 30° W.; moreover by the following spring it was necessary to afford protection even farther to the westward. The Admiralty therefore decided to base an escort force on Newfoundland, which in conjunction with similar forces operating from Iceland and the United Kingdom would give effective cover as far as 45° W. St. John's was finally chosen as the base for the Newfoundland force, because it was already defended to some extent and had by far the best port facilities in the island. Its strategic position, close to and a third of the way along the great circle route from North America to Great Britain, was ideal for the purpose.

When the Admiralty's decision reached it on May 20, 1941, the Canadian government immediately offered to escort convoys in the Newfoundland area with a force which would include all the available Canadian destroyers and corvettes under the command of a Canadian officer. The idea of concentrating its forces on a well-defined and vital objective which also was immediately related to the defence of the Dominion, held a strong appeal for the small Canadian navy. The Admiralty accepted this offer, and the Naval Service accordingly began a study of the problems of establishing a base for the Newfoundland Escort Force at St. John's. It was agreed that the Admiralty should pay for and own the base: the development of St. John's accordingly became a joint undertaking in which three governments took part. The British government assumed responsibility for the capital cost; the Newfoundland authorities acted as agent in all matters relating to the acquisition of existing properties; while the Canadian government advanced the necessary funds, placed the contracts and

supervised their carrying out, and bore the cost of administering and maintaining the base. The Canadian Navy in St. John's was something like a tenant living free of rent in a house which he himself had designed, of which he paid for the upkeep, and in which members of the landlord's family were welcome to take shelter.

It was a difficult task to create a base at St. John's. The harbour was very small, and was already filled with commercial wharves of which those that were not essential to the economic life of the city were useless for naval purposes; while both vacant land and existing buildings suited to the needs of the base were almost non-existent. Necessity alone dictated the setting up at St. John's of facilities for a large naval force.

The Newfoundland Escort Force, which consisted almost entirely of warships from the two Commonwealth Navies most closely concerned, began operations from St. John's in the spring of 1941, and during the earliest period their needs were met by a depot ship, a store ship, and an oiler, supplied by the Admiralty. Work on the shore installations was begun in August, and when winter came the work on all the important buildings was well-advanced, but had not been completed. The base was designed to support a force of about sixty escort ships, without recourse to fleet auxiliaries. In July, 1941, the Canadian naval personnel at St. John's numbered 900 officers and men: by November, 1942, the total had risen to 1,962, and by the end of 1944 to 4,747. The Newfoundland Command had been established in June, 1941, as an independent command under Commodore L. W. Murray, R.C.N. After the spring of 1943 it functioned as a relatively independent sub-command under the Commander-in-Chief, Canadian Northwest Atlantic.

In simple terms, St. John's was the western base and turn-around port for ships flying the white ensign that were engaged in escorting, on the lap between Newfoundland and the British Isles, those great transatlantic convoys that formed the principal pipe-line through which the enormous resources and strength of North America were pumped into Europe. For the U-boats in the North Atlantic, that small harbour was a hornet's nest, and the naval activities which were carried on there made an inestimable contribution towards winning the war. The development of the St. John's base was noteworthy from the fiscal point of view, because the responsibility was divided in such an unorthodox way. The project was one among many instances to be found in the recent war of smooth and fruitful co-operation between governments for a common purpose: precedents which would be even more encouraging than they actually are had the common danger been less dire and immediate.

In the widespread war against the U-boats, the North Atlantic area showed certain more or less special characteristics. The shipping lanes that crossed it were, for geographic and other reasons, less subject to the presence of hostile aircraft than were some of those elsewhere. This area was also characterized by the considerable choice of widely dispersed routes that it afforded. Throughout the winter, over the northern part of the region, where the shortest routes lay, and particularly in the western part of it, coldness of air and water, ice, fog, and violent storms, were more than usually prevalent. Among all the ocean regions the North Atlantic was in a class by itself for the volume of shipping that was constantly

moving through it, for the large number of enemy submarines with which it was normally infested, and for the concern with which it was rightly regarded.

The life of the sailors, Canadians and others, who manned the small escort ships was in a general way similar to that of most combatant personnel in any armed service. That is to say that it was monotonous, sordid, and dangerous; but made bearable to most of those who lived it by a sense of serving a cause, by a buttressing consciousness of being an essential part of an important whole, by the continuing exhilaration that comradeship afforded, and by an almost childlike ability to extract the very last morsel of enjoyment from even the smallest pleasures.

Anti-submarine warfare was unusually subject to long and frustrating periods when nothing whatever happened. In action the tension was less extreme than in the hottest kind of surface engagement, but it was apt to be very much more prolonged. In general the strain on personnel is probably greater in small ships than in large ones. An extremely unsatisfactory feature of this form of warfare was the very frequent uncertainty concerning results. This obscurity existed principally because a U-boat was usually submerged at the time when it was, or might have been, damaged or sunk; and most types of tangible evidence such as floating oil, planks, or pieces of furniture, might have been intentionally discharged through the submarine's torpedo-tubes. The extraordinary ability of the U-boats to survive heavy punishment added to the difficulty.

This always annoying uncertainty sometimes resulted in extreme disappointment. For instance, late in the evening of September 21, 1942, off Cap des Rosiers near Gaspé Bay, the minesweeper H.M.C.S. *Georgian* sighted a submarine which almost immediately submerged. *Georgian* attacked with two patterns of depth charges, after the second of which the U-boat surfaced about nine hundred yards astern. The minesweeper went about in order to ram, but before the position had been reached the submarine was seen to turn over on her side and sink. A pattern of depth charges was dropped on the position where the U-boat had disappeared, and large quantities of oil came to the surface. No further movements on the part of the U-boat were detected, and oil continued to come up. In the course of the encounter thirty-four depth charges had been dropped. *Georgian* felt confident that she had a sinking to her credit—but the official assessment was "Probably Damaged."

That the work of the escorts was dangerous goes without saying. Small ships often sank almost instantly if torpedoed, making it touch and go whether or not those below decks could escape in time. Of three torpedoed corvettes, for example, H.M.C.S. *Spikenard* sank in from three to five minutes, while the Fighting French ship *Mimosa* and H.M.C.S. *Charlottetown*, each struck by two torpedoes, sank in about two and three minutes respectively. The work was hazardous even when U-boats were not present, as the experience of H.M.C.S. *Windflower* shows. This corvette was one of the escorts of SC 58, a convoy consisting of forty-nine ships. Off Newfoundland on December 7, 1941, the *Windflower* apparently made a radical change in course, possibly attempting to regain touch with the convoy in the dense fog that prevailed at the time, and her new course led her into collision with a merchant ship in the convoy. The

corvette sank with the loss of twenty-two out of the sixty-six persons on board. Of these twenty-two, nineteen were missing including all the officers except one, and three died after having been rescued. Later in the war, however, a more general and highly-skilled use of improved radar sets greatly reduced this type of hazard.

When escort vessels were torpedoed it was not always practicable to launch boats or floats; a lifebelt afforded no protection against the often deadly coldness of the water; and it was sometimes impossible for other ships to begin rescue work at once. For example, the survivors of H.M.C.S. *Ottawa*, which was sunk on the night of September 13-14, 1942, while helping to escort ON 127, were in the water for between one and two hours before they could be rescued. The crews of escort vessels were often the rescuers rather than the rescued: indeed before it had become customary to attach rescue ships to convoys the escorts did most of the picking up of those who had got into the water. Sometimes they even went into the wholesale branch of the rescue business. In February, 1943, for example, the corvette H.M.C.S. *Trillium* in the escort of ON 166, with seventy-eight persons already packed tightly on board, picked up 160 survivors from three merchant ships. Carrying this great additional mass of space-filling bodies, the *Trillium* contrived during the ensuing three days to take part in a series of difficult anti-submarine actions. In July, 1940, not far from the north-western coast of Ireland, the destroyer H.M.C.S. *St. Laurent* took on board more than 850 survivors of the torpedoed S.S. *Arandora Star*. These survivors, about two-thirds of whom were German or Italian internees, had spent from six to nine hours in boats, on rafts, or in the water. With this tremendous human cargo on board, the destroyer returned to Greenock on the Clyde.

A large amount of research in the interest of survivors was carried out during the war, a work in which Canadian science played a considerable part. Attempts were made by this means and with varying success to provide survivors with improved floats and life-preservers, and with better forms of concentrated food and means of obtaining drinkable water. Careful attention was also given to the physiological effects of prolonged immersion.

The transatlantic convoys, and consequently their escorts as well, followed as far as possible a regular schedule of sailings. This fact imparted to the movements of these escort ships an evenness of rhythm most unusual in war operations. The tendency was for each ship, from one refit to the next, to shuttle back and forth between the same two ports. Thus the crews became very familiar with the external and surface aspects of these towns. His ship, however, was the sailor's home-away-from-home, an advantage for which the soldier may well have envied him.

The time spent at sea in shielding and shepherding those great, plodding, vulnerable convoys, must have been an unforgettable experience for all those who manned the escort ships. Convoy and escorts, scattered across the sea as far as the eye could reach, formed a self-contained and lonely community of several thousand men, strangers made one by danger and because they had the same incentives to face that danger. One large convoy looked very much like another, and any one of them on the horizon looked like an industrial town. To the officers and men of each escort vessel the

other members of the group were old friends ashore and afloat, and the real or supposed peculiarities of each ship were known to all. As his days and nights of steaming, punctuated now and then by the strident tocsin of the action-stations bell, accumulated into months of seetime, the sailor in an escort ship became as it were a native of that watery region in which his ship, equipment, and training, found their fulfilment.

Whatever the lot of the escort sailor, it was on the whole blissful compared to that of his opposite numbers in the U-boats. In general, nevertheless, the morale of the German "submariners" throughout the war proved equal to the strain, and the conduct of the U-boats in this respect was very good. A grotesque exception, however, was *U-501*, the earliest of the Royal Canadian Navy's victims. Early in September, 1941, the corvettes *Chambly* and *Moose Jaw*, in the course of a training cruise south of Greenland, were ordered to reinforce the hard-pressed escort of SC 42. When nearing the convoy shortly after dark, *Chambly*, who had *Moose Jaw* on her starboard quarter, made an asdic contact dead ahead at 1,700 yards. After dropping a 5-charge pattern *Chambly* regained contact and was preparing for a second attack, when the U-boat surfaced close to *Moose Jaw* and proceeded to cross her course. The corvette opened fire; but her 4-inch gun jammed after the first round. *U-501* stopped and *Moose Jaw* ran alongside. A large group of Germans were standing on the U-boat's deck with their arms raised, and one of them, who turned out to be of all people the captain himself, leapt on board *Moose Jaw* without even wetting his feet. He afterwards alleged that he had done this so as to be in a position to insist that his men be picked up rather than left to drown. It is only fair to add that the difference between this and most other U-boats seems to have lain in the quality of her commanding officer, and that she later put up a brief fight before finally surrendering.

As everyone knows, the principal naval effort of Canada in the Second World War was directed against the U-boats. That this would be so, however, only became clear during the early months of hostilities as the character of the conflict began to take shape. It was the wisest policy in the circumstances: for it led to a reinforcing of the weakest part of the anti-axis naval line, by those means which Canada was best fitted to supply, and in a theatre with respect to which she enjoyed a lordly geographic position. In 1939 the shipbuilding industry of the Dominion had been relatively undeveloped, and equipped in the main for building small vessels, while the armament industry had been embryonic. Modern warships are as full of very elaborate apparatus as a forest is of trees, but among them anti-submarine vessels are comparatively simple: to produce these craft and their equipment was therefore undergraduate work suited to the industries concerned. Such ships were also adapted to the resources of Canada's small navy, for they presented the difficult problems of repairing and refitting, training personnel, and manning, in a fairly simple form. At the same time, the Canadian contribution toward winning the Battle of the Atlantic was an offering, not given to the gods of merely local defence, but laid squarely upon the altar of victory itself; for the North Atlantic convoys were the tap-root of those offensive measures in Europe and Africa on which the defeat of the Axis was to depend.

EVOLUTION OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

By Wing Commander F. H. HITCHINS
Air Historian, R.C.A.F.

THE history of military aeronautics covers a period of just over 150 years from the first observation balloon at Maubeuge, Charleroi and Fleurus in June, 1794, to the first atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August, 1945. The story of military aviation in Canada is much briefer, covering at the most no more than four decades.

A few years after the Boer War the first attempt was made to make the Canadian Army air-minded when a group of men in Montreal, inspired possibly by the use of balloons for observation work in South Africa, proposed that a balloon corps be formed in Canada.¹ Nothing came of the suggestion. It was not long, however, before another attempt was made to add a third dimension to the Dominion's armed forces.

In February, 1909, J. A. D. McCurdy and F. W. Baldwin, charter members of Dr. Alexander Graham Bell's Aerial Experiment Association, successfully flew their "Silver Dart" biplane over the ice-covered surface of Bras d'Or Lake at Baddeck, Cape Breton Island. These brief flights have been recognized by the Royal Aero Club as the first true heavier-than-air flights made by British subjects anywhere in the British Empire.

That summer McCurdy and Baldwin took their biplane to Petawawa Military Camp to demonstrate before senior army officers the role which aircraft might play in war. The two aviators suggested that the aeroplane could be used to reconnoitre enemy dispositions and range artillery fire. McCurdy and Baldwin accurately stated what the new invention *might* do, but the demonstrations at Petawawa were not successful in proving what the aeroplane *could* do. The "Silver Dart" after several flights of about half a mile was wrecked in a heavy landing; a second machine was also damaged, and the Militia Council, unimpressed, decided to await the outcome of experiments in Britain before proceeding further.²

Five years passed—years during which Germany, France, Britain, and many other countries organized air forces. In the Turco-Italian and Balkan Wars the military aeroplane received its first tests in action for reconnaissance, photography, artillery ranging, leaflet and bomb-dropping. In August, 1914, when the Great War began, some of the first stories, or rumours, flashed from overseas were reports of hostile air attacks and scouting Zeppelins shot down. When Canada began mobilizing the First Contingent, Sir Sam Hughes offered to provide a corps of six military aviators, an offer which the War Office gladly accepted. In the event six proved to be too ambitious a number, only two pilots were actually enrolled. With an American biplane which the government purchased for \$5,000, these two

¹In 1861 when the British government, because of the tension over the Trent affair, sent reinforcements to the garrisons in Canada, it was suggested that a balloon should accompany the troops. The War Office did not agree.

²In May of that year the British government had set up an Advisory Committee for Aeronautics.

men, constituting the Canadian Aviation Corps, accompanied the First Contingent overseas in October, 1914.

One of the aviators, who had been designated "Provisional Commander" of the Corps, soon returned to Canada with exaggerated and quite unfounded claims of overseas service. His subsequent career is a fascinating story, but it has no place in the history of the Canadian Air Force. The second pilot, Lieutenant W. F. Sharpe, did go to France for a short time and then returned to England for further training. He was killed in a flying accident in February, 1915. His name is the first of 1,560 Canadian air-men inscribed in the Book of Remembrance in the Memorial Chamber at Ottawa.

Meanwhile the Burgess-Dunne biplane, Canada's first military aircraft, had become a heap of "worthless junk" behind a hangar on Salisbury Plains. So ended the Dominion's first aviation corps. Over three years elapsed before Canada again took definite action to organize an Air Force.

In the interval, however, the Dominion had provided many thousands of recruits for the Royal Flying Corps, the Royal Naval Air Service, and their successor, the Royal Air Force. From the outbreak of war the attention of the War Office and the Admiralty had been drawn to Canada as a potential source of pilots, and early in 1915 officers were sent out to recruit men for the two branches of the British air service. In the late summer of that year the Army Council, through the Colonial Office, appealed to all the Dominions for recruits for the Royal Flying Corps and suggested that they might, singly or in conjunction, raise complete air units. Canada replied (October 29, 1915) that efforts would be made to secure recruits, but "for the present at any rate" no attempt would be made to form Canadian squadrons. Australia, however, accepted the offer and began organizing air units. As a result the Commonwealth at the end of the war had four squadrons with distinguished records in the Royal Air Force.

In 1916 several conferences were held between British, Australian, and Canadian officials to discuss plans for Dominion air units, and the Canadian authorities even went so far as to frame informal recommendations for a Canadian Flying Corps, but at a final conference held in March, 1917, they were still undecided whether to proceed or not. So the matter stood over for another year.

Then in May, 1918, Sir Edward Kemp, the Minister for the Overseas Military Forces of Canada, armed with statistics which had been collected during 1917, raised the question again. He presented to Lord Weir, the new Secretary of State for the Royal Air Force, a series of specific proposals: that greater publicity should be given to the work of Canadian air-men, and that Canadians in the R.A.F. should be formed into a Canadian section with distinctive badges. He added that a small Canadian Flying Corps might also be formed.

Sir Edward's first suggestion that "adequate credit . . . [be given] . . . in despatches and reports to all Canadians for conspicuous services rendered from time to time" was, in the opinion of the Air Council, a "difficult" one. The established practice in the R.A.F., as it had been in the R.F.C. and R.N.A.S., was to avoid mention of individuals by name. But deeming it politic to meet the Canadian wishes, the Air Ministry arranged to have a monthly report prepared of noteworthy incidents, for Kemp's

information, on the understanding that, if released to the press, no names were to be mentioned. In actual fact all names were deleted before the Canadian Minister received them, and the reports were of little interest or value. Likewise an attempt to have Canadians designated in the R.A.F. Weekly Communique of operations was too late to bear any significant result before the end of hostilities; only twelve were marked in the last two communiques issued in November, 1918.³

Sir Edward's second proposal, that a Canadian section be formed in the R.A.F., the Air Council accepted in principle. It demurred at the third suggestion that a small Canadian Air Force be organized. The Council agreed that the establishment of a C.A.F. was a logical and indeed inevitable move, but this was not the time for it. To avoid dislocation and confusion in the newly created R.A.F. at so critical a stage of the war (the German spring offensive was still raging), the British Air Minister suggested that definite action be avoided for the present. A scheme could be worked out to be brought into effect during the winter.

As a first step to meet the wishes of the Canadians it was agreed to man two R.A.F. squadrons with Canadian personnel. In June a series of meetings began between Air Ministry and Canadian Army officials to discuss details. The Air Ministry officials repeated their reluctance to set up Canadian units at that time, but the Canadians resisted all suggestions to defer action until the war was over, insisting that the principle had been settled and that it was imperative that the natural aspirations of the Dominion should be considered. While the complicated questions of equipment, pay, and upkeep were slowly threshed out, the Air Ministry in August issued instructions to form two squadrons manned entirely with Canadian personnel. Training of ground crew began late in August but the squadrons did not actually form until after the Armistice.⁴ Early in 1919 the formation of the C.A.F. was carried a step further by the formation of No. 1 Canadian Wing "as a purely Canadian Unit" to administer the two squadrons. The intention then was to return the two units to Canada, intact, as the nucleus of the new Canadian Air Force. Future plans were, however, still quite nebulous and, until the Dominion government could decide its policy, training continued in England.

While the Air Council and Canadian military authorities in Britain were setting up a Canadian Air Force overseas, the Admiralty and Department of Naval Service had been organizing another air service in Canada. As early as the winter of 1916-17 the Admiralty had become concerned over the possible extension of German U-boat activities to the western side of the Atlantic; the construction of long-range submarines boded ill for the future. An officer of the Royal Naval Air Service (Wing Commander J. W. Seddon) was therefore sent to Canada early in 1917 to investigate the possibilities of establishing anti-submarine defensive measures on the Canadian east coast. An Inter-Departmental Committee of the Naval and Militia Departments, after considering the subject, reported that "an Air Service [was] necessary for the adequate defence of the Atlantic Coast."

³There were at that time over 6,600 Canadian officers in the R.A.F.; approximately one pilot in four came from this Dominion.

⁴The squadrons were variously referred to as Nos. 81 and 123, R.A.F., and No. 1 Scout and No. 2 Day Bombing, C.A.F.

Plans were accordingly drafted, costs estimated, sites inspected, and four seaplanes were sent out from Britain to facilitate an early start.⁵ But nothing was done that year. For financial reasons the Canadian government dropped the project and the seaplanes remained in their crates at Halifax.⁶

A year later the Admiralty again raised the subject. New German cruiser submarines were already operating off the Azores, the Canary Islands, and the coast of north-west Africa as far south as Dakar. It was to be expected that in the spring and summer of 1918 they would appear off the east coast of Canada in the focal area between Newfoundland and Cape Breton. Since Britain could spare neither ships, aircraft, personnel nor equipment to set up defensive patrols, the Canadian and American Naval Departments were asked if they could arrange for the manufacture of what would be required and the establishment of the necessary anti-submarine measures. In discussions at London, Washington, and Ottawa details were worked out for seaplane and kite balloon bases at Halifax and Sydney with a number of sub-stations along the coast.

Plans were fairly well advanced before the Air Ministry in May, 1918, first became aware of them. It came as something of a shock to learn that, while Britain after long deliberation and no little controversy had succeeded in amalgamating her two air services into one arm, Canada was considering the creation of two air corps. The Air Ministry expressed some concern lest the new Canadian Naval Air Service would mean a serious loss in personnel to the R.A.F. "If the war continues we shall have yet another rival air force in the Field, probably under either direct naval or direct military authority."

Nevertheless the formation of the Royal Canadian Naval Air Service (as it was styled) proceeded, largely under Admiralty direction, with the assistance of several ex-R.N.A.S. officers on loan from the R.A.F. This dual "control" raised many problems and caused long delays in securing supplies. In Canada too, Lieutenant Colonel J. T. Cull, DSO, who was in charge of the new corps, encountered many difficulties—inertia, indifference, delays, lack of equipment, and other obstacles. German U-boat operations off the American coast provided a useful fillip for government officials who (Cull reported) "know nothing about the needs of aviation and, sometimes, one is driven to thinking, care less."

Recruiting began for a force of about 1,000 men. Some cadets were sent to the United States for a course of ground training and seaplane flying, while a small detachment went to Britain for lighter-than-air training. Since it would be early in 1919 before the R.C.N.A.S. would be ready to begin operations, the United States Navy undertook to carry on in the interval. Aircraft and personnel were sent to the two stations at Halifax and North Sydney. Seaplane flights from the first station began late in August, and in the following month from Sydney. The U.S.N. commander at

⁵Two seaplane stations at Halifax and Sydney were considered to be minimum requirements. Seddon estimated that a force of 300 men would be required, with thirty-four seaplanes, at a cost of £300,000, of which £102,000 would be for purchase of the aircraft.

⁶In October, 1917, they were presented to the United States Naval Flying Corps for training purposes.

Halifax, Lieutenant Richard E. Byrd, was later to win great fame as an aviator and explorer. Convoy escorts and reconnaissance patrols continued from the two stations in Nova Scotia until the end of hostilities. No enemy submarines were sighted, although there was one scare in mid-October, when a U-boat was reported off the entrance to Halifax harbour.

When the Great War ended, therefore, Canada had two Air Forces under formation—one overseas, the other in Canada. What should be done with them? Within a month of the Armistice an order-in-council was issued (December 5, 1918), discontinuing the R.C.N.A.S. "for the time being" and its personnel was released.⁷ But the Honourable C. C. Ballantyne, then Minister for Naval Services, emphasized that the R.C.N.A.S. was not abolished; the present action was being taken only until such time as the government decided on the details and policy of a permanent air service. A Canadian officer remained attached to the Department of Naval Service as acting Director of the R.C.N.A.S. from December, 1918, until December, 1919. The Air Ministry then discovered that this officer, on loan from the R.A.F., was working solely for Canada and accordingly requested and obtained from the Canadian government a refund of his pay.

Meanwhile the Canadian Air Force in Britain had continued its training, at R.A.F. expense, in the expectation that the training would be completed by June 30, 1919, and the units would then be transferred to Canada. The Canadian authorities were unable, however, to formulate a definite air policy by that date and demobilization of the C.A.F. began. Early in June Sir Edward Kemp cabled from Ottawa that "Government do not feel that time is opportune for committing itself to maintaining permanently two squadrons. . . . Government will decide future policy Air Force later." The units gradually faded away. One squadron was formally disbanded on January 28, 1920, followed a week later by the second squadron and the Wing Headquarters.

The inability of the Canadian government to make up its mind on air policy was certainly not due to lack of enthusiasm among Canadian officers in the R.A.F. or lack of encouragement from the Air Ministry. The latter gave good counsel and advice and prepared detailed plans and probable costs to be laid before the Cabinet at Ottawa. In addition to plans and advice the British government gave more tangible encouragement in the form of gift aircraft and supplies. The first donations were eighteen "token" aeroplanes presented in January and February, 1919, as replacements for machines donated during the war by patriotic Canadian individuals and organizations. Some weeks later, when plans for the post-war C.A.F. were being fully considered, the Director of Air Service, C.A.F., asked the Air Ministry for about 100 aircraft as initial equipment. Such a donation, it was pointed out, might hasten the Canadian government in formulating its plans. Sir Robert Borden admitted that initial expense was likely to be the chief obstacle. "There is a good deal of difficulty [he wrote] in connection with any proposal to organize an effective Air Force for Canada. The financial difficulty stands chiefly in the way." The Air Council and War Cabinet approved the Canadian request for gift aircraft

⁷Canada purchased from the United States the ground material at Halifax and Sydney, and received as a donation the flying material (twelve seaplanes and four kite balloons with a number of motors and spares).

but decided "in the interests of imperial defence" to include all the Dominions, India, and the colonies. On June 4, 1919, the British government announced in the House of Commons that it would give 100 aircraft from surplus R.A.F. stores to each Dominion and India, and a few machines to each colony or protectorate requiring them.⁸ As a result of this offer the Dominion received approximately \$5 million of equipment, consisting of eighty aeroplanes, fourteen flying boats, twelve airships, six kite balloons, together with sheds, motor transport, armament, wireless equipment, cameras, and other stores. Britain in fact gave more than Canada herself spent on the Air Force in over four years.

When the offer was first made, the Canadian authorities in Britain provisionally selected aircraft types suitable for a military Air Force. The types finally accepted were more adapted to non-military air work in the Dominion. This change was due to the establishment of the Air Board in Canada. This body, of seven members, was set up by the Air Board Act of June 6, 1916, with wide powers to regulate aviation throughout the Dominion. In addition to the control of commercial flying and the conduct of civil government air operations, the Board was charged with the air defence of Canada, including the organization and administration of a Canadian Air Force.

After long consideration by the Air Board a C.A.F. was created by order-in-council on February 18, 1920. The establishment authorized was 1,340 officers and 3,905 airmen—figures never attained in actual fact; indeed in August, 1939, the R.C.A.F. was over 1,100 below the strength authorized in 1920. The new C.A.F. was a non-permanent, non-professional force whose function was to give biennial refresher courses to ex-officers and airmen of the R.A.F. A Canadian Air Force Association was formed, with branches in the provinces, to compile nominal roles of pilots, observers, and airmen and prepare rosters for the monthly training courses. The first courses began at Camp Borden on October 1, 1920, and by the end of 1922, 550 officers and 1,271 airmen had received refresher training.

Two years' experience, however, demonstrated that the results hardly justified the effort and expense involved. It was obvious that drastic changes were necessary if Canada was to have an Air Force at all worthy of the name. There were two major defects. Under the existing scheme no new pilots had been trained since the Armistice. New blood—a new generation of airmen—was needed to carry on the Force. Furthermore, as originally constituted, the C.A.F. had no permanency. Its staff were civil servants employed in the Civil Operations Branch of the Air Board who were appointed for periods of six months to a year for duties with the C.A.F. It was, therefore, decided in 1922 to reorganize the C.A.F. on a more durable basis. As a first step, until final plans could be completed, the Civil Operations Branch was consolidated with the C.A.F., the civil servants of the Branch being granted temporary commissions in the Air Force. The order-in-council (June 30, 1922) which was issued to cover this transition period authorized a temporary establishment of 69 officers and 238 other ranks.

⁸The offer was later expanded in August, 1919, to include spare parts, mobilization equipment, motor transport, lorries, hangars, etc.

1922 was a year of re-organization not only for the C.A.F. but for all three defence services. The government decided on a policy of centralization under one Minister of National Defence. This would mean economy, greater efficiency, closer co-operation between the services, and a single comprehensive scheme of defence rather than three separate plans. A bill to incorporate the Departments of Militia and Defence, Naval Services and Air Board was passed by Parliament in June, 1922, and on January 1, 1923, the new Department of National Defence was created.

A month later (February, 1923) the King approved the prefix "Royal" for the Canadian Air Force, but since the whole organization of the Force was at that time under consideration, general use of the new title was deferred until the following year. On April 1, 1924, "The King's Regulations and Orders for the R.C.A.F." were promulgated and the Force emerged as a permanent body, consisting of an active force and a reserve. That date, April 1, 1924, on which Canada's fifth Air Force came into being, is generally regarded as the birthday of the present R.C.A.F.

Its strength now totalled a modest 61 officers and 262 airmen, administered by a "Director, R.C.A.F." under the control of the Chief of the General Staff. The annual appropriation for its support was \$1,561,000 (for 1924-5). During the next few years the Force slowly expanded to reach a peak in 1931 of 177 officers and 729 airmen, with a parliamentary vote (for 1930-1) of \$7,475,700.⁹ Then its growth was cut short and the depression of the nineteen-thirties all but destroyed the R.C.A.F. The annual vote fell, or plunged, to \$1,750,000 for 1932-3, and approximately 20 per cent of the Force (78 officers, 100 airmen, and 110 civilians) had to be released, leaving only 103 officers and 591 airmen.

Fortunately the R.C.A.F. survived the drastic financial stringency of 1932 and during the next seven years gained strength slowly but steadily. At the same time, the character of the Force underwent a major change. Prior to 1932 the R.C.A.F. had been unique among the Air Forces of the world in that the greater part of its work was essentially non-military in character. Military aircraft indeed were few and of obsolete or obsolescent types. During these years (1923-32) the R.C.A.F. acted as the government's civil air company, carrying out flying operations for the various departments. In this capacity it performed very valuable services; photographing great areas of the Dominion, helping to open up new sections of the interior, transporting officials into remote and inaccessible regions, blazing air routes, patrolling forests and fishery areas, suppressing smuggling of narcotic drugs and liquor, experimenting in air mail services, carrying treaty money to the Indians, and performing many a humanitarian act by flying sick and injured trappers, traders, farmers, and Indians from remote outposts to places where adequate medical attention could be given. After 1932 the Force was relieved of this civil government air work and was able to concentrate on military aviation.¹⁰ Steps were taken to secure more modern types of service aircraft, but as so many other competitors were now in the field it was difficult to obtain equipment.

⁹Of this total, \$2,510,000 was for the R.C.A.F., \$4,065,000 for Civil Air Operations, and \$900,700 for air mail routes.

¹⁰Commercial companies and provincial governments took over much of the "civil" work.

Another feature of the recovery of the Force after 1932 was the formation of an Auxiliary Active Air Force. This force had been authorized as early as 1924, but no action was taken prior to 1932 when the formation of three squadrons was approved. By September, 1939, twelve auxiliary units had been authorized, although several were only in preliminary stages of organization.

Other significant changes occurred in these years of falling barometer in Europe. The increasing gravity of the situation overseas was clearly reflected in the parliamentary vote. For 1936-7 the sum allotted for the R.C.A.F. was \$4,130,000. For the next year it was \$11,391,650 — an increase of over 175 per cent. With adequate funds at last available new units were formed and the construction of new stations was accelerated. In 1938 three Commands were organized — Western Air, Eastern Air, and Air Training. The head of the R.C.A.F., whose title had been changed in 1932 from "Director" to "Senior Air Officer," was elevated to Chief of the Air Staff (December 15, 1938), and the Force, formerly under the control of the Army, became an independent arm, directly under the Minister of National Defence (November 19, 1938).

When Hitler invaded Poland the R.C.A.F. had a total strength of 4,071 officers and men (298 permanent officers, 112 auxiliary, 10 R.A.F., 2,750 permanent airmen, and 901 auxiliary).¹¹ On September 1, 1939, this small Force was placed on active service and nine days later went to war.

War meant a tremendous expansion and many new responsibilities, the greatest of which was the administration of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan. To cope with these heavy burdens, a separate Ministry of National Defence for Air was created in May, 1940, with an Air Council to advise the Minister. Three new components were added to the Force, a Special Reserve to accommodate the thousands of new recruits, a Women's Division in August, 1941, and the Air Cadets in April, 1943. For a time there were also University Air Squadrons and an Aircraft Detection Corps assisting in the work of instruction and defence.

From its tiny force of 4,000 men at the outbreak of war, the R.C.A.F. expanded to over 206,000 by the end of 1943 and held fourth place among the Air Forces of the United Nations. It developed and administered the great British Commonwealth Air Training Plan which produced 131,553 trained airmen for the British and Dominion Air Forces. At home the R.C.A.F. put over forty squadrons into the field which, in addition to guarding our coasts and sharing in the Aleutian operations, played a very important part in co-operation with Coastal Command and the British, Canadian, and American Navies in the hard-fought battle of the Atlantic. Overseas the R.C.A.F. contributed forty-eight squadrons for service with the several Commands of the R.A.F. Fourteen of these units formed a special R.C.A.F. Group (No. 6) in Bomber Command; fourteen others constituted four wings in the Second Tactical Air Force. Other squadrons flew with Coastal Command over the North Sea, the Bay of Biscay and the Atlantic, fought with the Desert Air Force from Alamein to Treviso, patrolled over the Indian Ocean, and carried supplies to our armies in North-Western Europe and Burma. In addition to the personnel of these

¹¹There were at that time more Canadian officers in the R.A.F. than there were in the R.C.A.F.

units at home and abroad, great numbers of Canadians served in R.A.F. formations in every theatre of war. The R.C.A.F. suffered 17,054 casualties in killed, presumed dead, and missing; it won over 8,600 awards for gallantry.

Now the R.C.A.F. is contracting to post-war requirements. These plans call for a Force of three components, Regular, Auxiliary, and Reserve, with a total overall strength of 30,600 officers and men. The Air Cadets will also be continued as a valuable training ground for our youth. Though relatively small, this Force, it is believed, will be a well balanced arm which, should occasion ever again arise, can be expanded into a great war-time training and operational Air Force — just as the R.C.A.F. was expanded after 1939.

From the flights of the "Silver Dart" at Petawawa in the summer of 1909 to the homecoming by air of R.C.A.F. overseas squadrons in the summer of 1945 is but a brief span as time is measured. But in that generation a new air arm was created. In the Great War of 1914-18 its seed was planted by the thousands of young Canadians who flew with the R.F.C., the R.N.A.S., and the R.A.F. In the years between the wars the sapling grew, despite lack of nourishment and drastic pruning. That the young tree's roots were well planted and its timber sound, was fully proved in the great storm of 1939-45. Now it has grown to maturity, taking its place with pride beside the other services to spread its protecting branches over the Dominion. On the flag which was designed for the Canadian Army Commander overseas, there are three red maple leaves springing from one stem. They may be taken to symbolize the three services—Navy, Army, and Air Force — united in a common cause.

LIBERAL NATIONALISM IN THE EIGHTEEN-SEVENTIES

By W. R. GRAHAM
The University of Toronto

ON the first of July next some of us will celebrate Dominion Day and some of us will celebrate Canada Day, depending on whether we are abject colonials hanging tightly to the apron strings of Great Britain or dangerous nationalists inspired by an insidious ambition to rend the imperial tie asunder. By whatever name we celebrate the day, we shall be marking, in our modest, restrained fashion, the anniversary of what has justly been called "a great political achievement."¹ Nowadays many Canadians are disposed to look upon their country with a somewhat jaundiced eye. Canada has not fulfilled its high promise and we are never without lugubrious lamentations over that unhappy fact. The twentieth century is almost half over and there are few indications that historians will say that it belonged to Canada. But to the generation of men who witnessed the political changes of the eighteen-sixties, Confederation was a great achievement full of profound importance for every inhabitant of British North America.

At the same time the political transformation of 1867 was somewhat abrupt and it confronted the various provinces with a set of entirely new mutual relationships for which they were not wholly prepared. Thus Confederation set in motion a long process of readjustment, a process which involved the formulation of new concepts and policies predicated on the possession of dominion from sea to sea and suiting the realities of an entirely new political structure.

[Confederation, then, posed a multitude of questions for Canadians, questions that were on everyone's lips, questions like these: What should be the relative strength of Dominion and provinces in the framework of federalism? In the sphere of external relations, would the expansion of British North America alter its status within the Empire and if so, in what way? Or was independence, as the Manchester School had so forthrightly preached, the natural destiny of Canada as of all colonies? Would or would not independence have as its inescapable corollary, annexation to the United States? Meanwhile, how could the enormous task of material development best be performed? What was the most advantageous way of linking British Columbia with the East and of filling up the vast empty spaces in between? Were tariffs for revenue or protection best designed to promote the true interests of the country? And, when all was said and done, what were those interests?]

These questions were debated eagerly and with enthusiasm by Canadians of the Confederation period. Most could agree that the future of their country was assured, that on the northern half of North America one of the great nations of the future was in the making. No such general agreement existed, however, with respect to the policies best suited to the promotion of Canada's growth and development. Naturally enough, the two Canadian political parties became the vehicles by which these differences of opinion were translated into

¹*Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations* (Ottawa, 1940), I, 19.

intelligible programmes of policy. In time, definite national policies emerged and ultimately were accepted by both parties as integral links in the chain of Canadian tradition, as assumptions on which future action by Canadian governments would be based. In the eighteen-seventies such policies were only in the formative stage and the two parties found themselves opposed on every fundamental issue which arose at that time. It was, of course, possible to say with the Canada First party that "The ins and outs cannot be segregated under the old names of Reformer and Conservative. Tory and Grit are merely synonymous with cat and dog and convey no notion save that of difference in momentum."² This oft-repeated accusation, however, is far truer seventy years later than it was when it was written and is one of many examples of the prophetic powers possessed by the men of Canada First. But in the seventies political warfare and public debate seem to have been particularly acrimonious as the country groped its way in search of a basic pattern of philosophy and action.

I

None of the many contentious issues which arose immediately after Confederation more agitated the public mind (to use a favourite expression of the period) than the question of Canada's national status. What would be Canada's position in the Empire and among the nations of the world? While there were relatively few souls hardy enough to entertain the thought that Canada was ready to stand on its own feet as an independent nation, or who thought that such a consummation was in any way to be wished, it was widely felt that somehow the old subservient colonial status was not in keeping with the new prominence of the united provinces. To be sure, the British North America Act recognized no alteration in the imperial relationship but the nascent national consciousness of Canadians gave rise to a good deal of questioning about the validity of that relationship as it existed.

Not only in Canada was there earnest searching of the soul on this subject. A number of factors conspired to mark the year 1870 as a watershed in the evolution of British imperial philosophy.³ The majority of Englishmen had long been disposed to view their colonies as liabilities rather than assets, and this was particularly true of the North American ones. The ascendancy of free trade, to the great chagrin of Canadian merchants, had brought to an inglorious end the old integrated imperial system. Colonies were no longer regarded as the handmaidens of commercial prosperity but as encumbrances, apt to involve the Mother Country in profitless financial expense and fruitless wars.

This attitude prevailed in the Old Country when the Canadian delegates visited it in 1865 and 1867 and there is ample testimony to the monumental indifference which greeted the passage through Parliament of the bill to unite the British North American provinces.⁴ Englishmen seemed to take it for granted that the colonies were about to separate from Great Britain. Not sadness but a feeling of relief that they had come of age and were ready

²W. A. Foster, *Canada First: A Memorial* (Toronto, 1890), 54-5.

³See C. A. Bodelsen, *Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism* (London, 1924), chap. II.

⁴John A. Macdonald's complaint that it seemed to be regarded with about as much animation as was bestowed on "a private bill uniting two or three English parishes." Sir J. Pope, *Correspondence of Sir J. Macdonald* (Toronto, 1895), 451.

at last to assume their own responsibilities was Mother England's reaction to the impending departure of her most troublesome children.

This attitude must have severely disillusioned the Canadian delegates, fervent as was the devotion of most of them to the Crown, but only one, A. T. Galt, concluded that the thing for the new Dominion to do was to accept its destiny as an independent nation. "... I believe," declared Galt during a debate on the subject in Parliament in 1870, "that the day for independence will come, and unless we were prepared for it, unless our legislation be framed with that view, we will be found then in the same position as now, and being unprepared for a separate political existence, we will have no choice with regard to our future."⁵

There was small support for this point of view in Canada. Leaders of both political parties and both ethnic groups dissociated themselves entirely from the idea. Professions of loyalty to the Crown were never more devout than at the time of Confederation. The spectre of the new colossus to the south was too close at hand to permit irresponsible utterances in favour of separation from the Mother Country. Confederation itself was conceived very largely as an anti-American expedient and executed in that spirit. Independence, far from assuring protection against annexation, as Galt suggested it would, seemed sure to lead down an "inclined plane" quickly and inevitably to that very fate. The *Toronto Globe* was not ashamed to state the unvarnished truth: "... we have not yet strength to stand alone."⁶

[There were, then, few adherents in Canada of the prevailing English view that separation was both desirable and in the nature of things. After 1870, however, British imperial philosophy itself began to change. Numerous factors conspired to make Englishmen ponder the wisdom of their anti-imperial point of view. They somehow sensed that the era of unchallenged British supremacy, of the swaggering Palmerstonianism of the middle decades of the nineteenth century, was drawing to its close. The incredible expansion of the United States during and after the Civil War constituted a threat to Great Britain's industrial and commercial pre-eminence, while the rise of Bismarck's German Empire disturbed the continental balance of power and forced England to turn her attention once more to Europe. Perhaps, after all, colonies might be of some value, might prove bulwarks to British power in the face of rising assertive nationalisms. Vague talk of imperial consolidation began to be heard where the voices of disintegration had reigned supreme.]

It was some years before the gradual eclipse of British supremacy developed hard and fast schemes of imperial federation and produced the jingoistic racialism of the Chamberlain era. But even in the seventies it had its effects on British policy. Confronted with the disappearance of European stability, Great Britain made a determined effort to extricate herself from the disputes in which she had become involved with the United States over matters arising out of the Civil War, and appeared willing in the process to sacrifice, not only her own interests, but those of Canada as well. Canadians felt, with considerable justice, that the Gladstone Government, in negotiating the Washington Treaty in 1871, had neglected Canadian interests

⁵O. D. Skelton, *The Life and Times of Sir Alexander Tilloch Galt* (Toronto, 1920), 451.

⁶The *Toronto Globe*, Oct. 17, 1874.

rather shamefully in their eagerness to appease the United States. [Even Macdonald, whom no one could accuse of lukewarmness to the imperial connexion, judging by his own account emerged as a fighting Canadian nationalist during the negotiations.⁷ The announcement of the terms of the treaty elicited a howl of disapproval, particularly from the Liberal stronghold of Ontario, which dearly wanted what Sir John had vainly tried to obtain—a reciprocity treaty with the United States.

The Liberal leaders in the Canadian House of Commons took a strongly nationalist stand during the debate on the Treaty and placed on the journals of the House a series of resolutions expressing their dissatisfaction with its terms and with the surrender of Canadian interests. On May 6, 1872, Richard Cartwright introduced three resolutions, the definitive one of which voiced regret "that Her Majesty's Advisers have seen fit to assume the responsibility of withdrawing the claims of the Dominion of Canada, against the United States for compensation on account of injuries arising from the Fenian raids."⁸ This was successfully amended by the Conservatives to the effect that "an expression of opinion on the subject" was in the interests neither of Canada nor of good relations between the Dominion and the Mother Country.⁹ Two days later, on the motion for second reading of the bill to carry the provisions of the Washington Treaty into effect, Edward Blake moved the following amendment:

That before proceeding further upon the said Bill, this House feels bound to declare that while Her Majesty's loyal subjects, the people of Canada, will at all times cheerfully make any reasonable sacrifice in the interests of the Empire, we have just ground for the great dissatisfaction prevailing throughout the country at the mode in which our rights have been dealt with in the negotiations resulting in the Treaty of Washington, and at the subsequent proposal of our Government that England should endorse a Canadian loan as a price for our adoption of the Treaty and for our abandonment of the claims in respect of the Fenian raids, which affect, not merely our purse, but also our honour and our peace.¹⁰

After an extremely lengthy debate this motion was finally negatived by a substantial majority and the bill went through its remaining stages without serious opposition.

II

The Washington Treaty focused attention on the subject of the imperial relationship and gave a healthy fillip to Canadian nationalism. It was in Ontario that a developing national spirit was most in evidence. The most enthusiastic exponents of this spirit were the group of young men who adopted as their motto the arresting words, "Canada First." Drawing their inspiration largely from the vision and eloquence of D'Arcy McGee, they were a small but articulate knot of crusaders preaching the gospel of the "new nationality." Their leader, after his arrival in Toronto in 1871, was Goldwin Smith under whose influence the group developed from a rather adolescent and sentimentalized exaltation of Canada's romantic history to a more practical participation in public discussion of current political issues. In general the aims of the

⁷Sir J. Pope, *Memoirs of Sir John A. Macdonald* (Ottawa, 1894), II, chaps. xx, xxi.

⁸*Canada, Journals of the House of Commons*, 1872, May 6, 84.

⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰*Ibid.*, May 8, 98.

Canada First group were, in the words of Goldwin Smith, "to cultivate Canadian patriotism, to raise Canada above the rank of a mere dependency, and to give her the first place in Canadian hearts."¹¹ In 1874 Canada First entered the political arena with a new party, dubbed the Canadian National Association, whose aim it was to cultivate these sentiments and achieve these objectives. The first article of the Association's platform declared for "British connection, Consolidation of the Empire—and in the meantime a voice in treaties affecting Canada."¹²

The last ten words of the clause, clearly the important ones, were obviously inspired by the Washington Treaty and designed to exploit the dissatisfaction with its terms widely current at that time. In itself, however, the clause was quite innocuous and no one took it very seriously until Blake preached from the same text in his famous speech at Aurora in October, 1874. Blake, who wandered in and out of the Cabinet almost at will during Alexander Mackenzie's prime ministership from 1873 to 1878, had renounced his hesitant allegiance to the Liberal leader immediately after the election of 1874 and resigned from the Ministry in which he had reluctantly accepted the position of Minister without Portfolio. Now at Aurora he took up the platform of Canada First, with regard to other matters as well as the imperial relationship, and made it his own. Referring to Canada's position in the Empire he declared:

Matters cannot drift much longer as they have drifted hitherto. The Treaty of Washington created a very profound impression throughout this country. It produced a feeling that at no distant date the people of Canada would desire that they should have some greater share of control than they now have in the management of foreign affairs; that our Government should not present the anomaly which it now presents—a Government the freest, perhaps the most democratic in the world with reference to local and domestic matters, in which you rule yourselves as fully as any people in the world, while in your foreign affairs . . . you may have no more voice than the people of Japan. . . . But how long is this talk in the newspapers and elsewhere, this talk which I find in very high places, of the desirability, aye, of the necessity of fostering a national spirit among the people of Canada to be mere talk? . . . the time will come when that national spirit . . . will be truly felt among us, when we shall realise that we are four millions of Britons who are not free, when we shall be ready to take up that freedom, and to ask what the late Prime Minister of England assured us we should not be denied—our share of national rights.¹³

Blake went on to say that Canadians could not complain of this regrettable state of affairs as long as they refused to shoulder the responsibilities, as well as seek the rights, of free-born Britons and concluded that imperial federation offered the best solution to the difficulty.)

Blake admitted that his speech would probably prove to be a "disturbing" one and so it did. Nothing in it was more disturbing to Canadian orthodoxy

¹¹Foster, *Canada First*, 3.

¹²*Ibid.*, 8.

¹³R. G. Perry (ed), 'A National Sentiment!' *Speech of the Hon. Edward Blake at Aurora with the Comments of Some of the Canadian Press Thereon* (Ottawa, 1874), 9-10.

than his pronouncements on the subject of imperial relations. The *Toronto Church Herald*, organ of the Church of England, warned that "although . . . Mr. Blake faintly spoke of a 'Federal basis,' it is quite evident he had in his mind the dissolution of our connection with England." The *Herald* found it impossible to "share his dissatisfaction with our present constitutional position."¹⁴ The *Ottawa Citizen* was less restrained in its language. "Radicalism," it cried, "is reckless and aggressive in the Mother Country as well as in Canada. The colonial tie is attacked at both ends, and nothing but a united effort on the part of all loyal subjects of Her Majesty can avert the danger which threatens its continuance."¹⁵ The *Peterborough Review* declared that now that the Canada First platform had been "taken up and advocated by a man in the position of Mr. Edward Blake . . . it becomes the loyal citizens of Canada to give no uncertain sound with regard to doctrines which, if they lead to anything, must lead to independence or—perhaps we would not be far wrong if we said—and annexation . . . we can heartily join hands with . . . most of our confreres in denouncing the cultivation of a 'national sentiment,' which we presume means a *Canadian* national sentiment, as distinct from that of the Empire. . . ."¹⁶

Such expressions of Tory loyalism were mixed with shouts of exultation over the rupture in the Liberal ranks, for the Conservative journals were all but unanimous in the view that Blake's oration was his valedictory as a Liberal and his inaugural address as chieftain of the Canada First party. Goldwin Smith himself later referred to Blake as the "man to whom it looked as its leader" and described Blake's re-entry into the Liberal Cabinet in 1875 as "a heavy blow."¹⁷

The glee of the Conservative newspapers seemed to be justified by the reaction of the *Toronto Globe*, the organ of Canadian liberalism, to the Aurora speech. The *Globe's* manner of handling the speech was itself open to suspicion. Blake spoke on a Saturday. On the following Monday the *Globe* contained not a word about the North York meeting but the leading editorial was devoted to a virulent attack on Goldwin Smith and Canada First. On Tuesday the first half of Blake's speech was printed; the following day the remainder appeared along with editorial comment, the first that George Brown had seen fit to make. The *Globe* had been pouring scorn on the Canada First organization ever since the latter had first appeared over the political horizon but had refused to take it seriously. Instead it had ridiculed it as a political absurdity, poked fun at its programme, and patronized its leaders as idle visionaries and hopelessly inept novices. "Let these sucking politicians," it sneered on one occasion, ". . . go to school and study the alphabet of politics in the meantime, while they 'tarry at Jericho till their beards are grown'."¹⁸ Suddenly, however, after October 3, 1874—the date of Blake's speech—Canada First had assumed, judging by the editorial columns of the *Globe*, a sinister and dangerous aspect. ". . . what is the meaning of 'Canada First'?" asked the Liberal journal. "Unless all reports are impudent fabrications, there is an esoteric and exoteric philosophy; the outside profession, the bundle of incongruous planks of the piebald programme; the inner creed of the high

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 41.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 40.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 84-5.

¹⁷Foster, *Canada First*, 11.

¹⁸*Globe*, Jan. 9, 1874.

priests of the party, separation from England, and a distinction, recognized either by law or by the force of a tacit compact, in favour of citizens born in Canada."¹⁹ In the weeks that followed the *Globe* attacked this insidious "inner creed" and its "high priests" with a brand of belligerent loyalism which even the Tory journals were unable to surpass.

Brown's strategy in dealing with the Aurora speech was quite obvious. The sentiments voiced by Blake were clearly those of the Canada First group in all important respects and there was considerable truth in the assertion of the Conservative *Toronto Mail* that the *Globe* was attempting, by concentrating its attack on Goldwin Smith and his followers, "to discredit the utterances of the member for South Bruce [Blake] before they appeared in print."²⁰

When finally it did get around to commenting on Blake's address, the *Globe* damned the notion of imperial federation with faint praise, choosing to regard it, for the time being at any rate, as a dream:

The question about the future relationship between Canada and the Empire [it declared] may well be regarded as an open one, and while at present interesting as a speculation, it is not to be looked upon as much more, as far as it contemplates a change in our present condition. A great Federal Parliament for the British Empire is not, by any means, a novelty, and is an idea which has many attractions for a certain class of minds. Much in the abstract may be said in its favour, but its practicability is a very different affair. . . . Still, the subject affords material for interesting and harmless speculation, which in the course of time may issue in some arrangement which will fuse the whole Empire more thoroughly into one united whole, and make the inhabitants of all its different parts so entirely one in sentiment and feeling and aspiration, that the only country they will recognize as theirs will be the British Empire, and the only national sentiment they will deem worthy of cherishing will be the one that thinks not of "Canada First" or of "Australia first," or of "heligoland [*sic*] first," or "Norfolk island first," but of the grand old British race first, and of all who love their Sovereign, and all who swear by the "Old Flag" as first and last and midst as well.²¹

On the day following the appearance of this outburst, Goldwin Smith delivered an address at the National Club of Toronto in which he expressed his well-known conviction that Canada's position as a colony of a European nation was anomalous and that she should assert her independence. In view of the fact that Smith's effort followed so closely on the heels of Blake's, it is hardly to be wondered at that the two should have been examined together and judged as being cut from the same piece of cloth. The two men were, after all, dealing with the same subject and Blake's assertion that Canadians were "four millions of Britons who are not free" and his talk of developing a "national sentiment" seemed not far removed from Smith's outright advocacy of independence.

More than ever after the National Club address the *Globe* levelled the full force of its fury against Smith but Blake came in for his due share of strictures, softened down though they were in the hope that the sensitive member for South Bruce would not desert the party in favour of Canada

¹⁹*Ibid.*, Oct. 5, 1874.

²⁰Perry (ed.), *'A National Sentiment'* 23.

²¹*Globe*, Oct. 7, 1874.

First. [Mr. Blake's utterances on this point are to be regretted," declared the Toronto paper, "because coming from so high an authority they tend to create popular dissatisfaction with existing institutions, which may find vent in the direction that Mr. Goldwin Smith is so eager to foreshadow."²² The *Globe* was at a loss to account for this dissatisfaction, this restless preoccupation with constitutional status, this disquieting introduction of disturbing themes into the realm of public discussion. Things were well enough as they were, it thought; there was neither necessity nor demand for change. "... to justify radical changes," argued Brown, "it is necessary to show the existence of a grievance." What have Mr. Goldwin Smith or his followers of the Canada First persuasion to show as against Great Britain in the way of any grievance that, without disturbing our present political arrangements, cannot be easily remedied?"²³ "We are suffering from no injustice, and we are conscious of no hampering, degrading influence exerted upon us by virtue of our colonial position."²⁴ "That we are a nation with an individuality and a type of our own is now seen on both sides of the Atlantic."²⁵ [What was this notion of imperial federation, then? A dream, albeit an attractive one. Independence? A nightmare! "Britain's presence once effectively withdrawn from the continent," warned the *Globe*, "how long would it be before our busy brothers on the other side would raise international complications which could only be solved by submission or war? ... we have not yet strength to stand alone."²⁶ Let there be an end to this idle speculation; let the theorists devote their talents to more productive purposes; let well enough alone. Such was the conservative doctrine with which the Liberal organ regaled its readers.

Editorial opinion in Canada was all but unanimous that imperial federation was utterly visionary, something which would be achieved only in the distant future, if ever. But the *Globe's* feeling of blissful content with the conditions of Canada's colonial status was not shared by all the Liberal press. "The relations of the Dominion to the Empire, must ... be considered," affirmed the *Orangeville Advertiser*. "There is no use in saying that we are well enough as we are. ... It is absurd to say that our present relations will be permitted to continue as they are; that a self-governing people, with the large territory and population that we have, shall remain in the position of colonists."²⁷ *Le Bien Public* of Montreal welcomed Blake's national stand. "As for us," it declared, "we applaud heartily that part of the program of Mr. Blake and the national party of Upper Canada, the aim of which is to develop in the hearts of the Canadian people that national spirit and those sentiments of independence which must some day permit Canada to take its place among the great nations."²⁸ The *Galt Reformer*, no doubt for Brown's benefit, asked tartly, "Are Reformers forsooth not to think or speak of any new subject? Verily that would be Toryism with a vengeance."²⁹

²²*Ibid.*, Oct. 23, 1874.

²³*Ibid.*, Oct. 19, 1874.

²⁴*Ibid.*, Oct. 17, 1874.

²⁵*Ibid.*, Oct. 12, 1874.

²⁶*Ibid.*, Oct 17, 1874.

²⁷Perry (ed.), 'A National Sentiment,' 27-8.

²⁸*Ibid.*, 76.

²⁹*Ibid.*, 77.

Thus the animadversions of the *Globe* did not truly represent Liberal opinion as a whole. Despite the protestations of the Liberal journals to the contrary, the Aurora speech and the comments thereon did reveal a deep cleavage within the ranks, a fundamental difference of opinion between opposite temperaments—the inertia of satisfied conservatism, represented by Brown and the *Globe*, and the reforming urge to move onwards represented by the younger, less complacent members of the party led by Blake.

III

Edward Blake was a man of stubborn convictions and tenacious will and his desire for the development of Canadian autonomy was not reduced one whit by the philippics of the *Globe*. Although he awakened by and by from the dream of imperial federation,³⁰ he remained firmly persuaded that Canada must free herself as far as possible from control by the Colonial and Foreign Offices in London, that she must not rest in securing, as he said, "that fuller measure of self-government which becomes our station amongst the peoples of the world."³¹ One is forced to wonder why he put forth the notion of imperial federation at all for he must have realized, along with his critics, the inconsistency of that idea with his urgent plea for the development of a national spirit. "... we are four millions of Britons who are not free." That, when all is said and done, was the very heart and kernel of his utterances on Canada's external status, rather than his vague suggestion about reorganizing the Empire on a "Federal basis." It was his ardent wish that Canada should "take up that freedom," not by casting loose from the Empire, but by asserting her right to a larger say in the determination of her external policy and the management of her own affairs without interference from London. Hence Liberal nationalism, as exemplified by Blake, was nationalism directed against the imperial powers of Great Britain, preoccupied as it was with enhancing the constitutional autonomy of the Dominion. It thus contrasts with the nationalism of the Conservative party, which was essentially anti-American in character. True, Conservative leaders could, and did when the occasion demanded, adopt a strongly nationalistic point of view on constitutional issues but they do not seem to have developed, as completely as some Liberal leaders, and in particular Blake, a real philosophy of Canadian autonomy. It is true, too that the Liberal party during the seventies was itself split on the question of imperial relations; the attitude of the *Globe* testifies to that. Nevertheless, it was Blake's viewpoint that prevailed in the formulation of official policy.

In the summer of 1875, after prolonged negotiations, Blake re-entered Mackenzie's Cabinet as Minister of Justice, a position for which his legal attainments admirably suited him. He did so only after a great deal of argument, exasperating hesitation, and on certain well-defined conditions. During the session of 1875 Blake had led a small but influential rump of Liberal members of the Commons in opposition to the policy of the Government by which Mackenzie sought to fulfil the so-called Carnarvon Terms with respect to the Pacific Railway and British Columbia. A discussion of Liberal railway policy during the eighteen-seventies is beyond the scope of

³⁰O. D. Skelton, *Life and Letters of Sir, Wilfrid Laurier* (London, 1922), II, 345.

³¹A. Mackenzie, *et al. Reform Government in the Dominion* (Toronto, 1878), Blake at Teeswater, Sept. 24, 1877, 146.

this paper. What is relevant here is Blake's reaction to the fact of the Carnarvon Terms, rather than to their nature.

Shortly after his accession to office, Mackenzie had become embroiled in a dispute with British Columbia by his announcement that he intended to seek a relaxation of the terms of union between that province and Canada which related to the construction of the Pacific Railway. Irritated by this action on Mackenzie's part, the government of British Columbia, in June, 1874, appealed to the imperial government to intervene. This request was anticipated, however, by the Colonial Secretary in the Disraeli Ministry, Lord Carnarvon. Before he had received the British Columbian petition, Carnarvon, an ardent imperialist, tendered his good offices as arbitrator of the dispute. "...If both Governments," he wrote to the Governor-General, Lord Dufferin, "should unite in desiring to refer to my arbitration all matters in controversy, binding themselves to accept such decision as I think fair and just, I would not decline to undertake this service."³² The offer was unwelcome to Mackenzie, who regarded the controversy as a purely Canadian matter and entirely beyond the sphere of the imperial authorities. The Prime Minister despatched a telegram to Carnarvon which, his lordship complained, "was of the curtest description and indicated a disposition to treat the whole question as one of insignificant character."³³ "It bore on its face," Carnarvon added, "clear evidence of those 'stone chippings of the workshop'... which attest an early stage of literary culture."³⁴ In reviewing the matter in a conversation with Lord Dufferin in November, 1876, Mackenzie took occasion to inform the Governor-General that in his opinion "Lord Carnarvon should not have pressed his interference upon us, that in a great country like this it was not well for the Colonial Secretary to be too ready in interfering in questions having no bearing on imperial interests."³⁵ But despite his repugnance to Carnarvon's offer, the Prime Minister felt compelled to accept, for, as he pointed out to a political friend who had apparently ventured to criticize his action, "We as a government were responsible for the peace of the country."³⁶

No such responsibility bound Blake, then a private member. He not only objected to the terms themselves as being "imprudently liberal,"³⁷ but criticized the Government for having submitted to Carnarvon's offer of arbitration in the first place. He told the House of Commons:

For my own part I regret that the Government has felt it necessary to yield to the extent to which they did yield to the request of Lord Carnarvon. I desire to speak with every respect of that nobleman in his personal and in his political position. But I must say that I believe that the people, the Parliament, and the Government of this country are

³²*Canada, Sessional Papers*, 1875, no. 19, 12-13, Carnarvon to Dufferin, June 18, 1874. Cf. Carnarvon to Dufferin, private, June 17, 1874. Carnarvon was not sanguine about the success of his arbitration. I am indebted to Professor F. H. Underhill for allowing me to use his copy of the private correspondence of Lord Dufferin and Lord Carnarvon which is taken from a microfilm in the possession of Professor C. W. de Kiewiet of Cornell University. All quotations from the correspondence of these two men are from this source unless otherwise acknowledged in the foot-notes.

³³Same to same, private, June 25, 1874.

³⁴Same to same, private, July 23, 1874.

³⁵Public Archives of Canada, Alexander Mackenzie Letter Books, I, memorandum of an interview with Lord Dufferin, n.d.

³⁶*Ibid.*, II, Mackenzie to D. Thompson, confidential, April 29, 1875.

³⁷*Canada, House of Commons Debates*, 1875, March 5, 548.

better able to appreciate the obligations which my hon. friend [Mackenzie] proposes us to enter into. I say that at this time of day we are unfit for our position here if we are not prepared temperately and respectfully, yet firmly to assert that proposition. . . . It is not the Colonial Secretary, it is not the Imperial Government that has to raise the money to build this work. It is upon Canadian credit, by Canadian enterprise, and at Canadian cost, and Canadian risk that this work is to be accomplished; and it is therefore by the free voice and decision of the people of Canada that the terms, in my judgment, upon which that work shall be constructed are to be fixed . . . if we accept the arrangement which the Government propose to us, we accept it because we believe it best in the interest of this country to do so—not because Lord Carnarvon said so.”³⁸

[Among the conditions which Blake decreed must be fulfilled before he would re-enter the Cabinet in 1875 was his insistence that Canadian freedom of action in affairs concerning Canada alone be maintained at all times.³⁹ From the day that he became Minister of Justice to his resignation in January, 1878, most of his energies were devoted to asserting Canadian rights and attempting to reduce the power of the British government over Canadian affairs. In this purpose he had the full support of Mackenzie, who was quite as anxious as Blake that Canadian freedom of action should be achieved and preserved. But it is with the name of Edward Blake, more than any other, that the development of Canadian autonomy during this period must be associated.]

One of the first matters to confront Blake as Minister of Justice was the question of the appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council from the decisions of Canadian courts. During the session of 1875 the Government had put through an act establishing a Supreme Court for Canada. The bill, as introduced by the then Minister of Justice, Telesphore Fournier, contained no reference to the right of appeal to the Privy Council, although in introducing the measure Fournier declared “that while he did not desire to put any unnecessary obstacle in the way of exercising the right of petition, he wished to see the practice put an end to altogether. . . . He would like very well to see a clause introduced declaring that this right of appeal to the Privy Council existed no longer. . . . However . . . he had made no mention of the matter in the bill now before the House, but left it to be disposed [of] at some future time.”⁴⁰

Almost, it would seem, in answer to Fournier’s invitation, a private member, Irving of Hamilton, moved, during the third reading of the bill, that a provision be inserted to the effect that “The judgment of the Supreme Court shall in all cases be final and conclusive, and no error or appeal shall be brought from any judgment or order of the Supreme Court to any Court of Appeal established by the Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland, to which

³⁸*Ibid.*, 547

³⁹In box no. 92 of the Blake Papers in the University of Toronto Library there is a pencilled memorandum in Blake’s handwriting which lists a number of topics which Blake wished to discuss with Mackenzie, presumably before he would rejoin the Cabinet. Item 6 in this list reads “The *submission* to Ld. Carnarvon.” Item 7 reads “The agreement to his terms.” Blake’s ultimatum which lists the conditions for his re-entry, also in box no. 92, is interesting. The following stipulation heads the list: “1. Non interference of England in Canadian concerns. No reference to Colonial Minister.” The second item is significant: “2. *Do Brown*.”

⁴⁰*Canada, House of Commons Debates*, 1875, Feb. 23, 286.

appeals or petitions to Her Majesty in Council may be ordered to be heard, saving any right which Her Majesty may be graciously pleased to exercise as her royal prerogative."⁴¹

Fournier accepted Irving's amendment with alacrity but Sir John A. Macdonald, who had supported the bill up to that point, rose to his feet in high dudgeon. Indignantly he proclaimed that this amendment was the first step towards the severance of the Dominion from the Mother Country and predicted that "it almost, if not quite, insured the disallowance of the bill in England."⁴² Later on in the debate, the Conservative leader protested again "against the incorporation of such an unhappy and essentially unfortunate principle in this Bill" and affirmed his belief that: "it would be hailed as a great triumph by the enemies of the Colonial connection . . . he believed it would be held in England as one of the evidences which were alleged to exist of a growing impatience in this country of the connection with the Mother Country. . . . Those who disliked the colonial connection spoke of it as a chain, but it was a golden chain, and he, for one, was glad to wear the fetters."⁴³

To this argument, Mackenzie replied with vitriolic irony. Reminding the House that all appeals in cases involving less than \$4,000 were already prohibited by Ontario statute and that a similar restriction existed in Quebec law, the Prime Minister asked sarcastically: "Did loyalty depend upon whether a man's case was above or below \$4,000? . . . It was quite consistent with our loyalty to prevent all cases under \$4,000 from going to England, but it was quite inconsistent with our loyalty to prevent those above \$4,000 being appealed! Such was the illogical position of the hon. gentleman. . . . It was not unreasonable to expect that we had men here equally as capable of administering our laws as the Judges in England. . . ."⁴⁴ Mackenzie solemnly assured the members that the Government had no desire whatever to destroy the connexion, that the question at issue was not one of loyalty but simply of convenience. Even the *Globe* thought Macdonald was carrying his loyalism a little too far. ". . . it is hard to see how it could lead to independence," it declared. "For Sir John Macdonald . . . to talk about the amendment sowing the seeds of disloyalty broadcast was mere bunkum."⁴⁵ Finally, the Opposition having been silenced, Irving's amendment was passed by a majority of seventy-two and incorporated into the Supreme Court Act as Clause 47.

This was not the end of the matter, however. During the summer of 1875 Mackenzie was in England and he learned in conversations with Lord Carnarvon that the imperial government was considering, as Macdonald had warned it would, the advisability of disallowing the Supreme Court Act because of the much-debated Clause 47.⁴⁶ Mackenzie thought he had arrived at a *modus operandi* with the Colonial Secretary whereby the Act would be allowed to come into force at once, the right of the law officers of the Crown to decide on its legality being reserved for the future. However, on his re-

⁴¹*Ibid.*, March 30, 1876.

⁴²*Ibid.*

⁴³*Ibid.*, 1875-1.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 1875-2.

⁴⁵*Globe*, April 1, 1875.

⁴⁶F. H. Underhill, "Edward Blake, the Supreme Court Act, and the appeal to the Privy Council, 1875-6" (*Canadian Historical Review*, XIX, Sept., 1938, 250). Professor Underhill's article is a detailed narrative of the negotiations over the Supreme Court Act. I have attempted merely to sketch the major developments.

turn to Canada the Prime Minister found that the imperial authorities showed a disinclination to allow the machinery of the Supreme Court to be set in motion until the law officers had given their opinion on Clause 47. Meanwhile Blake, now the Minister of Justice, added to Mackenzie's worries over the matter by threatening to resign unless permission was given to establish the Court at once or if the Act should be afterwards disallowed.

A potential clash between Mother Country and Dominion was avoided when Blake, on a visit to England in the summer of 1876, was forced to conclude with Lord Chancellor Cairns, after discussions with him and other British legal authorities, that the clause was, after all, rendered inoperative by the words "saving any right which Her Majesty may be graciously pleased to exercise as her royal prerogative." But while admitting the legal ineffectiveness of Clause 47, Blake was by no means disposed to surrender the principle it embodied and made an earnest effort to secure the promise of the British authorities that, if a measure could be framed which would eliminate the appeal, they would give it their sanction. He was able, however, to elicit nothing but vague expressions of sympathy with his general point of view and he reported to Mackenzie that "they will not commit themselves to abolition and probably would kick against it."⁴⁷

In the end the Act was allowed to go into force unaltered because of the ineffectiveness of the abolition clause. What would have been a tremendous loss of prestige for the Mackenzie Government was thus averted. But the net effect of the Act on the appeal to the Privy Council was nil. The matter was dropped by the Government in Ottawa. Blake retired from the Cabinet early in 1878, this time not to return, and Mackenzie, with the country in the throes of a commercial depression, was forced to devote his entire energies to matters of greater immediate importance.]

IV

Although the main object of Blake's trip to London in 1876 was to settle the matter of the appeal to the Privy Council, he took advantage of the opportunity to discuss with members of the British Cabinet other aspects of Canada's national status. Undoubtedly the most important of these in Blake's mind was the nature of the functions and the extent of the powers of the Governor-General. Mackenzie's administration was marked by a very noticeable amount of friction between the Cabinet and the representative of the Crown. In large part this friction was the outcome of the clash of personalities and temperaments of the men who between them performed the executive functions of the Canadian Government at that time. For the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava had a far more exalted conception of his office than had either Alexander Mackenzie or Edward Blake.

The imperial government would have found it difficult, perhaps, to find in the British aristocracy a man better suited in some respects to the office of Governor-General of Canada than Lord Dufferin. A man of exceptional ability, he possessed the necessary social graces and was particularly fortunate in his ability to converse in French as readily as in English. Above all, it must be said that the interests of Canada found a place in his heart. He believed in the future of this country and eagerly watched its growth and

⁴⁷F. H. Underhill, "Edward Blake's Interview with Lord Cairns on the Supreme Court Act, July 5, 1876" (*Canadian Historical Review*, XIX, Sept., 1938, 294).

development. But Dufferin did not quite understand or admit the absolutism of responsible government promulgated by Blake and other Canadian constitutional nationalists. He could not see himself as a symbol, merely the figurehead of the Canadian government. As early as 1874 he admitted his restiveness to Carnarvon. "... I shall be glad when my term is over," he wrote. "The Governorship of a colony with Constitutional advisers does not admit of much real control over its affairs, and I miss the stimulus of responsibility."⁴⁸ He was as anxious to give advice as to receive it, perhaps more so. He found it possible, without a trace of humour, to refer to the Queen's representative as "master of the Ministers,"⁴⁹ and spoke of a colonial Cabinet as a "team to drive."⁵⁰ He obviously was eager to take a part in affairs and willing, when necessary, to exert his influence in the country and with the home authorities.

To say all this is not to suggest that Dufferin came to Canada with any intention of frustrating the functioning of responsible government or that he was antagonistic to the development of Canadian nationalist sentiment. Indeed he expressed pleasure over the fact that he could discern the growth of such a spirit. Nevertheless, as an intelligent man with clear and well defined ideas on certain subjects, Dufferin believed that his opinions were worthy of consideration and potentially of considerable practical value. Total abstinence on his part from participation in Canadian affairs would have seemed to him a gratuitous waste of talent. But to Edward Blake, such participation was unconstitutional and contrary to the fixed and immutable principle of responsible government.

It is clear from the private correspondence of Dufferin and Carnarvon that the two Englishmen had a far less advanced, or at least a very different, view of responsible government than Blake and Mackenzie had and that Dufferin came to Canada with a definite programme in mind. His task, as Carnarvon saw it, was to "hold things together in Canada and consolidate the Dominion." If Dufferin could do this the Colonial Secretary was of the opinion that "we shall have a reasonable chance of preserving it from absorption in its large neighbour."⁵¹ "You may depend upon my doing my very best," Dufferin replied, "both to weld this Dominion into an Imperium solid enough to defy all attraction from across the line, and to perpetuate its innate loyalty to the Mother Country. It was only upon the understanding that this should be a principal part of our programme, that I consented to come here..."⁵² Part of this policy, in Dufferin's words, was to "minimize as much as possible the prestige of the Local Legislatures and their Governments."⁵³ This in itself would have been enough to bring the Governor-General into conflict with the Liberals, the champions of provincial rights. At any rate, Dufferin clearly thought of himself as having powers beyond the signing of orders-in-council and the reading to the assembled members of Parliament a speech composed by and embodying the views of others. This conception of his position resulted in the rise of a serious antagonism between him and his ministers.

⁴⁸Dufferin to Carnarvon, private, March 18, 1874.

⁴⁹Same to same, private, Nov. 22, 1877.

⁵⁰Same to same, private, Dec. 21, 1874.

⁵¹Carnarvon to Dufferin, private, April 8, 1874.

⁵²Dufferin to Carnarvon, private, April 25, 1874.

⁵³Same to same, private, Dec. 21, 1874.

Dufferin's desire to participate, rather than merely to officiate arose, no doubt, partly from the fact that he shared with a good many of his fellow Englishmen the conviction that they, being English, knew a great deal more about politics and government generally than any mere colonist could possibly know. This conviction was deepened in Dufferin's case by the fact that his first minister was an untitled and untutored stonemason. Must a peer, then, a cultured man of the world, accept the principles and the policies, must he, in all cases and without question or argument, heed the advice of an immigrant artisan? The idea must have seemed too absurd to Dufferin for him to accept it wholeheartedly. As a contemporary expressed it, "Just at first there is not much doubt that Lord Dufferin . . . was disposed to question Mr. Mackenzie's fitness for his office."⁵⁴

Undoubtedly the Governor-General found it impossible to refrain from adopting a superior attitude, not only with regard to the men with whom he had to work, but also with respect to life in the Dominion capital. "... altogether," he reported to Carnarvon, "there seems to me a lamentable lack both of political capacity, and of political instruction in the country."⁵⁵ He complained of "a terrible want of society" and lamented that "one's life at times is dull and lonely."⁵⁶

If the relations between Governor-General and Prime Minister were at times rather strained, Dufferin's association with Blake was characterized by almost continual friction. On every major issue, the two men were on opposite sides. Whereas Blake deplored what he regarded as Dufferin's interference in matters which were rightfully the sole concern of Canadians, Dufferin on his part deprecated Blake's lukewarmness to Canadian expansion and development, an attitude which was in utter contrast to his own. Blake, himself a well educated, cultured man with a brilliant intellect, was vexed by Dufferin's unintentional yet unmistakable attitude of superiority. Dufferin, on the other hand, regarded Blake as a spoiled child and impossibly temperamental. A further cause of Blake's displeasure with the Governor-General, according to Sir Richard Cartwright, was that he would have liked to become Prime Minister in 1873 and thought that Dufferin should have sent for him instead of Mackenzie,⁵⁷ though how Dufferin could have pursued any other course, Mackenzie having been formally elected leader of the party is hard to imagine.

Blake's successful attempt in 1876 to pare the powers of the Governor-General, then, arose partly from personal antipathies and divergent points of view. It arose more specifically from certain incidents which focused the issue as no amount of philosophical difference of opinion could have done. The first of these incidents grew out of the case of Ambroise Lepine, a colleague of Louis Riel, who had been convicted of complicity in the murder of Thomas Scott during the uprising in Manitoba and sentenced to death at Winnipeg. This action by the Manitoba court placed the Government at Ottawa squarely on the horns of a dilemma. If they allowed Lepine's sentence to be carried out, Catholic Quebec would be in an uproar over an alleged miscarriage of justice. Yet, were the sentence commuted, the Govern-

⁵⁴Sir Richard Cartwright, *Reminiscences* (Toronto, 1912), 124.

⁵⁵Dufferin to Carnarvon, private, April 16, 1874.

⁵⁶Same to same, private, March 18, 1874.

⁵⁷Cartwright, *Reminiscences*, 148,

ment would be accused by Protestant Ontario of condoning murder in cold blood.

Dufferin telegraphed the news of the sentence to Carnarvon: "Lepine found guilty of murder by a mixed jury. Considerable excitement amongst French population. My French Ministers say they must resign unless the death sentence is commuted to some minor penalty such as banishment with loss of civil rights. . . . If asked to do so by my Government, would you relieve them of the odium of dealing with the case, and allow me to decide in your name as to what is to be done with Lepine."⁵⁸ " . . . the most intelligent of my French ministers, . . ." Dufferin wrote to the Colonial Secretary, "said that it would be a great relief to them all if the Imperial Government would undertake to deal with the matter."⁵⁹ " . . . our principal object is to deter my ministers from the odium of a decision which cannot fail to appear abominable to one or other of the two nationalities, and probably to both. . . ."⁶⁰ Carnarvon agreed to sanction such a policy but carefully stipulated that "there must be a distinct request from your Ministers. They must initiate the matter or else when things go wrong and party feeling runs high I shall be accused of interference and the blame will be very conveniently laid on my shoulders."⁶¹ This request from the Canadian Government was forthcoming⁶² and in due course Dufferin, "according to his independent judgment and on his own personal responsibility,"⁶³ as he informed Blake, commuted Lepine's sentence to two years' imprisonment and permanent deprivation of all political rights. This step by the Governor-General extricated the Government from an unpleasant predicament but it raised in acute form the question of ministerial responsibility and the powers of the representative of the Crown. Although, according to Dufferin, Blake's own journal, the *Liberal*, supported the Governor-General's action in the Lepine case,⁶⁴ Blake himself seems to have been annoyed by it, as one of his chief objects during his visit to London in 1876 was to secure recognition of the convention that the prerogative of pardon in Canadian cases must be exercised only upon the advice of responsible ministers.

There was another incident which occurred in 1875, during Blake's absence from the Government, which illustrates better than any other, perhaps, the nature of his national philosophy and his desire to secure formal recognition of Canada's autonomous powers. This concerned the power of the Governor-General to disallow enactments of the provincial legislatures contrary to, or without the advice of his ministers.

In June, 1873, Lord Kimberley, Colonial Secretary in the Gladstone Government, had advised Lord Lisgar, the then Governor-General of Canada, that the disallowance of the New Brunswick School Act of 1871 "is a matter in which you must act in your own individual discretion and on which you cannot be guided by the advice of your responsible Ministers of the Dominion."⁶⁵ Blake was highly incensed when he discovered this and in 1875

⁵⁸Dufferin to Carnarvon, private, n.d.

⁵⁹Same to same, private, Nov. 12, 1874.

⁶⁰Same to same, private, Dec. 8, 1874.

⁶¹Carnarvon to Dufferin, confidential, Nov. 12, 1874.

⁶²Dufferin to Carnarvon, private, Dec. 8, 1874.

⁶³*Canada, Sessional Papers*, 1875, no. 11; W. P. M. Kennedy, *The Constitution of Canada* (London, 1938), 348.

⁶⁴Dufferin to Carnarvon, private, March 8, 1875.

⁶⁵*Canada, House of Commons Debates*, 1875, March 31, 1,006.

gave notice of a motion respecting ministerial responsibility for the exercise of the power of disallowance.)

Dufferin apparently was anxious to forestall any action by the House on the subject and persuaded Mackenzie to try to get Blake to withdraw his motion, pointing out to the Prime Minister "how undesirable it was that any delicate constitutional question of this nature should be hastily dealt with by the House of Commons,—and probably an unnecessary and certainly, a premature collision superinduced between the Dominion and the Home Government. . . ." ⁶⁶ Mackenzie agreed to do this but remarked that "it would be impossible to resist the motion in the House of Commons." ⁶⁷ Blake, however, at first refused to withdraw his motion. Finally Dufferin had an interview with him in the presence of Mackenzie. Blake still insisted that he would introduce his motion and make a statement thereon, but agreed that he would then withdraw it upon being informed by Mackenzie that the matter was the subject of correspondence between the Canadian and British governments.

(Such was the course pursued. On March 31 Blake introduced the resolution, the significant clause of which was as follows: "That this House feels bound in assertion of the constitutional rights of the Canadian people to record its protest against and dissent from the said instruction [contained in Kimberley's despatch to Lisgar] and to declare its determination to hold His Excellency's Ministers responsible for his action in the exercise of the power [to disallow provincial legislation]. . . ." ⁶⁸ The resolution elicited little discussion but all those who commented on it were in agreement with the principle it embodied. Mackenzie stated that the Cabinet had taken action on the matter and thought it "inadvisable and unnecessary to record a truism upon our journals." ⁶⁹ Blake in reply agreed to withdraw his motion but felt that he "must express a moderate measure of dissent from the doctrine that it is not fitting that this resolution should go upon the Journals because it happens to be true. I could only wish that all the entries in our Journals possessed the same admirable quality." ⁷⁰)

Blake was not satisfied to let the matter drop here. In December, 1875, as Minister of Justice he composed a formal report on the subject of ministerial responsibility for the disallowance of provincial statutes.

The importance to the people of the advice given by ministers is in precise proportion to its effectiveness. So long as the course pursued is dependent on the advice given, responsibility for the advice is responsibility for the action, and is, therefore, valuable; but it is the action which is really material; and to concede that there may be action contrary to advice would be to destroy the value of responsibility for the advice—to deprive the people of their constitutional security for the administration, according to their wishes, of their own affairs—to yield up the substance, retaining only the shadow of responsible government. ⁷¹

⁶⁶Dufferin to Carnarvon, private, March 8, 1875.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*

⁶⁸*Canada, House of Commons Debates*, 1875, March 31, 1,004.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, 1,010.

⁷⁰*Ibid.*

⁷¹*Canada, Correspondence, Reports of the Ministers of Justice and Orders in Council upon the Subject of Dominion and Provincial Legislation 1867-1895* (Ottawa, 1896), 73.

The same issue of the powers of the Governor-General was raised, though in a more general way, during the controversy between Canada and British Columbia over the Pacific Railway. Dufferin was extremely anxious to see the railway pushed forward and impatient with the rather lackadaisical policy of his ministers. Though the Governor-General may not have inspired Carnarvon's offer of mediation in 1874, he certainly did not disapprove of it, and "after the proposal had been made Dufferin adopted it as his own."⁷² When the Carnarvon terms were repudiated by a Canadian minute of council of September, 1875, Carnarvon wrote, deprecating the departure from his terms. In his despatch was the tacit assumption that he was still employed as arbitrator and that the trip which Dufferin was about to make to British Columbia was to furnish the Colonial Secretary with new facts that he might reach a new decision. "The situation thus was, that a member of the British Government in London, advised by an imperial officer in Canada, was to settle a dispute between a province and the federal administration."⁷³

[This was a situation that was intolerable to Mackenzie and Blake alike. Blake, Dufferin explained to Carnarvon, "is evidently very jealous at any language which implies a claim on the part of the C.O. to intervene in this dispute in the character of an arbitrator."⁷⁴ Whereas Dufferin and Carnarvon obviously regarded the Carnarvon terms as a tripartite agreement whose fulfilment they had a right to demand, and whereas the former expressed his willingness to co-operate with the latter in bringing "serious pressure to bear upon the Mackenzie Govt., in order to compel them to keep their word,"⁷⁵ the Canadian ministers clearly considered the dispute a private one between Canada and British Columbia in which neither the British government nor the Queen's representative had any business interfering. In the same angry interview with Dufferin in November, 1876, referred to earlier, Mackenzie pointed out to the Governor-General "that we were responsible for the Acts of the government, not him, that he had nothing to do with it except as a constitutional governor, and that we had to be responsible to the people of Canada and to no one else."⁷⁶ Meanwhile Blake in London had been writing letters to Carnarvon defining his conception of Canada's constitutional status and attempting to secure a reduction in the powers of the Governor-General.]

[Canada is not merely a colony or a province [wrote Blake]: she is a dominion. . . the vastness of her area, the numbers of her population, the character of the representative institutions and of the responsible government which as citizens of the various provinces and of Canada her people have so long enjoyed, all point to the propriety of dealing with the question in hand in a manner very different from that which might be fitly adopted with reference to a single and comparatively small and young colony . . . [it may be fairly stated that there is no dependency of the British crown which is entitled to so full an application of the principles of constitutional freedom as the dominion of Canada.]⁷⁷

⁷²J. A. Maxwell, "Lord Dufferin and the Difficulties with British Columbia, 1874-7" (*Canadian Historical Review*, XII, Dec., 1931, 370).

⁷³*Ibid.*, 382.

⁷⁴Dufferin to Carnarvon, private, May 26, 1876.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*

⁷⁶P. A. C., Mackenzie Letter Books, I, memorandum of an interview with Lord Dufferin, n.d.

⁷⁷*Canada, Sessional Papers*, 1877, no. 13, 4.

[Blake did succeed in obtaining important modifications of the Governor-General's commission and instructions.⁷⁸ Henceforth the pardoning power was to be exercised only with ministerial advice and the enumeration of subjects on which legislation must be reserved was discontinued.⁷⁹ Although his attempt to secure for Canada the right to conclude her own extradition treaties with foreign countries ended in failure, he succeeded in procuring the power of establishing Canadian admiralty courts for jurisdiction on the Great Lakes. His attitude on this matter was similar to his point of view on all other questions affecting Canadian autonomy. ". . . we are ourselves quite competent," he told a public meeting, "to determine what laws should regulate our maritime concerns, and to interpret and administer [*sic*] the laws we make, without resorting to the British Parliament for legislation."⁸⁰

These were not insignificant achievements. But to the more lasting credit of [Blake and his fellow Liberal nationalists is the fact that they correctly discerned the course which Canada must follow in acquiring a measure of national freedom consistent with her stature.] Whilst rejecting the separationism of Goldwin Smith, these men carried forward the struggle of those who had fought for responsible government, demanding for Canada the widest possible freedom of action consistent with membership in the Empire.] Out of this process, the gradual elimination of colonial inferiority and in its place the gradual appearance of equality and complete self-government, has grown a structure unique in the history of the world—the British Commonwealth of Nations. The role of Canada in that development is not one of which Canadians need be ashamed.

⁷⁸See W. P. M. Kennedy, *Statutes, Treaties and Documents of the Canadian Constitution, 1713-1929* (Toronto, 1930) for a comparison of the earlier and later commissions.

⁷⁹Kennedy, *Constitution of Canada*, 342.

⁸⁰A. Mackenzie, *et al.*, *Reform Government in the Dominion*, Blake at Teeswater, Sept. 24, 1877, 145.

NATIONAL HISTORIC PARKS AND SITES

By the NATIONAL PARKS BUREAU, LANDS, PARKS, AND FORESTS BRANCH,
DEPARTMENT OF MINES AND RESOURCES

THE functions of the National Parks Bureau include the restoration, preservation, marking and administration of National Historic Parks and Sites and the commemoration of the public services of outstanding personages connected with the civil and military history of the Dominion. In this phase of its work the Bureau is advised by the Historic Sites and Monuments Board of Canada, an honorary body of recognized historians representing the various parts of the country.

The personnel of the Board is as follows: Chairman, Dr. J. Clarence Webster, Shediac, New Brunswick; Professor Fred Landon, London, Ontario; Professor D. C. Harvey, Halifax, Nova Scotia; the Honourable E. Fabre-Surveyer, Montreal, Quebec; J. A. Gregory, North Battleford, Saskatchewan; the Reverend Antoine d'Eschambault, St. Boniface, Manitoba; Major G. Lanctot, Dominion Archivist, Ottawa, Ontario; Professor M. H. Long, Edmonton, Alberta; Professor Walter N. Sage, Vancouver, British Columbia; W. D. Cromarty, National Parks Bureau, Ottawa, Ontario.

A general meeting of the Board was held in Ottawa, May 16-18, 1945, when many subjects relating to the historic background of the Dominion were reviewed and an additional number of sites selected to be marked by the Bureau at a later date. Of the many sites already considered by the Board, 332 have now been marked or acquired and 202 recommended for attention at a later date.

NATIONAL HISTORIC PARKS

Fort Anne National Historic Park is situated in Annapolis Royal, Nova Scotia. The museum building, restored in 1935, was originally the Officers' Quarters and was built in 1797-8 under the supervision of Edward, Duke of Kent, the father of Queen Victoria, when he was Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces in North America with headquarters at Halifax, Nova Scotia.

The museum building, bandstand, cannon, flag pole, benches and chain fence were painted; the roads and lawns properly maintained and the hedges trimmed; a number of the electric light posts in the park were moved to other locations in order to improve the lighting conditions; an underground drain was laid from the west side of the museum building to the moat. Many additional articles of historical interest were acquired.

A total of 5,544 persons signed the museum register during the year.

Port Royal National Historic Park is situated at Lower Granville, Nova Scotia. A replica of the group of buildings which sheltered the first European settlers in Canada has been erected on the exact site where the Port Royal Habitation stood nearly three and a half centuries ago. The original Habitation was the headquarters for about two years of Samuel de Champlain, famous explorer and chief geographer to Henry IV of France, who chose the location and drew up the plan of settlement.

Several pieces of furniture were made and placed in the Governor's Chambers; preserving fluid was applied to the outer walls of the Habitation; the Coat-of-Arms over the main entrance was cleaned and varnished; the doors were painted and all iron work cleaned and oiled; the bridges were repaired; fresh gravel placed in the powder magazines and the lawns rolled, fertilized and maintained.

The Minister of Game and Fisheries for the Province of Quebec kindly arranged for four wolf skins to be sent to the park and these are now on display at the Habitation.

Visitors registered in the park during the year numbered 3,296.

Fortress of Louisbourg National Historic Park is situated about three miles from the town of Louisburg, Cape Breton Island, Nova Scotia. Here were enacted the early stages of the long struggle which culminated in the possession of Canada for the British Crown. Erected more than two centuries ago by the French, who had named the settlement in honour of Louis XIV, King of France, Louisbourg was captured by the British forces in 1745, but was subsequently handed back to the French. The fortress was again besieged by the English and finally captured by them in 1758. It is interesting to recall that one of the brigades of infantry engaged in the recapture of Louisbourg was commanded by General Wolfe, who was later to die heroically at Quebec.

The damage to the entrance road caused by a tidal wave was repaired; a new woven wire fence was erected along the western boundary of the park; the lawns and paths were kept in good condition; bridges within the park area were repaired; the iron fence enclosing the Society of Colonial Wars memorial was scaled and painted; the entrance gates, field signs, and all storm doors and windows were painted and several of the rooms in the basement re-decorated.

A memorial erected by the Congregation of Notre Dame on the site of the convent to the members of the Order who served at the fortress during the period it was occupied by the French, was unveiled on August 25.

A total of 3,126 persons signed the visitors' register.

Fort Beausejour National Historic Park is situated near Sackville, New Brunswick. Built by the French, the fort was intended to be an Acadian stronghold against the undefined claims of the English to Acadia. Around the fort the Acadians had their homes and farms. It was captured by the British, under Monckton, in 1755, when the fort was strengthened and its defences extended by a system of entrenchments, traces of which still remain.

New signs were made and erected throughout the park to mark points of interest, the larger ones being placed on heavy posts set in concrete; the roads and paths were cleaned and trimmed; the walls of the furnace room were treated with a special cement preparation and the guns and gun carriages painted. The Coats-of-Arms of H.M.C.S. "Whitby" and "Moncton" were obtained from the Department of National Defence (Navy) and are on display in the museum.

Visitors registered during the year numbered 5,393.

Fort Chambly National Historic Park is situated about twenty miles south-east of Montreal, on a conspicuous headland on the Richelieu River.

The first fort, built by the French in 1665 as a protection against the Iroquois, was of wooden construction. After many vicissitudes, it was rebuilt of stone, this work being completed in 1711. In 1760 the fort was surrendered to the British, who, with a small armed force, held it until 1775. In that year the Americans captured the fort; they evacuated in the following year, but burned everything that was combustible, leaving only the four walls standing. The fort was later repaired and garrisoned by Sir Guy Carleton and played an important part in the War of 1812.

The walls of the fort were repointed; the memorials within the fort grounds were cleaned; the caretaker's residence and the interior of the museum were redecorated, the flag pole, picnic tables, storm doors, etc., were painted, and the trees, shrubs and paths trimmed.

During the year 16,203 persons signed the museum register.

Fort Lennox National Historic Park is located on Ile-aux-Noix in the Richelieu River, about thirteen miles south of St. Johns, Quebec. The present fort, which stands on the site of one previously erected by the French, was built by the imperial authorities in the period from 1812 to 1827. The island, comprising an area of 150 acres, was acquired by the National Parks Bureau in 1921, and extensive works have since been carried out on the buildings and grounds.

Permission was granted for the fort buildings to be used during the summer as a training centre for the Canadian Youth Association, sponsored by the Physical Fitness Division of the Department of National Health and Welfare; two of the temporary buildings erected on the Island during the period it was used as a Refugee Camp were disposed of by the War Assets Corporation and the water tank, also erected at that time was taken down. The roofs of the Guard House and Officers' Quarters were scraped and painted; the main entrance bridge was repaired; a new fire pump was installed and general maintenance work carried out on the fort buildings.

Visitors registered in the park during the year numbered 655.

Fort Wellington National Historic Park is situated at the east end of the town of Prescott, Ontario, and adjacent to Highway No. 2. The fort, named after the Duke of Wellington, was erected when the British authorities decided to fortify Prescott as one of the most vulnerable points of attack in the War of 1812, and as the main base for the defence of communications between Kingston and Montreal. It remains as it was when finally completed in 1838, an impressive landmark.

The wire fence enclosing the park property was removed; electric lights were installed in the underground passage leading to the caponniere; repairs were made to the palisades and to the drain from the septic tank; rubberized flooring was laid in the museum; a porch was constructed on the front of the Officers' Quarters now used as the caretaker's residence; the guard house was whitewashed, and the grounds maintained in good condition. Additional articles of historical interest were obtained for the museum and a four page leaflet was published containing a condensed version of the history of the fort.

A total of 2,594 persons signed the museum register during the year.

Fort Malden National Historic Park is situated in Amherstburg, Ontario. The fort was built in 1797-9 by the Second Battalion Royal

Canadian Volunteers. It was strengthened in 1812 as the principal military station on the western frontier and dismantled and abandoned in September, 1813. Only slight evidences of the original fortifications remain.

The boundary of the park has been extended to include an area immediately to the south on which a large residence known as "The Fort," and a smaller dwelling, known as "The Cottage," are situated. The latter is the only remaining building of the original Fort Malden. Many additional articles of interest relating to the early history of the district were received and are on display in the museum. The flag pole was painted and the lawns and paths kept in good condition.

During the year 15,279 persons signed the museum register.

Fort Prince of Wales National Historic Park is situated at the mouth of Churchill River, Churchill, Manitoba, and comprises an area of approximately fifty acres. The fort was built from plans drawn by English military engineers, to secure control of Hudson Bay for the Hudson's Bay Company and England. Construction was commenced in 1733 and completed in 1771. It was surrendered to, and partially destroyed by, a French naval force under La Perouse in 1782. Its ruins, which are among the most interesting military remains on this continent, have been partly restored and over forty cannon have been unearthed. Those suitable have been mounted on the walls of the fort.

General supervision was continued throughout the year.

NATIONAL HISTORIC SITES

During the year all the sites which have been marked on the advice of the Board were suitably maintained. These include Indian earthworks, forts, and villages; French forts, trading posts, and mission enterprises; sites connected with British exploration and naval and military operations in the long struggle for the possession of Canada; posts of the Hudson's Bay Company and sites related to the social, economic, and industrial development of the country.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY

By NORMAN FEE

THE annual meeting of Council was held at Baldwin House, the University of Toronto, on November 17, 1945. Other meetings of the Executive and Council were held at Kingston and Toronto on the same dates as the annual meetings. The invitation of the Royal Commission on Education for Ontario to submit a brief was accepted, and a committee consisting of Messrs. Brown, Underhill, and Saunders was named to prepare it. Council later accepted the recommendation of the committee that the representation to the Commission be coupled with that of the Ontario Historical Society.

Council named Mr. George W. Brown and Mr. Jean Jacques Lefebvre to represent the Association on Public Records Committee. The question of merging the *Canadian Historical Review* and the *Annual Report* of the Association was discussed both in the general meeting and in the Council meetings but no action was taken to combine the two publications.

Four new life members were added during the year. Plans for continuing the campaign for additional life members are to be renewed during the year.

THE PROGRAMME

The following report of the annual meeting is copied from the Report published in the *Canadian Historical Review*, June, 1946.

The annual meeting of the Canadian Historical Association was held at the University of Toronto on May 23-4 concurrently with the meeting of the Political Science Association. The first session was devoted to English history with papers by Professors B. Wilkinson and D. J. McDougall of the University of Toronto on "Constitutional Development in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries," and "Recent Work on Seventeenth-Century English History." A session was given to various aspects of the history of the armed services, three papers being read: "The Nature of an Official History," by Colonel C. P. Stacey; "Some Aspects of the Battle of the Atlantic," by G. N. Tucker; and "The Evolution of the Royal Canadian Air Force," by Wing Commander F. H. Hitchins. Papers at other sessions on Canadian history centred around the general theme of the inter-relations of cultural and political history: "The Religious Factor in Canadian History," by S. D. Clark, University of Toronto; "The Rise of the Western Progressive Movement, 1919-1921," by W. L. Morton, University of Manitoba; "Cultural and Political Implications of French-Canadian Nationalism," by Jean-C. Falardeau and Jean-C. Bonenfant, Laval University; "Liberal Nationalism in the Eighteen-Seventies," by W. R. Graham, University of Toronto. The presidential address by Professor F. H. Underhill of the University of Toronto was entitled "Some Reflections on the Liberal Tradition in Canada." These papers will be published in the *Annual Report* of the Association except for that of Professor Clark which was included in the programme of the Political Science Association.

A feature of much interest at the meetings was an exhibit of pictures by official war artists of the Canadian Army which was arranged through the co-operation of Colonel C. P. Stacey, Director of the Historical Section of

the Canadian Army. Major C. F. Comfort, officer in charge of war artists, who was present at the opening session made some comments on the exhibition in the course of which he described the close working arrangements between the military authorities and the war artists who worked in the field.

The sessions were marked by a high level of interest, and an attendance representative of all parts of the country and larger than at any previous meeting. The Association has maintained itself creditably during the war years and there are indications, such as the increase in the size of university staffs, that resources are available for a renewed and solid growth. Conditions, such as distance, which make the development of the Association difficult still remain, however, and every possible effort is needed to overcome them.

The Association would be greatly strengthened if its financial position were improved. In this connexion it was reported that the campaign for life memberships had had some success, but that the time had arrived when it should be renewed with vigour.

The following officers and members of Council were elected for 1946-7: President, H. N. Fieldhouse, McGill University; vice-president, F. H. Soward, University of British Columbia; new members of Council to retire in 1949, R. W. Collins, University of Alberta, J.-C. Falardeau, Laval University, W. L. Morton, University of Manitoba, J. W. Watson, McMaster University; representative for the *Canadian Historical Review*, D. G. Creighton, associate editor, University of Toronto; Canadian Historical Association *Report*, R. M. Saunders, editor, R. A. Preston, associate editor, University of Toronto; English secretary and treasurer, Norman Fee, The Public Archives, Ottawa; French secretary, Séraphin Marion, The Public Archives, Ottawa.

REPORT OF THE TREASURER

STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED APRIL 30, 1946

RECEIPTS			
Balance on hand May 1, 1945.....			\$ 215.77
Bank Interest.....	\$ 2.25		
Premium on U. S. Funds and Exchange.....	17.79		
		\$ 20.04	
Membership fees and sale of <i>Reports</i>	\$1,178.00		
Less amount collected for joint membership and remitted to Canadian Political Science Association	142.00	1,036.00	1,056.04
			<u>\$1,271.81</u>

DISBURSEMENTS			
Cunningham & Co., auditors.....	\$ 10.00		
University of Toronto Press—			
Printing Report.....	\$ 427.68		
<i>Canadian Historical Review</i>	598.20	1,025.88	
<i>Bulletin des recherches historiques</i>		80.50	
Administration—			
Clerical assistance.....	40.00		
Leclerc Printers.....	32.40		
Expenses of Secretary-Treasurer.....	30.00		
Petty cash, including freight and postage.....	50.00	152.40	1,268.78
Balance on hand, April 30, 1946.....			3.03
			<u>\$1,271.81</u>

Examined and found correct,
CUNNINGHAM & Co.,
Auditors
Ottawa, May 20, 1946

NORMAN FEE,
Secretary-Treasurer

RESERVE ACCOUNT			
Balance in Bank 1st May, 1945.....	\$ 591.25		
Dom. of Canada Bond purchased in 1945.....	500.00	\$ 1,091.25	
<i>Receipts</i>			
Bank interest.....	2.07		
Bond interest			
\$500.00 at 3% (11 mos. to April 1, 1946)....	13.75	15.82	
Life membership fees.....		389.00	404.82
			<u>\$1,496.07</u>
Balance			
On deposit in Bank of Montreal			
Dom. of Canada Bonds.....			496.07
Due 1963 3%.....	500.00		
Due 1966 3%.....	500.00	1,000.00	1,000.00
			<u>\$1,496.07</u>

Examined and found correct,
CUNNINGHAM & Co.,
Auditors
Ottawa, May 20, 1946

NORMAN FEE,
Secretary-Treasurer

MEMBERSHIP OF THE CANADIAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

(A) AFFILIATED SOCIETIES AND ORGANIZATIONS

- Acadia University Library*, Wolfville, N.S. Mrs. Mary K. Ingraham, Librarian.
- American Antiquarian Society*. Clifford K. Shipton, Librarian, Worcester, Mass.
- Antiquarian and Numismatic Society of Montreal*, Château de Ramezay, 290 Notre-Dame St. E., Montreal. Victor Morin, LL.D., President, 57 rue Sainte-Jacques ouest, Montréal; Pemberton Smith, Treasurer, 414 St. James St. W., Montreal.
- British Columbia Historical Association*. Rev. J. C. Goodfellow, President, Victoria, B.C.; W. E. Ireland, Hon. Treasurer, Victoria, B.C.; Miss H. R. Boutilier, Hon. Secretary, Vancouver, B.C.
- British Museum*, Dept. of Printed Books, London, W.C. 1, England.
- Bureau, The Book*, Victoria University, Toronto 5, Ont.
- Canadian Military Institute*, 426 University Ave., Toronto, Ont. Col. F. S. McPherson, President; T. J. Jackson, Secretary-Treasurer.
- Chicoutimi, Séminaire de*, Chicoutimi, P.Q.
- Clark University Library*, Worcester, Mass., U.S.A. Louis N. Wilson, Librarian.
- Cleveland Public Library*, 325 Superior Ave., N.E., Cleveland, Ohio, U.S.A. Miss Leta E. Adams, Order Librarian.
- Columbia University Library*, New York, N.Y., U.S.A. D. B. Hepburn, Supervisor, Acquisition Department.
- Dalhousie University Library*. Miss Ivy M. Prikler, Assistant Librarian, Halifax, N.S.
- Dartmouth College Library*, Hanover, New Hampshire, U.S.A.
- Geology and Topography Library*, Dept. of Mines and Resources, Ottawa.
- Hamilton Public Library*. Miss Freda F. Waldon, Librarian, Hamilton, Ont.
- Henry E. Huntington Library and Art Gallery*, San Marino, Calif. Leslie E. Bliss, Librarian; Max Farrand, Director of Research.
- Historical Society of Alberta*. W. Everard Edmonds, Secretary, 11146-91st Ave., Edmonton, Alta.; M. H. Long, Treasurer.
- Hudson's Bay Company*, Canadian Committee Office, Winnipeg.
- Indiana State Library*, 140 N. Senate Ave., Indianapolis, Indiana. Kenneth R. Shaffer, Order Librarian.
- Institute of Historical Research*, University of London, London, England.
- Kingston Historical Society*. R. G. Trotter, President; Ronald L. Way, Secretary-Treasurer, Kingston.
- Legislative Library of Ontario*, Toronto, Ont. Legislative Librarian (vacant).
- Library of Congress*, Washington, D.C.
- Library of Parliament*, Ottawa, Ont. F. A. Hardy, Librarian; Félix Desrochers, General Librarian, Ottawa.
- Literary and Historical Society of Quebec*. Col. Wm. Wood, President; D. S. Scott, Recording Secretary; Baron d'Avray, Corresponding Secretary; G. Henshaw, Treasurer.
- London and Middlesex Historical Society*. Hubert J. Trumper, President; Fred Landon, Treasurer, University of Western Ontario, London; H. Orlo Miller, Secretary, Box 571, London, Ont.
- London Public Library*. Richard E. Crouch, Librarian, London, Ont.; James S. Bell, Treasurer.
- McGill University Library*. Gerhard H. Lomer, M.A., Ph.D., F.L.A., Librarian, Montreal, P.Q.
- MacNab Historical Association*. Wm. MacNab Box, President, P.O. Box 155, Foleyet, Ont.
- Manitoba, Historical and Scientific Society of*. J. E. Ridd, Secretary, 1445 Wellington Crescent, Winnipeg, Man.
- Montréal, Collège de*, 1931 rue Sherbrooke ouest, Montréal, P.Q.
- Mount Royal High School*, Town of Mount Royal, P.Q.
- National Parks Bureau*, Dept. of Mines and Resources, Ottawa, Ont.
- Norwich Pioneers' Society*. T. H. Pobdon, President; A. L. Bushell, Secretary, Norwich, Ont.
- Nouvel-Ontario*, La Société Historique du, Collège du Sacré-Cœur, Sudbury, Ont.

- Nova Scotia Historical Society.* B. E. Paterson, President, c/o Halifax Club, Halifax, N.S.; W. L. Payzant, Secretary.
- Ohio State University, University Library,* Columbus, Ohio, U.S.A.
- Ontario Historical Society,* Dr. J. J. Talman, President; Geo. W. Spragge, Treasurer, 84 Gormley Avenue, Toronto 12, Ont.
- Peterborough Public Library,* Peterborough, Ont.
- Princeton University Library,* Princeton, N.J., U.S.A. Lawrence Heyl, Acting Librarian.
- Provincial Library of Alberta.* Mrs. Frank Gostick, Librarian, Edmonton, Alta.
- Provincial Library of British Columbia.* Dr. W. Kaye Lamb, Provincial Librarian and Archivist, Parliament Buildings, Victoria, B.C.
- Provincial Library of Manitoba.* J. L. Johnston, Provincial Librarian, Winnipeg, Man.
- Provincial Library of Saskatchewan.* Mrs. Austin Bothwell, Librarian, Regina, Sask.
- Public Archives of Canada,* Ottawa.
- Québec, Département de l'Instruction Publique,* Québec.
- Québec, Ministère des Terres et Forêts,* Québec.
- Queen's University Library.* E. C. Kyte, Librarian, Kingston, Ont.
- Royal Institute of International Affairs,* St. James's Sq., London, S.W. 1, England.
- Saguenay, La Société Historique du,* Abbé Victor Tremblay, Président; André Lemieux, Secrétaire, Séminaire de Chicoutimi, Chicoutimi, P.Q.
- St-Alexandre, Collège de,* R1, Pointe Gatineau, P.Q.
- Ste-Anne de la Pocatière, Collège de,* Ste-Anne de la Pocatière, P.Q.
- Ste-Marie, Collège de,* 1180 rue Bleury, Montréal, P.Q.
- Ste-Thérèse, Séminaire de,* Ste-Thérèse, P.Q.
- St-Hyacinthe, Séminaire de,* St-Hyacinthe, P.Q.
- Saskatchewan Historical Society.* J. A. Gregory, President; Z. M. Hamilton, Secretary, 403 McCallum Hill Bldg., Regina, Sask.
- Thunder Bay Historical Society.* J. P. Bertrand, President; D. G. Dewar, Secretary-Treasurer, The Public Library, Fort William, Ont.
- Toronto Public Library.* Charles R. Sanderson, Chief Librarian, College and St. George Sts., Toronto, Ont.
- Trois-Rivières, Séminaire des,* Trois-Rivières, P.Q.
- Trois-Rivières, Société d'Histoire Régionale de,* Séminaire des Trois-Rivières, P.Q.
- United College Library.* E. M. Graham, Librarian, Winnipeg, Man.
- University of British Columbia Library.* R. J. Lanning, Librarian, Vancouver, B.C.
- University of California Library,* Berkeley, Calif., U.S.A. Harold L. Leupp, Librarian.
- University of Cincinnati Library,* Burnet Woods Park, Cincinnati, Ohio, U.S.A. Edward A. Henry, Director of Libraries.
- University of Manitoba Library.* Miss Elizabeth Dafoe, Librarian, Winnipeg, Man.
- University of Toronto Library.* W. S. Wallace, Librarian, Toronto, Ont.
- University of Western Ontario, University Library,* London, Ont.
- Victoria University Library.* Miss Emily Keeley, Library Assistant, Toronto, Ont.
- Webster Canadiana Library,* New Brunswick Museum, Saint John, N.B.
- Wellesley College Library.* Lois E. Engleman, Assistant Librarian, Wellesley 81, Mass., U.S.A.
- Wisconsin State Historical Society.* 816 State Street, Madison 6, Wisc., U.S.A.
- Women's Canadian Historical Society of Ottawa.* Mrs. J. R. Dickson, President, 2 Thornton Ave., Ottawa; Mrs. D. Roy Cameron, Recording Secretary, 54 Park Road, Rockcliffe, Ont.; Mrs. Beath Morden, Recording Secretary, 4 Frank St., Ottawa; Miss Dorothy Barber, Treasurer, 223 Somerset St. W., Ottawa.
- Women's Canadian Historical Society of Toronto.* Miss C. Roberts, President, 20 Earl St., Toronto; Miss Kate Symon, Corresponding Secretary, 68 Avenue Rd., Toronto; Mrs. C. L. Corless, Treasurer.
- Women's Wentworth Historical Society.* Mrs. George Wood Brown, President, 159 Aberdeen Ave., Hamilton, Ont.; Mrs. Bertie D. Smith, Secretary, 284 Hess St. S., Hamilton; Mrs. W. H. Magill, Treasurer.
- Yale University Library.* Donald G. Wing, Accessions Department, New Haven, Conn., U.S.A.
- York-Sunbury Historical Society.* Sterling Brannen, Treasurer, P.O. Box 568, Fredericton, N.B.

(B) LIFE MEMBERS

- Bell, Dr. Winthrop, Chester, N.S.
 Brebner, J. Bartlet, Dept. of History, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
 Brown, Dr. George W., Baldwin House, University of Toronto, Toronto 5
 Burt, A. L., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
 Eames, Frank, Box 180, Gananoque, Ont.
 Ellis, Ralph, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, U.S.A.
 Graham, Major Gerald S. 2 Cockspur Street, London S.W.1, England.
 Grant-Suttie, Col. G. L. P., 110 St. George St., Toronto
 Hardy, Mrs. A. C., Brockville, Ont.
 Helstrom, C. T. E., Box 27, Gray, Sask.
 Hudson's Bay Company, Hudson's Bay House, Winnipeg
 Hyde, James H., Hotel Savoy-Plaza, 5th Avenue, New York, N.Y., U.S.A.
 Lanctot, Dr. Gustave, Dominion Archives, Ottawa
 Landon, Fred, University of Western Ontario, London, Ont.
 Leonard, Col. Ibbotson, 782 Wellington St., London, Ont.
 Long, Morden H., University of Alberta, Edmonton
 Lower, Dr. A. R. M., United College, Winnipeg
 Macdonald, Norman, Department of History, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ont.
 Mackenzie, Donald R., 273 Powell Avenue, Ottawa, Ont.
 Morgan, F. Cleveland 1455 Union Avenue, Montreal, P.Q.
 Morse, Dr. W. Inglis, 17 Fresh Pond Parkway, Cambridge, Mass.
 Musson, Charles J., 480 University Ave., Toronto
 Myers, Leslie P., 89 Durie St., Toronto 3
 Raymond, Hon. D., The Senate, Ottawa, Ont.
 Rimouski, Evêque de, Rimouski, P.Q.
 Riordon, Carl, 374 Cote-des-Neiges Rd., Montreal
 Ross, J. K. L., 270 Cote-des-Neiges Rd., Montreal
 Sage, Dr. Walter N., University of British Columbia, Vancouver
 Saunders, Richard M. Baldwin House, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ont.
 Scott, S. Morley, Dept. of External Affairs, Ottawa, Ont.
 Sifton, Victor, *Winnipeg Free Press*, Winnipeg
 Smith, Pemberton, 414 St. James St. W., Montreal
 Stacey, Col. C. P. Dept. of National Defence, (Army) Ottawa, Ont.
 Tombs, Guy, 1111 Beaver Hall Hill, Montreal
 Tweed, T. W., 9 Burlington Cres., Toronto 10
 Underhill, Frank H., Department of History, University of Toronto, Toronto
 Wilson, Hon. Cairine N., The Senate, Ottawa, Ont.
 Wright, Mrs. E. C., Box 559, Wolfville, N.S.

(C) ANNUAL MEMBERS

- | | |
|---|---|
| Abramovitch, Sam, 4366 Laval Ave.,
Montreal 18 | Armstrong, Dr. Elizabeth, 2500 Q St.,
N.W., Washington |
| Adair, E. R., McGill University, Montreal | Armstrong, P. C., C.P.R. Co., Montreal |
| Adams, Eric G., 328 Ridgewood Rd.,
Apt. 14, Montreal | Arrell, Alex H., Cayuga, Ont. |
| Agnew, D. J., 225 College St., N., Sarnia,
Ont. | Atherton, Dr. W. H., 329 Common St.,
Montreal |
| Aitcheson, Major J. H., Dept. of National
Defence, Ottawa | Atkinson, Miss Isabel, Kerrobert, Sask. |
| Alberts, Gerald A., 56 Berkeley Ave.,
Yonkers, N.Y. | Ayearst, Morley, New York University,
New York, N.Y. |
| Allard, R.P. J.-A., East Bathurst, Comté
de Gloucester, N.B. | Bailey, Alfred, University of New Bruns-
wick, Fredericton, N.B. |
| Allard, L'hon. Jules, Palais de Justice,
Montréal | Baillie, R.L.T. 152 Stibbard Avenue, To-
ronto, Ont. |
| Allen, James G. Dept. of History, Uni-
versity of Colorado, Boulder, Col.,
U.S.A. | Barbeau, C.-M., 260 McLaren St., Ottawa |
| Anderson, Mrs. J. R., 371 Claremont
Ave., Westmount, Montreal | Baudry, R. P. René, Saint-Joseph Uni-
versité, Saint-Joseph, N.B. |
| Anderson, William, University of Minne-
sota, Minneapolis, Minn. | Beaugrand-Champagne, Aristide, 1071
Blvd Mont-Royal, Outremont, P.Q. |
| | Beer, Lt. W. A., 188 St. George St. To-
ronto |
| | Bell, Dr. Winthrop, Chester, N.S. |

(C) ANNUAL MEMBERS—*Continued*

- Bernier, J.-E., 27, Deuxième Avenue, Iberville, P.Q.
- Berridge, Dr. W. A., Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 1 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y.
- Beveridge, H. J., 45 Bower Ave., Ottawa.
- Bird, John, *Winnipeg Tribune*, Winnipeg
- Black, Robert Adair, 1301 Traction Bldg., Cincinnati, Ohio
- Bladen, V. W., 273 Bloor St. W., Toronto
- Bland, Rev. Salem, 554 Spadina Ave., Toronto
- Bogart, E. C., 4 Wychwood Park, Toronto
- Bois, H. C., Coopérative Fédérée de Québec, 130 est, rue St-Paul, Montréal
- Bonesteel, N. O., Markham, Ont.
- Boucher, G. P., Economics Division, Dept. of Agriculture, Ottawa.
- Bouffard, Paul-Henri 229 rue St. Joseph, Québec, P.Q.
- Boutilier, Miss Helen R., 976—West 13th Ave., Vancouver
- Brady, Alexander, Economics Building, University of Toronto, Toronto
- Brault, Lucien, Archives nationales, Ottawa
- Brebner, J. Bartlet, Dept. of History, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
- Brisebois, Napoléon, 1931, rue Centre, Montréal
- Britnell, G. E., Dept. of Economics, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon
- Bronson, F. E., 725 Acacia Ave., Rockcliffe, Ont.
- Brough, T. A. 4679 West 15th Street, Vancouver, B.C.
- Brouillette, Benoit, 535 avenue Viger, Montréal
- Brown, George W., Baldwin House, University of Toronto, Toronto
- Brown, W. J., 1006 Wellington St., London, Ont.
- Browne, Col. Peter L., New Supreme Court Bldg., Ottawa
- Bruchési, Jean, Sous-Secrétaire de la Province, 273 ave. Laurier, Québec
- Burbey, Louis H., *The Detroit Times*, Detroit 26, Mich.
- Burford, W. T., Canadian Federation of Labour, 126A Sparks St., Ottawa
- Burnett, Miss Jean, 273 Bloor St., West, Toronto
- Burpee, L. J., 22 Rideau Terrace, Ottawa
- Burt, A. L., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
- Burwash, Miss Dorothy, 53 Daly Ave., Ottawa
- Callan, Richard, High School of Montreal, 3449 University St., Montreal
- Cameron, Dr. G. S., 318 Stewart St., Peterborough, Ont.
- Carrière, Joseph M., Box 1383 University Station, Charlottesville, Va.
- Carrothers, W. A., Public Utilities Comm., 510 Central Bldg., Victoria, B.C.
- Carter, Miss Gwendolen M., Smith College, Northampton, Mass., U.S.A.
- Caty, J. J., Ross Mines, Holtbyre, Ont.
- Chapais, Sir Thomas, Hôtel du Sénat, Ottawa
- Charters, David, 3815 Dundas St., Vancouver
- Chartier, Mgr., 11 rue Gordon Appt., 3, Sherbrooke
- Chernick, Jack, School of Business Administration, Minneapolis, Minn., U.S.A.
- Church, H. B., Barrister, Orangeville, Ont.
- Clark, S. Delbert, 273 Bloor St. W., Toronto
- Clay, Charles, 124 Wellington St., Ottawa
- Clerihue, V. R., 553 Granville St., Vancouver
- Cleverdon, Miss Catherine L., 33 Deshon Ave., Bronxville, N.Y.
- Coats, Dr. R. H., 273 Bloor St. W., Toronto
- Colby, C. W., 1240 Pine Ave. W., Montreal
- Coleman, E. H., Under-Secretary of State, Ottawa
- Colley, James, Room 408, 215 St. James St. W., Montreal
- Collins, Ross W. Dept. of History, University of Alberta, Edmonton
- Conklin, Mrs. W. D., Kingsville, Ont.
- Cook, Dr. John T., Box 606, Duncan, V.I., B.C.
- Cooke, A. C., University of British Columbia, Vancouver
- Cooper, H. S., Bank of Commerce Bldg., 6 James St. N., Hamilton
- Cooper, John Irwin, McGill University, Montreal
- Corey, Albert B., Sunset Rd., R.D.1, Castleton, N.Y.
- Coutts, G. B., 517 Seventh Ave. W., Calgary
- Coyne, J. B., 602 Great West Permanent Bldg., Winnipeg
- Crean, J. G., 18 Balmuto St., Toronto
- Creighton, Donald G., Baldwin House, University of Toronto, Toronto
- Crouse, Nellis M., 414 Cayuga Heights Road, Ithaca, N.Y.
- Cunningham & Co., 165 Sparks St., Ottawa
- Currie, A. W., University of British Columbia, Vancouver

(C) ANNUAL MEMBERS—*Continued*

- Dadson, Thomas, Wolfville, N.S.
 Darracott, W. H., Hon. Sec. C.I.I.A.,
 Travellers' Bldg., Winnipeg
 Dawson, R. MacG., 273 Bloor St. W.,
 Toronto
 Demers, M. le juge Philippe, Palais de
 Justice, Montréal
 Dent, C. R., 24 Rowanwood Ave.,
 Toronto
 Derome, Gaston, 8263 rue Drolet,
 Montréal 10
 D'Eschambault, M. l'abbé Antoine,
 Archevêché de St-Boniface, Man.
 Desranleau, S. Exc. Mgr P., Sherbrooke,
 P.Q.
 Desrosiers, M. l'abbé Adélar, Principal
 de l'École Normale, Montréal
 Deutsch, John J., Bank of Canada, Ottawa
 Dewey, A. Gordon, Brooklyn College,
 Brooklyn, N.Y.
 Dobbin, R. L., 295 Reid St., Peter-
 borough, Ont.
 Donnelly, R. P. Joseph P., Saint Louis
 University, Saint-Louis 3, Miss.
 Dorland, Arthur Garratt, University of
 Western Ontario, London, Ont.
 Duff, Louis Blake, Niagara Finance Com-
 pany Limited, Welland, Ont.
 Duffett, Walter E., Research Dept., Bank
 of Canada, Ottawa
 Duguid, Col. A. Fortescue, D.S.O.,
 Historical Section, Dept. of National
 Defence, 175 Nepean St., Ottawa
 Duhamel, Roger, 3189, rue Maplewood,
 Apt. 12, Montréal

 Eames, Frank, Box 180, Gananoque, Ont.
 Easterbrook, W. T., University of Mani-
 toba, Winnipeg
 Eastman, S. Mack, University of Sas-
 katchewan, Saskatoon
 Eastwood, Austin, West Bank, Baghdad,
 Iraq
 Edwards, W. A., 4384 Sherbrooke St. W.,
 Westmount, Montreal
 Egilson, Konrad, 39 West 22nd Ave.,
 Vancouver
 Eleanora, Sister Mary, St. Mary's Aca-
 demy, Crescentwood, Winnipeg
 Ellis, Ralph, University of Kansas,
 Lawrence, Kansas, U.S.A.
 Ells, Miss Margaret, Public Archives of
 Nova Scotia, Halifax
 England, Robert, Patricia Bay, R.R.1,
 Sydney, V.I., B.C.
 Ewart, T. S., 6 Lakeview Terrace, Ot-
 tawa

 Fabre-Surveyer, L'hon. juge E., 128,
 avenue Maplewood, Outremont, P.Q.

 Falardeau, J. C., 12 Haldimand St.,
 Quebec
 Faucher, Albert, Faculté des Sciences
 Sociales, Université Laval, Québec
 Fee, Norman, Public Archives of Canada,
 Ottawa
 Ferguson, G. V., *Winnipeg Free Press*,
 Winnipeg
 Ferland-Angers, Mme A., 251 Milton St.,
 Apt. 33, Montreal
 Ferns, H. S., United College, Winnipeg
 Field, H. H., 49 Chrysler Ave., Ottawa
 Fieldhouse, H. N., Dept. of History,
 McGill University, Montreal
 Firestone, O. J., Annex, Room 313, Daly
 Bldg., Ottawa
 Firth, Miss Frances, Dept. of History,
 University of New Brunswick, Fred-
 ericton
 Flenley, R., Baldwin House, University
 of Toronto, Toronto
 Foran, Mrs. T. P., 147 Wilbrod St.,
 Ottawa
 Forsey, A. E., 3 Lakeview Terrace,
 Ottawa
 Fortier, F., 1127 rue Parc Lafontaine,
 Montreal
 Foster, Miss Joan, Trafalgar School for
 Girls, Montreal
 Fraser, Clarence, R.R. no. 1, Lakeshore
 Highway, Clarkson, Ont.
 Frégault, Guy, 6701, Des Erables, Mon-
 tréal 36
 Frumhartz, Miss Esther, 503 Crawford
 St., Toronto

 Gamble, C. L., 212 Park Ave., Brantford,
 Ont.
 Gamsby, G. A., 381 Kingston Crescent,
 St. Vital, Man.
 Garland, Rev. M. A., University of West-
 ern Ontario, London, Ont.
 Garton, P. Douglas, 414 St. James St.,
 Montreal
 Gartz, Victor E., 1321 Sherbrooke St. W.,
 Montreal 25
 Gates, Mrs. Lillian F., Cornell University,
 Ithaca, N.Y.
 Gelley, T. F., Royal Military College,
 Kingston
 Gibb, Harley L., 2380 Cortland Ave.,
 Detroit, Mich.
 Gibson, Frederick W., 151 Union St. W.,
 Kingston, Ont.
 Gibson, James A., Dept. of External
 Affairs, Ottawa
 Gibson, J. D., Wartime Prices and Trade
 Board, Ottawa
 Glass, Ogden, Ashbury College, Rockcliffe,
 Ont.
 Glazebrook, G. deT., Baldwin House,
 University of Toronto, Toronto

(C) ANNUAL MEMBERS—*Continued*

- Graham, Major Gerald S., Historical Section, C.M.H.Q., 2 Cockspur St., London S.W.1, England
- Grant-Suttie, Lt.-Col. G. L. P., 110 St. George St., Toronto
- Gravel, C.-E., 3570, rue McTavish, Montréal
- Gray, G. L., Dept. of Education, Toronto
- Griffin, John William, 101 Douglas Drive, Toronto
- Grossman, Harry, 3682 Joseph St., Verdun, Montreal 19
- Groulx, M. l'abbé Lionel, 261, avenue Bloomfield, Outremont, P.Q.
- Guilday, Rev. Peter, 305 Mullen Memorial Library, Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.
- Hamilton, Louis, 2 Ladbroke Grove House, London, W. 11, England
- Harrison, W. E. C., Queen's University, Kingston, Ont.
- Harriss, C. Lowell, 555 Hadley Ave., Dayton 9, Ohio
- Hart, C. W. M., 273 Bloor St. W., Toronto
- Harvey, Hon. Chief Justice, 10226 Connaught Drive, Edmonton
- Harvey, Daniel C., Public Archives of Nova Scotia, Halifax
- Harwood, C. A., 3424 Simpson St., Montreal
- Havens, Edmund G., 616 Allison Drive, Ann Arbor, Mich., U.S.A.
- Hay, L. Hamilton, 1898 Dorchester St., Apt. 4, Montreal
- Heaton, Herbert, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
- Helleiner, K. F., 273 Bloor St. W., Toronto
- Helstrom, Theodore, Box 27, Gray, Sask.
- Hewson, C. G., West Hill High School, N.D.G., Montreal
- Holbrook, Dr. J. H., Medical Supt., Mountain Sanatorium, Hamilton
- Hudon, R. P. Léo 14 rue Dauphine Québec
- Hudson, A. B., Supreme Court, Ottawa
- Humphrey, John P., McGill University, Montreal
- Hyde, James H., Hotel Savoy-Plaza, New York 22, N.Y., U.S.A.
- Innis, Harold A., Economics Bldg., University of Toronto, Toronto
- Ireland, Willard E., Provincial Library and Archives, Victoria, B.C.
- James, F. Cyril, McGill University, Montreal
- Jefferys, Charles W., York Mills, Ont.
- Jennings, F. C., Librarian, Carnegie Library, Ottawa
- Johnston, J. G., Northern Ontario Bldg., Toronto 2, Ont.
- Johnston, Robert A. A., 112 Old Forest Hill Rd., Toronto
- Jones, R. E. F., 55 Admiral Rd., Toronto
- Jones, Robert L., Ph. D., Marietta College, Marietta, Ohio
- Josie, Capt. G. H. 261 Laurier Ave., East, Ottawa, Ont.
- Ketcheson, Fred G., 123 Glendale Ave., Toronto
- Kinchen, Oscar A., Texas Technological College, Lubbock, Texas
- King, G. B., 1050 Grosvenor Ave., Winnipeg
- King, Right Hon. W. L. Mackenzie, Ottawa
- Kinnear, Miss Muriel, Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa
- Kirkconnell, Watson, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ont.
- Laflamme, M. l'abbé Eug.-C., 16, rue Buade, Québec
- Laing, Dr. L. H., 1922 Day St., Ann Arbor, Mich.
- Laird, David H., K.C., 400 Victory Bldg., Winnipeg
- Lamb, W. Kaye, University of British Columbia, Vancouver
- Lancot, Gustave, Archives publiques du Canada, Ottawa
- Lancot, J. B. 631 Logan Street, St. Lambert P.Q.
- Landon, Fred, 846 Hellmuth Ave., London, Ont.
- Langdon, John, 4978 Ponsard Ave., Montreal 6
- LaViolette, F. E., McGill University, Montreal
- Lebel, Paul, 206 Brown Ave., Quebec
- Lederle, John W., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.
- Lefebvre, J. J., 1700 St-Denis, Montréal
- Leonard, Col. Ibbotson, 782 Wellington St., London, Ont.
- Levick, A. A., 7070 Sherbrooke St., West Montreal, P.Q.
- Little, W. J., Victoria University, Toronto
- Long, Mrs. Ernest E., 663 Dollard Blvd., Outremont
- Long, Morden H., University of Alberta, Edmonton
- Longley, R. S., Dept. of History, Acadia University, Wolfville, N.S.
- Longstaff, Major Frederick Victor, Seabank, 50 King George Terrace, Victoria
- Lower, A. R. M., United College, Winnipeg
- Lunn, Miss Jean, 458 Argyle Ave., Westmount, P.Q.

(C) ANNUAL MEMBERS—*Continued*

- McClung, Miss Helen, Ontario Archives,
Parliament Bldgs., Toronto
 McCulley, Joseph, Pickering College,
Newmarket, Ont.
 MacDermot, T. W. L., Dept. of External
Affairs, Ottawa
 MacDonald, Rev. J. A., St. Francis
Xavier University, Antigonish, N.S.
 Macdonald, Norman, Dept. of History,
McMaster University, Hamilton, Ont.
 MacDonell, Malcom, St. Francis Xavier
University, Antigonish, N.S.
 McDougall, M., Box 680, Benjamin
Franklin Station, Room 704-B Brad-
ford, Washington, D.C.
 MacFarlane, Major R. O., Dept. of
Education, Legislative Bldg., Winnipeg
 MacGibbon, D. A., Board of Grain Com-
missioners, Winnipeg
 McGibbon, D. W., Imperial Oil Ltd, 56
Church St., Toronto
 MacGregor, Alex, Confederation Life
Chambers, Toronto
 McHenry, Dean E., University of Cali-
fornia, Los Angeles 24, Calif.
 McIlwraith, T. F., Royal Ontario Mu-
seum, Toronto
 MacInnes, C. M., University of Bristol,
Bristol, England
 McInnis, Edgar, University of Toronto,
Toronto 5, Ont.
 McIvor, R. Craig, Waterloo College,
Waterloo, Ont.
 MacKay, R. A., Dept. of External Affairs,
Ottawa
 McKelvie, B. A., Lafortune Road, Cobble
Hill, V. I., B.C.
 Mackenzie, Donald R., 273 Powell Ave.,
Ottawa
 Mackenzie, N. A. M., University of
British Columbia, Vancouver
 Mackintosh, W. A., Queen's University,
Kingston
 MacLachlan, Robert D., P.O. Box 903,
Victoria, B.C.
 MacLaren, C. H., 14 Metcalfe St., Ottawa
 MacLean, Rt. Rev. Mgr. Donald A.,
Catholic University of America, Wash-
ington, D.C.
 McLennan, F. D., Drawer 908, Cornwall,
Ont.
 McLeod, J. A., Bank of Nova Scotia, 38
Melinda St., Toronto
 Macleod, J. E. A., 323 Fourth Ave. W.,
Calgary
 MacNaughton, Miss Katherine, P.O.
Box 123, Campbellton, N.B.
 MacVean, Wm. C., Bishop's University,
Lennoxville, P.Q.
 Machum, L. A., 303 Cameron St.,
Moncton, N.B.
 Magrath, C. A., 841 St. Charles St.,
Victoria
 Maheux, M. l'abbé Arthur, Archiviste,
Université Laval, Québec
 Major, T. G., Box 125, Port of Spain,
Trinidad, B.W.I.
 Malchelosse, Gérard, 5759, avenue Duro-
cher, Montréal
 Mallory, J. R., Brandon College, Brandon,
Man.
 Manny, Miss Louise, Newcastle, Mira-
michi, N.B.
 Marin, C. H., 675 Dorchester St. W.,
Montreal
 Marion, Séraphin, Archives nationales,
Ottawa
 Marsh, Donald B., Barnard College,
Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
 Martell, J. S., Public Archives of Nova
Scotia, Halifax
 Martin, Chester, Baldwin House, Uni-
versity of Toronto, Toronto
 Massey, Hon. Vincent, Batterwood
House, Port Hope, Ont.
 Masters, D. C., Bishop's University,
Lennoxville, P.Q.
 Matthews, Mrs. H. C., Navy St., Oak-
ville, Ont.
 Matthews, W. D., Dept. of External
Affairs, Ottawa
 Maurault, Mgr Olivier, 1000 est, boule-
vard Crémazie, Montréal
 Miller, Harry, 63 Merton Road, Hamp-
stead, P.Q.
 Milligan, Frank, A. 351 Waterloo Street,
Winnipeg
 Mills, G.H.S., 3521 Redpath Street, Mon-
treal
 Milne, C. V., 829 Royal Ave., Calgary,
Alta.
 Minville, E., Écoles des Hautes Études
Commerciales, 535, avenue Viger,
Montréal
 Monahan, F., 1844 Allison Road,
Vancouver
 Moore, Horace E., *The Whitehorse Star*,
Whitehorse, Y.T.
 Morgan, F. Cleveland, 308 Peel St.,
Montreal
 Morin, R. P. Conrad, 3113 avenue Gu-
yard, Montréal 26
 Morin, Victor, 57 ouest, rue Saint-
Jacques, Montréal
 Morton, W. L., University of Manitoba,
Winnipeg
 Motherwell, Miss Elizabeth L., 820
Rideau Rd. Calgary, Alta.
 Mott, Miss K. Stella, R.R. No. 3, Nor-
wich, Ont.
 Mullally, Dr. Emmet J., 2021 Union Ave.,
Montreal
 Munro, W. B., 268 Bellefontaine St.,
Pasadena, Cal.

(C) ANNUAL MEMBERS—*Continued*

- Munroe, David, Ormstown Academy, Ormstown, P.Q.
 Murphy, Miss Ethel, Box 145, Clarkson, Ont.
 Murray, Miss Jean E., University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon
 Murray, S. G., 273 Bloor St. W., Toronto
 Murray, W. H., 36 Churchill Ave., Westmount, P.Q.
 Myers, Leslie P., 89 Durie St., Toronto
- Nadeau, Dr. Gabriel, Rutland State Sanatorium, Rutland, Mass.
 New, Chester W., McMaster University, Hamilton, Ont.
 Newfield, I. G., 68 Don Crest Road, Toronto 6
 Norris, W. Glenn, Tompkins County Clerk, Court House, Ithaca, N.Y.
- Oleson, T. J., Dept. of History, University of British Columbia, Vancouver
 Ormsby, Miss Margaret A., Dept. of History, University of British Columbia, Vancouver
- Papineau, Mgr, Evêché de Joliette, Joliette, P.Q.
 Paquin, Peter Paul, 2351 Garneau Park, Ville-Emard, Montréal
 Parent, Raymond, L'archiviste-bibliothécaire, Ministère du Travail, Québec
 Parizeau, Gérard, 10 Avenue Glencoe, Outremont
 Park, Lt. J. D., 10927 88th Ave., Edmonton
 Peardon, Thos. P., Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
 Pettit, Sydney, 1137 Hilda St., Victoria, B.C.
 Phillips, Lester H., Dept. of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich., U.S.A.
 Pickersgill, J. W., Dept. of External Affairs, Ottawa
 Pierce, Lorne, The Ryerson Press, Toronto
 Potvin, M. l'Abbé Pascal, Archives, Université Laval, Québec
 Pouliot, R. P. Adrien, 14 rue Dauphine, Québec
 Pouliot, R.P. Léon, 1855 est, rue Rachel, Montréal
 Preston, Anthony W., Bishop's University, Lennoxville, P.Q.
 Preston, R. A., Baldwin House, University of Toronto, Toronto
 Prince, A. E., Queen's University, Kingston
 Pritchett, John Perry, Queen's College, College of the City of New York, New York, U.S.A.
- Prodrick, Capt. R. G., 241 Park Road, Rockcliffe, Ottawa
- Ransom, Mrs. C. M., 6201 3rd Avenue, Apt. 7, Rosemount, Montreal
 Ray, Eldon P., 197 Murray Street, Peterborough, Ont.
 Reaman, G. E., Dept. of English, Ontario Agricultural College, Guelph
 Reid, Miss Allana, 152 Hillcrest Ave., Montreal West, P.Q.
 Reid, Escott, M., Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C.
 Reid, W. S., 4330 Delorimier Ave., Apt. 3, Montreal, P.Q.
 Reilly, J. C., 414 Ottawa Electric Bldg., Ottawa
 Reynolds, C. Murray, Van Houten Block, 16 Commercial St., Nanaimo, B.C.
 Richardson, A. J. H., Bishop's University, Lennoxville
 Richardson, F/L G. W., R.C.A.F., Overseas
 Riddell, R. G., Dept. of External Affairs, Ottawa
 Rife, C. W., Hamline University, St. Paul, Minn.
 Rimouski, S. Exc. Mgr l'évêque de, Rimouski, P.Q.
 Robbins, Dr. J. E., 166 Marlborough Ave., Ottawa
 Roberts, Miss D. M., 3230 Westmount Blvd., Westmount, P.Q.
 Robinson, Percy J., Box 102, Aurora, Ont.
 Roe, Frank Gilbert, 11919-105th St., Edmonton
 Rolland, Herman J., 4318 Earnscliffe Ave., Montreal
 Rosenberg, L., 4806 Park Avenue, Montreal
 Ross, Miss Aileen D., 273 Bloor St. W., Toronto
 Ross, Miss Dorothy, 367 Metcalfe Ave., Westmount
 Ross, John T., 110 St. Peter St., Quebec
 Rothney, Gordon O., Sir George Williams College, Montreal
 Roy, Antoine, rue Gomin, Québec
 Roy, Ferdinand, Palais de Justice, Québec
 Roy, Pierre-Georges, 44, rue Wolfe, Lévis, P.Q.
 Rutherford, W. D., 298 Wellington Street, Brantford, Ont.
- Sage, Lt. Donald, Dept. of National Defence, 175 Nepean St., Ottawa
 Sage, W. N., University of British Columbia, Vancouver
 Samuel, Dr. Sigmund, 104 Forest Hill Rd., Toronto

(C) ANNUAL MEMBERS—*Continued*

- Sanderson, Charles R., Chief Librarian,
Toronto Public Library, Toronto
- Sanderson, J. F., Canadian Bankers'
Association, 302 Bay St., Toronto
- Sandwell, B. K., *Saturday Night*, Toronto
- Saunders, Miss Audrey M., 23 Woodlawn
Ave. W., Toronto
- Saunders, Richard M., Baldwin House,
University of Toronto, Toronto
- Saunders, Robert, 5 Winter St., St. Paul,
Minn., U.S.A.
- Saunders, S. A., 143 Spadina Road,
Toronto
- Savelle, Max, Stanford University, Cal.
- Schuyler, R. L., Columbia University,
New York, N.Y.
- Scott, C. F., 510 McLaren St., Ottawa,
Ont.
- Scott, F. R., McGill University, Montreal
- Scott, S. Morley, Dept. of External
Affairs, Ottawa
- Shiels, Archie W., Pacific American
Fisheries, South Bellingham, Wash.
- Sifton, Victor, *Winnipeg Free Press*,
Winnipeg
- Simpson, B. Napier (Jr), 18 Pinewood
Avenue, York Mills, Ont.
- Simpson, Geo. W., University of Saskat-
chewan, Saskatoon
- Sissons, C. B., Victoria College, Toronto
- Sister John Elizabeth, Mount St. Vincent
College, Halifax, N.S.
- Sjostedt, Mrs. Jessie Winslow, 237
Chapel St., Ottawa
- Skilling, H. G., Dept. of Political Science,
University of Wisconsin, Madison,
Wisc., U.S.A.
- Slater, E. H., Bank of Montreal Cham-
bers, Market Square North, London,
Ont.
- Smith, A. J. M., 314 Metcalfe Ave.,
Westmount, Montreal
- Smith, G. M., Dept. of History, Uni-
versity of Alberta, Edmonton
- Smith, Goldwin, Dept. of History, State
University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa,
U.S.A.
- Smith, H. Greville, Canadian Indus-
tries Ltd., Box 1260, Montreal
- Smith, Joe Patterson, Illinois College,
Jacksonville, Ill.
- Somerville, Mrs. J. M., Kenniston Apts.,
Ottawa
- Soward, F. H., Dept. of External Affairs,
Ottawa
- Spooner, J. W., 15 Birch St. S., Timmins,
Ont.
- Spragge, G. W., 84 Gormley Ave.,
Toronto
- Spry, Mrs. Graham, 85 John St., Ottawa
- Stacey, Col. C. P., Director of Historical
Section, Dept. of National Defence,
(Army) Ottawa
- Stanley, Lt-Col. G. F. G., Historical Sec-
tion, Dept. of National Defence,
(Army) Ottawa
- Steadman, T. Park, Sandwich Collegiate
Inst., Windsor, Ont.
- Stepler, Miss Dorothy, Strathroy, Ont.
- Stewart, Kenneth, 529 Osborne Ave.,
Verdun, P.Q.
- Stitt, James H., 361 Waverley St.,
Ottawa, Ont.
- Strange, H. G. L., c/o Searle Grain Co.,
Winnipeg
- St. Veronica, Sister, Mount Saint Ber-
nard College, Antigonish, N.S.
- Swannell, Frank, 564 Dallas Rd., Victoria
- Sweeney, John T. J., Box 432, Charlotte-
town, P.E.I.
- Talman, James J., University of Western
Ontario, London, Ont.
- Tanguay, Dr. Rodolphe, 19 Durham St.,
Sudbury, Ont.
- Tapscott, C. S., Court House, Brantford
- Tarr, E. J., Monarch Life Assurance Co.,
Winnipeg
- Taschereau, L'hon. L.-A., 187 Grande
Allée, Québec
- Taylor, Malcolm G., Dept. of Political
Science, Univ. of California, Berkeley,
Cal.
- Thomas, Lewis H., 324—20th St. East,
Saskatoon
- Thompson, E. B., 9 Ridout St., To-
ronto, Ont.
- Thomson, G. C., Barrister-at-law, Swift
Current, Sask.
- Tombs, Guy, 1111 Beaver Hall Hill,
Montreal
- Tombs, L. C., 503 Mount Pleasant Ave.,
Westmount, P.Q.
- Tomlinson, C. P., 3940 Côte des Neiges
Rd., Montreal
- Topping, C. W., University of British
Columbia, Vancouver, B.C.
- Tory, Dr. H. M., 327 Buena Vista Road,
Rockcliffe Park, Ottawa
- Tremblay, Maurice, Edifice de la Banque
Royale, 360 ouest, rue St-Jacques,
Montréal
- Trotter, Reginald G., Queen's University,
Kingston
- Tucker, Gilbert Norman, 100 Redpath St.,
Ottawa
- Tucker, Dean H., Mount Allison Univer-
sity, Sackville, N.B.
- Tweed, T. W., 9 Burlington Cres.,
Toronto 10
- Tyrrell, J. B., 14 Walmer Rd., Toronto

(C) ANNUAL MEMBERS—*Continued*

- Underhill, Frank H., Baldwin House,
University of Toronto, Toronto
- Van Alstyne, Richard W., Chico State
College, Chico, Calif., U.S.A.
- Vaughan, Miss Joan, Dept. of History,
University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, N.B.
- Vaughan, Mrs. O. D., 135 St. Germain
Ave., Toronto
- Viaud, Miss Viviane, 4691 West 10th
Ave., Vancouver
- Wade, Hugh Mason, Cornish, New
Hampshire, U.S.A.
- Waines, W. J., University of Manitoba,
Winnipeg
- Walter, T. Dayman, 2442 Gladstone Ave.,
Windsor, Ont.
- Ward, Mrs. S. N., Agincourt, Ont.
- Watson, J. W. McMaster University,
Hamilton, Ont.
- Way, Ronald L., 165 Division St.,
Kingston
- Webster, Dr. J. C., Shediac, N.B.
- Weir, Miss M. F., Sarnia Collegiate In-
stitute and Technical School, Sarnia,
Ont.
- Weir, S. E., K.C., Bank of Commerce
Bldg., Dundas and Richmond Sts.,
London, Ont.
- Whitelaw, W. M., University of Saskat-
chewan, Saskatoon
- Whitton, Miss Charlotte, 236 C Rideau
Terrace, Ottawa, Ont.
- Wilk, Pfc Joseph A., A.A.F., W.T.T.C.,
1108-15th St., Denver 2, Col.
- Williams, E. K., Huron and Erie Bldg.,
Winnipeg
- Willis, John, Osgoode Hall Law School,
Toronto
- Wills, Harold A., c/o Northland Post,
Cochrane, Ont.
- Wilson, George E., Dalhousie University,
Halifax
- Winkler, H. W., Morden, Man.
- Winslow, Edward Pelham, Chateau Apts.,
C 41, 1321 Sherbrooke St. W., Montreal
- Winter, Lt. Carl G., 8079 Mountain Blvd.,
Oakland 3, Cal.
- Wittke, Carl F., Oberlin College, Oberlin,
Ohio
- Wood, Col. Wm., 59 Grande Allée,
Quebec
- Woodley, E. C., Dept. of Education,
Parliament Bldgs., Quebec
- Woodyatt, James B., 355 St. James St.
W., Montreal
- Wright, Mrs. E. C., Box 559, Wolfville,
N.S.
- Wrong, G. M., 73 Walmer Rd., Toronto
- Wrong, H. H., Dept. of External Affairs,
Ottawa
- Younge, Miss Eva, 3600 University St.,
Montreal

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